【作者】 宋妍；

【导师】 朱宪辰；

【作者基本信息】 南京理工大学 ， 系统工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 共享资源在人类的经济社会中普遍存在,但是其使用的非竞争性和收益的非排他性特征决定了市场和政府两种制度安排均不能解决现实生活中复杂的共享资源有效供给,故分析个体间合作捐赠的第三种制度安排是否发生显得尤为必要,且其中一关键理论问题即异质性对共享资源捐赠水平的影响机理。与现实生活中广泛存在的实例相比,目前的绝大部分理论仍无法解释为何共享资源捐赠水平在某些群体中较高而在其他群体中较低或根本就是零供给,有关异质性影响的具体表现和方向也同时存在着或正向或负向或“U型曲线”关系的观点异议。由此引出:理论研究如何刻画并解释看似矛盾的个体异质性及其对共享资源捐赠水平的影响机理?围绕上述问题,本文从基于个体效用的微观经济学理论思路出发,以一维最主要的偏好异质性为视角来探讨共享资源的捐赠水平问题。结合使用博弈论等现代经济学分析工具,全文主要进行了以下四个方面的研究工作:第一,将个体“选择”引入“偏好-效用”的传统经济理论,从个体决策角度对异质性复杂机制进行识别、刻画与表征。新古典方法通常否认异质性,其理论模型往往以经济主体的同质性或者代表性行为主体为特征,个体选择因而毫无意义。本文强调个体选择的重要性,在区分个体决策知识差异的基础上,界定了一维重要的偏好异质性。第二,系统研究一般函数形式及不同决策场景下偏好异质性影响机理的N人博弈模型。本文采用以参数表示偏好的研究方法,首先分别讨论了纯粹偏好和有条件偏好两种情况下个体异质性的共享资源捐赠水平,得到了关于个体偏好异质性影响机理的一般性结论:在不考虑个体财富禀赋差异的情况下,偏好异质性与共享资源捐赠水平负相关;而有条件的偏好差异程度与共享资源捐赠水平之间的关系难以确定。然后,针对一般函数形式概念性结论的“难以确定”,本文依个体决策机制过程中个体决策要点可能发生的变化,将共享资源捐赠分为单期、跨期以及互惠合作三种情况分别构建解析模型,求解并得到了不同场景下单维异质性作用的确定结论:如果共享资源捐赠水平或个体投入努力无法突破固定费用的最低限制,则非合作均衡状态与个体间偏好差异程度无关;如果共享资源捐赠水平或个体投入努力足以达到固定费用的最低限制,则既有可能搭便车,也有可能有部分人投入努力承担共享资源供给,且有人搭便车的非合作共享资源捐赠水平是投入努力个体偏好程度的线性增函数;如果共享资源捐赠水平或个体投入努力达到了固定费用的最低限制且成功实现了集体行动的合作均衡解,则个体偏好异质性程度越小,集体行动取得的收益越大;反之,个体偏好异质性程度越大,共享资源捐赠的集体行动越难以发生。第三,在上述讨论基础上,本文对异质性“U型曲线”说法尝试给出一种替代性的分析思路。本文从共享资源合作捐赠异质性影响机理两种截然“相反”的观点出发,引出对异质性“U型曲线”关系的讨论。通过对个体决策知识状态的逻辑划分与不同决策场景下个体选择的解析模型考察,得出主要结论:一般情况下,单维异质性与共享资源捐赠水平间仍将基本符合单调关系,“U型曲线”只是一种特例,两种“相反”观点只是因分析目的不同、研究对象各异而得到的多样性结果。第四,以住宅共享资源为例的实证研究。本文选取一类典型的住宅共享资源——城市社区住宅电梯——的更新维护问题作为实证研究的考察对象,在解析模型分析的基础上进行指标设定、调查表设计与数据采集,考察样本对象的截面状态,对本文研究结论通过调查数据进行参数估计和显著性检验。这一实证工作不但避免了传统的有关个体异质性与共享资源捐赠的实证研究由于缺乏一个具有一般性的、符合现实的统一理论基础而导致要么理论与实证相脱节,要么实证研究只能是基于个案的描述性分析,而且也对本文的理论模型推导提供了非常有力的证据。更多还原

【Abstract】 Commons is universal in human society. However, the characteristics of the commons that non-excluadability and non-rivalness determine two types of institutional arrangements (market and government) both can’t solve the effective supply of commons in complex real life. Hence, it’s particularly necessary to analyze the third institutional arrangements: voluntary supply of commons. And the most critical theoretical issues are the commons contribution mechanisms of heterogeneity. There are many cases of success or failure commons contribution, but we have not an effective theory to explain, and the viewpoints on heterogeneity effects are positive effect or negative effect or U-shaped relationship in existence at the same time. Then we present the academic problem on capturing and explaining individual heterogeneity seemingly contradictory and its impact on the level of commons contribution.Around these issues, the start port of this article is the microeconomic theoretical ideas based on the individual utility, and the perspective is the most important one-dimensional preference heterogeneity. Combined use of game theory and other analytical tools of modern economics, the main works are presented in four aspects below.Firstly, the individual selection was introduced into the "preference-utility" traditional economic theory, and then the identification and characterization of the heterogeneity complex mechanism were researched from the perspective of individual decision-making.Neo-classical methods are usually denied heterogeneity, and its theoretical model is often the main economic homogeneity or characterized by the representation of actors, individual selection and therefore meaningless. Based on the distinction differences of individual decision-making knowledge, we emphasize the importance of individual selection and define the essential one-dimensional preference heterogeneity.Secondly, the article systemically researched the preference heterogeneity mechanism of N-person game model under the general function form and different decision-making scenarios.Adopting the research method of preference parameters, we first discussed separately commons contribution level based on individual preferences heterogeneity under purely preferences and conditional preferences two cases, and received the general conclusions of the individual preferences heterogeneity mechanism: without taking account of the individual wealth endowment differences, the relationship between preferences heterogeneity and commons contribution level is negative; and that the relationship between conditional preferences differences and commons contribution level is difficult to determine. Then in order to address the conceptual conclusions, we conceived three analytical models which were a single period, over-period as well as reciprocal cooperation respectively in accordance with the possible changes of individual decision-making points, solved and obtained the definitive conclusions about the one-dimensional heterogeneity effects under different scenarios: if the commons contribution level or individual donations can’t exceed the minimum limit of fixed costs, then the non-cooperation equilibrium has nothing to do with the inter-individual preferences differences; if exceeded, then both free-riding and some people assume contribution are possible, furthermore, there is a linear increasing function relationship between the non-cooperation commons contribution level of someone free-riding and the participators’ preferences; if exceeded and achieved the cooperation equilibrium, then the smaller the individual preference heterogeneity, the larger the collective action gains, whereas the larger the individual preference heterogeneity, the more difficult the collective action happen.Thirdly, the article tried to give an alternative analytical idea about the heterogeneous "U-shaped" relationship at the basis of the above discussion.Arguing from the repugnance of statements about heterogeneity and commons cooperative contribution, we dealt with the heterogeneous U-shaped relationship. By adopting the logic partition of individual decision knowledge state and the analytic model of individual decision under different decision scenery, the research result shows that in the base case, the relationship between the single dimensional heterogeneity and the output level does correspond primarily with monotone, the "U-shaped" just a sort of special case. The repugnance of statements is multifarious results for the simple reason that different analytical purposes and different subjects investigated.Fourthly, residential commons as an empirical example was investigated.Selecting update maintenance problems about a class of typical residential commons (for instance, urban community residential elevators) as an inspection object of the empirical research, we set indicators, designed questionnaire and collected dates at the basis of the analytical models. Through inspection of the cross-section sample of the target state, we tested the research conclusions. This empirical work not only avoids the traditional limits that either theoretical and empirical phase out of touch or empirical research can only be based on descriptive analysis of cases because of lacking of a general realistic consistent theoretical basis, but also on the theoretical model derived in the article provides a very strong evidence.更多还原