【作者】 陈曦；

【导师】 潘石；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 制度经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 金融是国家经济的命脉,而金融监管是防范和化解金融风险,保障金融系统安全、稳健、高效运行的必要制度。今天的金融安全已经上升到了国家安全的战略高度,金融监管无疑是保障金融安全最重要的制度安排。金融监管领域中的寻租活动极大地影响监管效率的发挥和有效监管的实现。尽管经过多年改革,但我国金融监管领域的寻租问题并未得到根本解决,而且有愈演愈烈之势。如今,国外金融监管寻租已经酿成严重的金融危机、经济危机、监管危机,我国金融监管寻租也让国内金融市场危机四伏。前车之鉴,后事之师。此次金融危机给我国金融监管体系以诸多关键启示,危机中后期的国际金融监管改革进程和方向,也为我国完善金融监管提供了一定的经验借鉴。研究金融监管寻租问题,提出治理金融监管寻租具体的制度改革与创新路径,成为研究者的当务之急。建议相关部门建立侧重惩罚的激励机制,除官方监管机构外,引入多元的金融监管主体,提高监管透明度,完善行政赔偿与责任追究制度,促进金融机构严格自律弱化他律。此外我们应该注意的是,改变监管框架只是完善金融监管的部分内容,而强化监管者的执行力建设亦是题中应有之意:我们应该比以往更加注重监管政策的执行力建设,因为即便是趋近于完美的制度如果没有得到良好执行,也只是空谈。更多还原

【Abstract】 Finance is very important to the economy of our country. Financial supervision is a vital tool to provide and secure financial risks. Today financial safety has arrived at national security strategy altitude; financial supervision is the most important system to ensure the financial market in stable. Rent-seeking is a series of non-productive activities. It could affect people’s deeds and income. Rent-seeking in financial supervision area keeps supervision far from efficiency and soundness. To study the matter of rent-seeking in financial supervision has both theoretical and practical significance.First, this paper starts with financial supervision theory. After summing up the development and foundation of financial supervision theory, the meaning of rent-seeking in financial supervision established on the rent-seeking theory and financial supervision theory is well defined. Therefore, after analyzing rent and rent-setup, this paper discusses general principle to control rent-seeking from mental cost, rent-seeking scope, economic cost, conditions and monitoring.Then, the history is reviewed in which the financial supervision, rent-seeking and society background changed in the past years. We pay much attention on the principle of rent-seeking and mechanism rent-setting. We take multiple angles of views to analyze the reason why rent-seeking could be made. We find seven main reasons: supervisor capture, market disturbing, interest group, excess profit margin, random supervision, regulation failure, system unbalance. We consider that the origin of rent-seeking is state’s property right unclear and dual economy system. We firstly point out that recessive deposit insurance is a main base of financial supervision rents in china. In the mean time, information asymmetry also creates the rents. We examined the effect of rents affect society economic activity, and then first suggest that the impact of rent to financial supervision could be divided into negative and neutral. We also disprove some people’s argument that rent is benefit to society. For understanding the supervisors’behavior of rent-seeking well, we establish supervisor rent-seeking utility model on the base rent theory study. The model chooses 5 variables as parameters to study the real process in which the supervisors seek rents. The conclusion is as follow: rent amount, existing rent utility, expectant rent utility margin, acceptable risk endurance, restriction of institutions and conditions had different impact to supervisor’s decision-making. In this part, we firstly point out: rent threshold, rent level, rent competition, rent hollow, rent hollow short-time phenomena. We expect to get some accomplishment in rent-seeking theory.This paper differentiates whether an institution promote rent-seeking or profit-seeking. Further, we take next step to analyze flaws of the institution which restrains rent-seeking. For the serious situation that information asymmetry among government, supervisor and financial institutions, the best policy of each part conflicts unavoidably if he wants to gain the maximal utility. Game theory tells us attitude and punishment form government decide supervisor’s choice. The exclusive Nash Equilibrium of competition policy game model explains the fact that: if there is no good supervision, financial institution will break the law. The game has a perfect bayesian Nash equilibrium namely supervisor seeks rents with bad institutions.When we analyze the matter of correlative supervision and monitoring, we point out the common governmental nature is a interest bond between financial supervisor and state-owned financial institution. Official standard and non-official supervisor weakness are regarded as the main reason leading to financial market monopoly. As we know monopoly makes supervision target alienation, departmental influence, high cost, bad outcome, so the paper suggest non-official supervisors could use marker means to cure rent-seeking. After learning from FSA and FDIC’s experience, the coming part also points out the shortcoming of them.As to the policy commence part, this paper puts forward several feasible innovation methods: building up incentive mechanism emphasizing particularly on punishment, multiple financial supervisors form different sectors, better supervising transparency, sound administrative compensation and responsibility investigation, promote financial institution strengthen autonomy instead of heteronomy. At the end of this paper, combining inspiration from the subprime mortgage disaster with post-disaster international financial supervision reformation, pointing out that supervision frame is only a part of innovation; we should pay more attention to the enforcement of good policy. We should know perfect policy adds bad execution means nothing. Innovations:1. This paper builds up a whole financial supervision rent-seeking system. Financial supervision rent-seeking is a comparatively new area in institutional economics study. I start my work on institutional economics theory and practice foundation. I hope my effort could be helpful to understand the truth and nature of rent-seeking activities.2. In this paper I use several new analyzing methods to study the whole process of financial supervision rent-seeking.3. We firstly point out that recessive deposit insurance is a main base of financial supervision rents in china.4. We examined the effect of rents affect society economic activity, and then first suggest that the impact of rent to financial supervision could be divided into negative and neutral. We also disprove some peoples’argument that rent is benefit to society.5. For understanding the supervisors’behavior of rent-seeking well, we establish supervisor rent-seeking utility model on the base rent theory study. The model chooses 5 variables as parameters to study the real process in which the supervisors seek rents. The conclusion is as follow: rent amount, existing rent utility, expectant rent utility margin, acceptable risk endurance, restriction of institutions and conditions had different impact to supervisor’s decision-making. In this part, we firstly point out: rent threshold, rent level, rent competition, rent hollow, rent hollow short-time phenomena. We expect to get some accomplishment in rent-seeking theory.6. This paper firstly defines financial supervision rent-seeking and points out main bodies could be divided into independent rent-seeker, associated rent-seeker and participants. The intermediary is firstly use in rent-seeking study in this paper.更多还原