【作者】 洪联英；

【导师】 罗能生；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 国际贸易学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 当前,贸易理论研究已经从宏观领域深入到微观领域,从流通领域转向生产领域,探讨微观企业行为对贸易发展的影响意义深远。本文针对全球生产网络下南北贸易发展的非均衡现象,从全球生产组织视角,发展并运用一个国际生产与贸易中的企业权力理论及其分析框架,来解释当前发展中国家面临着贸易非均衡发展的不利态势,并为中国贸易发展中的现实困境问题提供新的解释和政策启示。论文首先提出一个国际生产与贸易中的企业权力理论及其分析框架。按照全球生产网络下企业的本质及其组织形式,本文将企业权力界定为一个企业或企业集团凭借和利用组织内特定的资源和能力而形成的对其他主体的一种控制能力(力量)或特殊的影响力。然后,从无形资产、物质资产和组织资源三个层面构建企业权力体系,即通过融合Barney(1991)的基于资源的企业能力理论和Gereffi(1999)全球价值链理论,提出一个“链接权”(指因专业化分工和企业能力高低而体现在价值链条中所拥有的节点位势权力)理论,并与GHM产权理论(Grossman & Hart,1986;Hart & Moore,1990)及Rajan & Zingales(1998)的进入权理论相结合,将企业权力的具体形式依次称之为链接权、所有权、进入权;相应的权力机制依次为:能力控制、所有权或股权控制、组织机制控制。再后,将企业权力现象纳入到“权力机制—权力结构”的分析框架中考察,并尝试采用一种新的分析范式,即将国际生产与贸易活动视为一种市场导向下的企业权力约束行为,来寻求企业权力约束与市场机制的统一。论文进一步运用这一理论及其分析框架,通过构建一组企业权力约束下的国际生产与贸易模型群,从机制层面分层论证企业权力行为影响贸易非均衡发展的内在机理。研究表明:①最终产品商对加工企业的所有权安排,是影响南北贸易结构失衡的微观组织根源。最终产品商利用企业所有权安排以及由此产生的对贸易组织结构的选择与控制,影响了南北贸易模式的不对称变化,一定条件下会导致北方国的贸易结构演变为资本和劳动都是净进口的国家,由此从新的视角解释了美中贸易逆差问题。②最终产品商对供应商的进入权组织控制,是影响各国贸易比较优势非均衡发展的重要机制。最终产品商通过限制进入、数量调整来激发供应商做出事前定制投资、事前转移投资和事后最优专用性投资。最终产品商行使这种企业权力行为过程中,事实上对供应商及其所在国家的贸易比较优势造成了不利影响,由此为我国贸易比较优势存在的困境问题提供了新的启示。③企业链接权的能力控制是影响各国贸易增长模式分化的组织根源。在不完全契约条件下,高端企业凭借其能力控制,不仅拥有对生产过程的分解权,而且也被赋予较高的讨价还价权力和相应抽取下级供应商租金分享的权力。由此强化的投入品要素报酬不均等条件,直接激励各国贸易增长模式产生分化。这为我国贸易增长方式的转变问题提供了新的理路。最后,论文基于中、韩、美三国的经验分析,从结构层面揭示企业权力的层次结构是影响各国垂直专业化贸易非均衡发展的微观组织基础。论文指出:①按照企业权力大小和地理空间关系,全球生产与贸易中的企业权力体系可以划分为全球层次、跨国层次和国家层次等三个层级。②中、韩、美三国的垂直分离价值指数、份额指数和变化趋势均表明,三国的垂直专业化贸易呈现出分层发展趋势,并与其企业权力层次结构相对应。③中国垂直专业化低阶段成长已经完成,企业权力的低层次结构制约了我国产业升级、技术进步和外贸发展,中国不仅需要提升本国在全球生产网络中企业权力的层次,而且还需要选择并调整相应的经贸发展战略。本文的政策含义:一是要大力扶持和发展有为企业,二是要采取以提升企业权力结构层次为基准的“新开放型”经贸发展战略。由此,论文围绕如何实现这些新战略,从投、引资政策、贸易政策、产业政策等方面提出了相应的政策调整思路。更多还原

【Abstract】 Researches on trade are shifting from macro field to micro study and from marketing to manufacturing. It is of far-reaching significance to study the effects of firm behavior on trade development. This dissertation, aiming at the disequilibrium of north-south trade development in global production network, tends to develop the theory of firm power and its analysis framework of international production and trade from the perspective of global production organizations, which the author applies to account for the disadvantages of developing countries in imbalanced trade development and offer new explanations for and policy enlightenments to the problems in China’s trade development.Firstly, this dissertation develops the theory and analytic framework of firm power of international production and trade. Based on the nature and organizational form of firms in global production network, this dissertation defines firm power as control power or special influence which an enterprise or enterprise group exerts on others by means of its special resources and capability of system. The author holds that the system of firm powers should be built from material assets, organization mechanism, and intangible assets. Based on Barney’s(1991) theory of resource-based firm capability and Gereffi’s (1999) theory of global value chain, the concept of chain link power is put forward, which is defined as position power embodied in value chains according to specialization and capability difference. Combined with GHM theory(Grossman and Hart,1986;Hart and Moore,1990) and Rajan & Zingales’s(1998) access theory, firm power is in turn specified as chain link power, property ownership and access power, and the respective mechanisms are capability control, ownership control, and organization control. This dissertation studies the phenomenon of firm power within a unified framework of“power mechanism-power structure”, and attempts to employ a new analytic paradigm which takes the activities of global production and trade as a market-orientated restraint behavior of firm power, to pursue an integration of power restraints and market mechanism.Then, this dissertation applies this theory and analytic framework to demonstrate the internal principles of firm power effects on disequilibrium of trade development from the perspective of power mechanism through building up a series of models of international production and trade under firm power restraints. The results go as follows:①The final good producer’s ownership arrangement to processing firms is the root of microeconomic organization exerting effects on the imbalance of North-South trade structure. The asymmetric changes of trade mode are influenced by the final good producer’s ownership arrangement, choice and control of trade organization structure. Under certain conditions, a northern country can be a net importer of both capital and labor. Therefore, the question of United States-China Trade deficit can be reasonably answered from a new perspective.②The final good producer’s organization control of access power is one of important mechanism to influence the disequilibrium development of country’s comparative advantage. By restricting access and adjusting numbers, the final good producer can incentive the supplier to provide more customized investment, transfer investment and optimal specialization investment. In fact, this process results in a negative influence over trade comparative advantages of suppliers and their countries. So this study provides new enlightenments to the paradox question of comparative advantages of China’s foreign trade.③The capability control of chain link power is the organization root of differentiation in trade growth pattern. Under incomplete contract, the capability control of the high chain firm enjoys power to decompose production process and high bargain and the corresponding power to extract rent share of subordinate supplier. The growing inequality of input factor reward strengthened directly incentives the differentiation of trade growth pattern. This study provides a new theoretical approach to the problem of China’s trade growth pattern transition.Finally, this dissertation, based on an empirical analysis of China, Korean and the US, reveals that the hierarchy structure of firm power is the foundation of micro organization that influences the disequilibrium development of vertical specialization trade from the power structure perspective, and points out:①the system of firm power in global production and trade may be divided into three levels: the global level, the transnational level and the national level according to the size of firm power and geography spatial relations;②the value index, the share index and the change tendency of vertical specialization in China, Korean, and the US indicate that their vertical specialization trade comes to be a trend of division development, and corresponds with their hierarchy structure of firm power;③the low growth stage of Chinese vertical specialization has been completed. The low hierarchy structure of firm power restricts China’s industrial upgrading, technology advancement and trade development. It is necessary for China to promote its firm power level in global production network, choose and correspondingly adjust strategies for its economic and trade development. Therefore, the policy implications of this dissertation are as follows:①China should endeavor to provide support to the development of promising enterprises;②new open-type strategies for China’s economic and trade development should be adopted to enhance the level of firm power structure. Other relative policy suggestions on how to realize these new strategies are put forward.更多还原