【作者】 李哲；

【导师】 何佳；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 1978年的十一届三中全会,揭开了中国改革开放的序幕,我国由此开始了从计划经济向市场经济转轨的历史进程。在这场伟大的改革进程中,国有企业的改制重组是一个关键的组成部分。对于中小型国有企业,我国各级政府采取了逐步退出、逐步民营化的策略;而对一些大型国有企业,则采取了私有化发行(share issue privatization,SIP),即改制上市的改革方式。然而,改制上市并没有达到预期的效果,研究表明,中国的私有化发行只取得了有限的成功、国有企业的发行效率低下;而改制不彻底是造成国有企业发行效率低下的重要原因。初次改制的不彻底决定了国有上市公司在上市后需要通过资本市场的运作,尤其是并购重组,作进一步的改革。自1993年的“宝延事件”以来,我国的企业并购逐渐兴起并在1997年之后如火如荼地发展起来。但是,作为新兴市场和经济转轨国家,我国的企业并购无论是在并购动因和机制上,还是在政府参与、干预程度上都表现出与西方发达资本市场不同的特征。在我国资本市场上,公司并购的显著特点是“关联性”和“同属性”并购(或称“区域性”并购)盛行。“关联性”并购是指发生并购的双方存在关联关系,“同属性”并购是指并购双方同属一个地方政府管辖。为什么我国资本市场上的并购会表现出这样的特征?我国上市公司并购的制度根源何在?并购的本质和目的是什么?为了透彻地回答上述问题,必须深刻了解我国的制度背景。制度背景不同,理论的解释能力必然存在差异。因此,笔者认为,前人常用的将西方成熟资本市场的并购理论直接用于国内并购研究的做法存在不足;本文试图从“二次改革”的视角来考察我国国有上市公司的并购重组。本文的主要内容和研究成果如下:1.回顾了中外企业并购理论和实践的发展,总结了制度变迁和渐进性改革的相关理论,剖析了我国国企改革进程的“路径依赖”特征和地方政府行为的制度根源,并以此为理论基础展开后文的实证研究。2.“改制上市”是我国国有上市公司渐进性改革的起点,也是并购重组的现实基础。本文将改制上市模式分为整体上市和分拆上市,实证检验了改制上市模式与发行效率的关系。结果表明:“改制上市”并没有取得预期的成功、我国国有企业的发行效率低下;因此,通过并购重组以提高经营绩效、解决历史遗留问题,就成为国有上市公司“二次改革”(或“二次改制”)的必由之路。3.控股权转让是典型的以上市公司为目标方的并购行为。本文从“地方政府的控制权收益”和“国有企业的改制上市模式”两个角度考察了国有上市公司控股权转让的制度根源,并实证检验了不同的控股权转让方式的实际绩效。结果表明:一,地方政府倾向于对公司价值低、从而控制权收益低的公司进行控股权的“有偿转让”,而对公司价值高、从而控制权收益高的公司进行控股权的“无偿划转”;二,“整体上市”的公司其控股股东倾向于有偿转让控股权,而“分拆上市”的公司其实际控制人更倾向于进行控股权的“无偿划转”;三,控股权“有偿转让”,尤其是有偿转让给民营企业后,上市公司的经营绩效显著提高,而控股权的“无偿划转”则导致了公司经营绩效的显著下滑。4.研究了国有上市公司作为收购方的并购行为。将上市公司的兼并收购行为划分为“改制型”、“投资型”和“行政主导型”,实证检验了这三种并购方式的制度根源与实际绩效。结果表明:“整体上市”的国有上市公司更倾向于进行“投资型”和“行政主导型”并购,而“分拆上市”的国有上市公司更倾向于进行“改制型”并购;“改制型”和“投资型”并购显著提高了公司的经营绩效,而“行政主导型”并购则导致了公司经营绩效的持续下滑。5.研究了上市公司面临退市时的并购重组行为。本文以ST公司为研究对象,从“地方政府的控制权收益”的角度,实证考察了此类并购重组的制度根源与实际绩效。结果表明:在上市公司面临“退市”风险时,地方政府为了维持自身的控制权收益,实施了一系列的资产重组来挽救上市公司;这种“支持性重组”导致了上市公司的“虚假繁荣”,但并不能真正提高上市公司的经营绩效。本文的主要创新点如下:1.从“二次改革”的角度研究我国国有上市公司的并购重组;国内学者多借鉴西方学者的做法,从资本运作的角度考察我国上市公司的并购重组问题。然而,处于转型经济的背景下,我国资本市场的发育程度与成熟资本市场存在巨大差异。因此,笔者认为将成熟资本市场的并购理论直接用于我国企业并购的研究是不足取的。近年来,我国的国企改革已从“增量改革”过渡到“存量改革”阶段,国有企业的改制重组成为这一阶段国企改革的重心。在这一特定的历史时期,并购重组承担了“深化国有企业改革”、“二次改制”的历史使命。因此,本文从“二次改革”的视角考察我国国有上市公司的并购重组问题。2.从国有企业“改制上市”的制度根源上考察我国国有上市公司的并购重组问题;我国正在进行的是一场渐进性改革。这一改革模式决定了我国的改革不是一蹴而就的,而是一个分步骤、分阶段、逐步深化的过程。本文以“渐进性改革”为理论基础,实证考察了国有上市公司的改制上市模式与并购重组方式的关系。结果表明,我国的国企改革进程存在明显的“路径依赖”特征:一,控股权转让方式与改制上市模式显著相关,不同模式上市的公司倾向于进行不同方式的控股权转让;二,并购类型与改制上市模式显著相关,不同模式上市的公司倾向于进行不同类型的并购;三,国有企业的“分拆上市”是“关联性”并购重组盛行的制度根源。3.从控制权收益的角度实证考察了我国国有上市公司并购重组中的地方政府行为;我国的国企改革是政府主导下的“强制性制度变迁”。政府主导模式下的“行政性分权”,形成了地方政府特殊的利益、功能和行为;而地方政府的利益很大程度上体现在对地方国有企业的控制权收益上。本文考察了地方政府的控制权收益对国有上市公司并购重组的决定性作用。结果表明:一,地方政府根据自身的控制权收益决定对不同价值的上市公司进行不同方式的控股权转让;二,地方政府为了自身的控制权收益和保护本地的经济发展,对陷入经营困境的ST公司进行了频繁的“支持性”重组;三,“地方政府利益”是“同属性”并购重组盛行的制度根源。4.通过考察上市公司并购前后的业绩变化,以及对“改制型”、“投资型”与“行政主导型”并购的并购绩效进行对比,来考察并购重组的实际绩效。现有研究多将成熟资本市场上对并购绩效的研究方法直接用于我国,其有效性值得商榷。比如,事件研究法以事件期的股票超常收益来衡量并购绩效,其前提是证券市场有效,即股价的变动能完全反映企业的实际价值。李善民等学者认为:转型经济背景下的中国资本市场属于新兴市场,与发达国家资本市场在发展阶段和效率上存在很大差别,中国股市还没有达到弱式有效;中国资本市场的内幕交易和二级市场操纵严重;此外,中国股市截至目前仍有相当部分的非流通股,流通股股价的波动难以衡量非流通股股东的财富变化,由此认为事件研究法不适用于我国资本市场。本文以公司经营业绩来考察上市公司并购重组的实际绩效,通过上市公司在并购前后财务指标的变化,以及不同并购类型的公司财务业绩的对比,来考察并购重组的实际绩效。实证结果表明:并购方式与并购绩效显著相关;不同的并购方式导致了不同的并购绩效。本文的研究意义在于:首先,从“国有企业的改制上市模式”和“地方政府行为”两个角度考察国有上市公司的并购重组,找到了导致国企改革困境的制度根源;进而,通过对并购绩效的一套科学评价体系,为如何走出改革困境、如何深化改革指明了出路。更多还原

【Abstract】 Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978 lifted the curtain on reform and openness of China. Thereafter China started its history course of transferring from planned economy to market. In the great process of reformation, the restructuring of SOEs is a vital part. For the meadian and small size SOEs, governments in various levels adopt a method of gradual retreat and privatization. While for the large ones, the governments choose the strategy of“share issue privatization (SIP)”.However, Chinese SIP did not achieve the desired results. A study reveals that SIP in China only got very limited success and the SOEs issued inefficiently. Another study indicates that incompletely restructuring is the main reason for poor efficiency. Halfway restructuring in the first time determines that the state-owned listed firms need more thorough reformation through operation in capital market, especially through mergers, acquisitions and restructurings.Since the“BAOYAN”incident in 1993, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China springs up and developed like a raging fire after 1997. Because China is a burgeoning market and an economical transitional country, M&As in China are different from those in developed countries, neither on the aspects of motivations, the mechanisms nor on the degree of government interventions. In Chinese capital market, the most significant trait of M&As is that the“related”and“regional”M&As prevail.“Related”M&A is that the two sides of M&A are related or interconnected;“regional”M&A is that both of the two sides of M&A are governered in the same local government. Why this trait exists in our country? What are the institutional roots of M&As of the listed companies in China? What is the essence and purpose of the M&As? To answer these questions intensively, one must understand the institutional background of China thoroughly.Different institutional backgrounds need different theories. So the author argues that the methods used by the preceding scholars who interpret the motivations of M&As in China by the theory of the developed countries is deficient. This paper tries to study the institutional roots of mergers, acquisitions and restructurings of the state-owned listed firms from the view of“second reformation”and testify their real effects.The main contents of this paper are as follows.1. This paper reviews the evolvement of theories and practices of M&As domestic and overseas. Basing on the theories about institutional vicissitude and gradual reform, the paper analyzes the“path dependence”characteristic of the process of reformation and the institutional roots of local government behavior, which are as the bases of the following empirical study.2. Share issue privatization (SIP) is the start of the gradual reform of the Chinese state-owned listed companies and the practical basis of mergers, aquisitions and restructurings. Distinguishing all the samples into“part listing”and“integrity listing”, this paper testifies empirically the relationship between listing modes and SIP efficiency of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The result reveals that SIP is not as successful as anticipation, in other words, Chinese SOEs’issue is inefficient. So it is necessary to improve the operating performance and solve the history problems of the state-owned listed companies through mergers, acquisitions and restructurings.3. Corporate control transfer is a typical M&A in which state-owned listed firms are as the target sides. This paper investigates the institutional roots of the corporate control transfer of the state-owned listed firms from the angles of“controlling benefit of local governments”and“the listing modes of SOEs”and empirically testifies the real effects of different categories of transfer. The results are as follows. Firstly, for the lower value firms from which they cannot get controlling benefit, the local governments intend to carry out“pay cash”transfer, while for the higher value firms from which they can gain higher controlling benefit, the local governments prefer to implement“no charge”transfer. Secondly, the controlling shareholders of“integrity listing”firms intend to carry out“pay cash”transfer, while the real controlling center of“part listing”firms prefer to impement“no charge”transfer. Thirdly,“pay cash”transfer, especially transfer to private companies results in improvement of operating performance, while“no charge”transfer deteriorates the operating performance of the listed firms.4. This paper investigates the M&As in which the state-owned listed firms are as the acquaring sides. Classifying all the M&As as“restructure”M&A,“investment oriented”M&A and“administration dominant”M&A, this paper empirically researches the institutional roots and the virtual effects of the three kinds of M&As. The result suggests that“integrity listing”firms tend to carry out“investment oriented”M&A and“administration dominant”M&A, while“part listing”firms prefer to implement the kind of“restructure”M&A. The“investment oriented”M&A and“restructure”M&A improve the performance significantly, while the“administration dominant”M&A worsens the operating performance of the listed firms unceasingly. 5. This paper researches the restructurings of listed firms facing exiting from the capital market. Sampling on the ST companies, the thesis empirically researches the institutional roots and real effects of this type of capital restructurings from the angle of“controlling benefit of local governments”. The result reveals that when the listed firms are confronted with the threat of exiting from the capital market, for their own controlling benefit, the local governments carry out a series of restructurings to save these companies, while the“propping restructurings”lead to pseudo prosperity which is not virtual improvement of the operating efficiency.The primary innovations of the dissertation are as follows.1. From the angle of“second reformation”to research the mergers, acquisitions and restructurings of the Chinese state-owned listed firms;Chinese scholers usually study mergers, aquisitions and restructurings of the listed firms from the view of capital operation by using the methods of estern countries directly. While the development of Chinese capital market in the transitional economy is different from those in mature markets. Hence the author argues that it is inconsiderable to do so like these scholers.In the recent years, our state-owned enterprise reformation has already transited from the phase of“increment reform”to the phase of“subsistent reform”, and the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises has been the key part of the SOEs’reform. During the special historical period, the mergers, acquisitions and restructurings has shouldered the historical responsibility of“deepening the reform of state-owned enterprise”and“second restructuring”. So, this paper investigates the mergers, acquisitions and restructurings of our state-owned listed firms from the angle of“second reform”.2. From the institutional roots of“restructuring and listing”of the SOEs to research the problem of mergers, acquisitions and restructurings of the state-owned listed firms;The reform in our country is a gradual reformation. This kind of reforming method determins that our reform is not accomplished in an action; it is a step by step, stage by stage and gradually deepened process.Basing on the theory of“gradual reform”, this paper empirically examines the relationship of the categories of M&As and the listing modes of SOEs. The results show that the process of our state-owned enterprise reform has the apparent characteristic of“path dependence”. Firstly, the categories of corporate control transfer are significantly related with the listing modes, in other words, companies issued in different modes tend to carry through different corporate control transfer. Secondly, the categories of M&As are significantly related with the listing modes, that is companies issued in different modes tend to implement different mergers and aquisitions. Thirdly,“part listing”is the institutional root of the“related”mergers and aquistions in Chinese capital market. 3. Investigating the local government behavior in the mergers, aquisitons and restructurings of the state-owned listed firms from the angle of controlling benefit;The SOEs’reform in China is a“compelling system vicissitude”dominated by the government. The“administration allocation”to the local governments shaped the special interest, function and behavior of the local governments. The interest of the local governments materializes in the controlling benefit of the local SOEs.This paper examines the crucial effects of the controlling benefit of the local governments on the mergers, aquistions and restructurings of the state-owned listed companies. The results are as follows. Firstly, the local governments implement different kinds of corporate control transfer according to their own controlling benefit. Secondly, for their own controlling benefit and protecting the local economic development, the local governments carry out frequent“propping”restructurings for the ST companies getting into the operation predicament. Thirdly, the interest of the local governments is the institutional root of“regional”M&As in Chinese capital market.4. Examing the real effects of M&As through two ways: one is to testify the change of the operating performance before and after the M&As, the other is to compare the performance improvement of“restructure”,“investment oriented”and“administration dominant”M&A.The literatures in China in existence usually study M&A performance by using the methods of mature capital market. Its validity needs discuss. For example, the method of“affair study”measures the M&A performance by the abnormal return of the stock during the period of affair, the premise of which is that the capital market is efficient, in other words, the fluctuation of the price of the stock can reflect the real value of the listed company. Shanmin Li argues that Chinese capital market in the background of the transitional economy is a burgeoning market, it is different with those in developed countries in development and efficiency. In China, the stock market is not yet weak efficiency. Furthermore, in Chinese capital market dealing with stable push and manipulating in secondary market previals; until these days, there are still quite a lot of stocks cannot circulate; the price of the circulating stocks cannot reflect the change of the value of the former. So Shanmin Li argues that the method of“affair study”is not fit for Chinese capital market.This paper examines the real effects of the mergers, aquisitions and restructurings of the listed companies through the operating performance. Examing the real effects of M&As through two ways: one is to testify the change of the operating performance before and after the M&As, the other is to compare the performance improvement of different M&As. The empirical results indicate that the real effects of M&As are related significantly with the categories of M&As, in other words, different categories of M&As lead to different real effects. The significance of this paper is as follows. Firstly, investagting the mergers, acquisitions and restructurings in two aspects of“listing modes of SOEs”and“local government behavior”, it finds the institutional roots which induce the SOEs’reform into a deadlock; secondly, by a system of estimation it points out the outlet of how to step out of the deadlock and how to deepen the reform of the state-owned listed firms.更多还原