我国铁路行业外部资本进入壁垒研究

【作者】 刘霞；

【导师】 石磊；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 铁路是国家重要的基础设施,在我国综合交通运输体系中具有举足轻重的地位。由于我国幅员辽阔,资源分布和工业布局不平衡;二元经济结构又导致了大量农村剩余劳动力从中西部向东部发达省区大跨度流动,这些都需要铁路这种单位运输成本低廉、具有中长途运输优势的交通工具对能源、材料和人员进行大规模运输。另外,受我国居民收入水平的限制,以及铁路在安全、节能、环保方面的优势,我国铁路不可能像发达国家铁路那样作为夕阳产业被边缘化,而是必须加快发展以适应经济和社会发展的需要。正是基于这样的认识,2004年国务院审议通过了《中长期铁路网规划》,提出了2020年我国铁路发展的目标。加快铁路投融资体制改革、吸引铁道部以外的资本参与到铁路建设中来,是实现这一目标的一项重要举措。为此,从2005年开始,铁道部陆续出台了多项政策鼓励外资和民营资本投入铁路,但收效甚微。无论是对比其他国家的铁路,还是我国的其他传统垄断性行业,我国铁路吸引外部资本的努力一直没有取得理想的效果。因此,研究铁道部以外的资本进入我国铁路所面临的障碍,并找出相应对策,就成为解决我国铁路投融资体制改革难题的一项迫切要求,具有重大的现实意义。在传统的产业组织理论中,进入壁垒是一个重要的研究领域。然而,现有的进入壁垒理论都无法对外部资本进入我国铁路面临的障碍这一问题做出比较令人满意的解释,究其根本,这显然涉及到我国铁路特殊的市场结构以及铁道部、国铁与外部资本参与建设的线路之间的复杂关系。因此,本论文的研究也是对现有进入壁垒理论的补充,具有重要的理论意义。本论文从产业组织的角度理论与实证地研究了外部资本进入我国铁路所面临的壁垒及其原因,主要内容有:首先,论文通过对现有文献的系统回顾发现,现有的进入壁垒理论、纵向一体化理论中有关一体化企业对竞争对手实施价格与非价格歧视以排挤竞争对手的研究以及网络外部性理论中关于主导厂商与非主导厂商之间竞争关系的研究,都无法对我国铁路业的外部资本进入壁垒问题做出有充分说服力的解释,先行者提出的观点不断受到后来者的批驳。此外,由于我国铁路本身所具有的一些独特性质,迄今为止,国内外学者对于外部资本进入铁路行业所面临壁垒问题的研究基本停留在定性化的描述阶段,未能利用理论模型对这一问题进行较为深入的分析。因此,如何将目前学术界对铁路性质的新认识与产业组织理论相结合,从而构建出符合我国铁路实际状况的模型,就成了当务之急。其次,论文对外部资本进入我国铁路行业的背景与现实状况进行了研究。我国铁路对外部资本的需求,是建立在铁路基本建设所需资金的巨大缺口之上的。一方面,从资金供给方面看,长期以来铁路基本建设投资所主要依赖的铁路建设基金、财政拨款和银行贷款三大渠道有逐年收缩的趋势。另一方面,从资金需求方面来看,要完成我国铁路基本建设的重任,达到《中长期铁路网规划》的目标,需投入巨额资金。资金供给与需求的巨大缺口,必须也必然要通过动员其他资金来源进行弥补。论文还回顾了铁道部逐渐放开外部资本进入的过程,并对我国铁路的产业结构以及铁道部、国铁及合资铁路三者之间的关系进行了深入研究,这是本论文理论研究的基础。再次,论文对我国铁路是否具有规模经济问题进行了实证分析。长期以来,铁路一直被认为是一个具有规模经济效应的行业,这是铁路在相当长时期内由国家所有,或是由政府对其实行严格管制和干预的基本依据。如果确是如此,本论文研究外部资本进入铁路行业,参与建设与国铁形成竞争关系的新线路就没有了理论根据。因为新的经营主体的进入反而降低了行业的效率,使社会福利受到损害。通过实证研究,本论文的结论是我国铁路并不具有规模经济,因此鼓励外部资本参与铁路建设,形成新的经营主体与国铁进行竞争就将有利于提高铁路行业的效率,使铁路企业能够以更低的成本提供更优质的铁路运输服务。这一结论,为外部资本以企业形式进入铁路的合理性和必要性提供了理论依据。文章还对外部资本参与铁路建设的现状进行了研究,发现作为外部资本参与铁路建设的主要载体的合资铁路的营业里程、客货运量、客货运周转量的增长率都呈现出震荡向下的趋势,这与政府政策上的导向是背离的,从而更加突出了论文研究的必要性。本论文的核心是,在对我国铁路行业的结构以及铁道部、国铁和合资铁路三者之间关系进行深入分析的基础上,建立了一个非价格歧视模型,对外部资本进入我国铁路行业所面临的壁垒问题进行了理论研究。结论表明:虽然铁道部是合资铁路的出资人之一,但是由于国铁对合资铁路实施非价格歧视所得到的收益远远大于合资铁路的损失,总体来说,歧视行为使铁道部的收益增加了。因此从理性人的角度来说,铁道部没有对国铁的非价格歧视行为进行规制的动力。另外,从整个社会角度来说,非价格歧视行为并没有使整个社会的运输量下降,反而有所增加,因此从行业管理部门的角度来讲,铁道部也没有对国铁的歧视行为进行规制的动力。再加上合资铁路的运价波动范围有限,在遇到非价格歧视时也没有能力使自身损失最小化。因此,外部资本参与建设的合资铁路的利益既无法从铁道部处获得保障,也无法通过调整价格的方式得到保障,这是外部资本进入面临的最重要的壁垒。本论文提出的政策建议有:第一,政企分开,一方面铁道部将企业职能交给国铁,自己仅作为行业主管部门承担行业监管责任,另一方面国铁将所拥有的对合资铁路归口管理的权利交还铁道部,使国铁不再具备对合资铁路实施非价格歧视的条件。第二,结构重组。一方面大力扶持合资铁路的建设,另一方面对国铁进行分拆重组,使国铁与合资铁路的规模之比小于某一临界值,从而使两者之间的竞争达到社会有效。第三,改革铁路运价形成机制,使无论国铁还是合资铁路都能够根据自身的成本、供求和竞争情况选择合适的价格,使自身的利润达到最大化。第四,各项改革共同推进。以吸引外部资本为主要目的的铁路投融资体制改革必须与政企分离、结构性重组等改革措施共同推进,没有配套改革的支持,投融资体制改革很可能无果而终。本论文共分六章论述以上内容。第一章是绪论,提出论文研究的现实与理论意义、论文的研究方法和框架结构。第二章是文献综述。第三章分析了铁路行业外部资本进入的背景并对我国铁路的产业结构和各利益主体之间的关系进行了研究。第四章是关于我国铁路行业的规模经济以及外部资本参建铁路运营情况的实证分析。第五章是对我国铁路行业外部资本进入壁垒的理论分析。第六章是结论和政策含义。更多还原

【Abstract】 The railway industry is an important infrastructure sector of country, and plays an important role in the comprehensive national transport system. Our country has a vast territory and imbalance between the distribution of resources and the layout of industries. A large number of spare labors flow from the central-west areas to the east provinces because of the dual economic structure. In this case, railway becomes very important because it is a kind of cheap vehicle and has advantages in medium-to long-haul passenger and bulk transport. With the restrict of low revenue and with the characteristics such as security, low consumption of resources and being more environment-friendly, Chinese railway industry is far away from being a sunset industry and still has great potential to develop. Based on such cognition, in 2004 the State Council passed National Middle/Long Term Transport Plans of China, which put forward the goal of Chinese railway in 2020. In order to achieve this goal, the investment reform is very urgent. Begin from 2005, the Ministry of Railways (MOR) has enacted several policies to encourage the foreign capital and civil capital to enter the railway industry. However, these policies had little effect in practise. So it has great realistic significance to research the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry.In the industrial organization theory, there are several traditional models on the barrier to entry. Howvever, these models are all not satisfying to explain the barriers in Chinese railway industry exactly. It is obvious that the reason roots in the special market structure of Chinese railway industry and the complicate relationship between MOR, the state railway enterprises and the joint venture railways. So, the research of this dissertation is an important complement to the theory of barriers to entry and has great theoretic significance.This dissertation researches the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry from the angel of industrial organization. The main contents are below:First, the paper reviews the theory of barriers to entry, the price and non-price discrimination theory, the theory of network externalities, the correlative research about the characteristics of railways and some other researches on the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry. It is found that each existed theory before cannot explain the barriers to entry of railway industry, especially of Chinese railway industry. The formers’ opinions are criticized by the latercomers. Thus, we need to find new methods to research and explain the problem of barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry.Second, this dissertation researches the background and status quo of the entry of outside capital in Chinese railway industry. From the view of capital supply, railway construction fund, government’s financial allocation and loans of banks are in a decreased trend. It is hard to rely on them to take on the responsibility of railway construction. From the view of capital demand, a large number of funds are needed in order to reach the goal of National Middle/Long Term Transport Plans of China. The huge gap between the supply and demand of the funds must to be met by attracting the funds outside of the MOR in. The paper also reviews the process of opening the door towards the funds outside of the MOR and researches the structure of Chinese railway and the relationship between MOR, the state railway enterprises and the joint venture railways, which is the basis of the theoretic research.Third, as the start point of the research, the paper gives an empirical analysis of scale economy of Chinese railway. The railway has been considered to be of scale of economy, for which the railway was owned by government or regulated strictly by government for a long time. If this kind of consideration is true, the research of our paper would lack the theoretic basis, because the new entity will reduce the efficiency of the industry and harm the social welfare. The empirical analysis shows that Chinese railway is not of scale economy, so it is benefical to encourage the outside funds to participate in the railway construction, which will create a new entity to compete with the state railway enterprises and improve the efficiency of the industry in result. The conclusion of the empirical research provides the essentially theoretical evidence for the entry of the outside funds. The paper also analyzes the status quo of outside funds that participated in the construction of the railway. It is found that the increased ratio of the total route length, passenger traffic, passenger-kilometers, freight traffic, freight ton-kilometers of the joint venture railways are all in a decreased trend, which deviates from the policies of MOR.Last, on the basis of the structure of Chinese railway, the paper establishes a non-price discrimination model for the problem of the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry. The conclusion shows that though MOR is one of owners of the joint venture railways, the profit of MOR is not reduced when the state railway enterprises discriminate the joint venture railways with a non-price means, because the getting of non-price discrimination is far more than the losing of joint venture enterprises. As a rational economic man, MOR has no incentives to regulate the non-price discrimination behavior of the state railway enterprises. And from the angel of the whole society, non-price discrimination doesn’t cut the traffic down, but increases the traffic, so MOR hasn’t incentives to regulate the discrimination behavior of the state railway enterprises from the angel of industrial management department. Furthermore, the fluctuation of the joint venture railway’s price is limited, so the joint venture entity cannot minimize its losing when facing the non-price discrimination. The interest of joint venture railways cannot be guaranteed by MOR and by adjusting the price, which are the most important barriers faced by outside funds.In order to cut the barriers to entry in Chinese railway industry, several policy advices are given. First is the separation of regulation from operation. On the one hand, MOR would turn in its operation function to the state railway enterprises, manage and supervise the railways as an industrial management department. On the other hand, the state railway enterprises would turn in its supervising right to MOR, then the state railway enterprises would lose the condition to carry on discrimination. Second is the recombination of the industry. On the one hand, we should develop the joint venture railways. On the other hand, the large state railway enterprises would be divided, so that the scale of the joint venture railways and the state railways will be symmetrical. Third is the reform of price formation mechanisms. The state railways and joint venture railways should both have the right to adjust their prices according to the cost, supply and demand, and competition conditions. Fourth is the simultaneousness of starting all the above reforms. The investment reform, the goal of which is to attract the outside funds, must be carried on with the reforms of separation of regulation from operation and of recombination of industry and so on together, or it would be unsuccessful.The dissertation is divided into five parts. Part I is the introduction, which introduces the realistic and theoretic significances of the paper, the research methods and the structure of the dissertation. Par II is the review to relevant literatures and comments. Part III analyzes the background and status quo of the entry of outside funds. Part IV is the empirical analysis to the economy of scale of Chinese railways and the operation of the joint-venture railways. Part V is the theoretic analysis of barriers to entry of Chinese railways. Part VI is the conclusions and policy advices.更多还原