建设工程合同效率研究

【作者】 郑宪强；

【导师】 何佰洲；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 技术经济与管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 市场经济中，合同是经济主体交换的权利凭证，建设工程合同也不例外。工程建设活动中，招投标、非法分包、转包、工程价款、工期、质量等纠纷看似造成合同履行障碍的外生变量，实则是合同内生变量。由于建设工程合同是一种不完全的延期交易合同，在合同订立与合同履行阶段存在着诸多的不确定性，这种不确定性可以把合同交易引入无穷多个解的结果，那么在无穷多个解中只存在一个最优解，亦即合同效率解。在合同人假设条件下，业主和承包商都有自利的机会主义者，建设工程合同的帕累托效率激励是促其合作的动力，但是其合作的结果并不必然导向社会效率。如何将业主与承包商个体帕累托效率与社会效率目标协同起来，这便是建设工程合同效率所追逐的卡尔多-希克斯效率目标，它旨在将业主和承包商个体有限理性的主观动机导向公共利益优化的客观结果。本文借鉴了经济分析法学理论，将研究建基在实用主义哲学观、“经济人”的人性观、效率与公平相统一的法律价值观三种观念之上，并且在规范与实证研究中继承了微观个体主义研究方法。本文分别研究了建设工程合同效率理论、风险分配、效率障碍、合同模式选择以及效率救济等内容。通过研究，本文认为合同效率既符合业主和承包商的自利动机，也符合建设工程成本最小化的经济学诉求。建设工程合同的不完全性决定了合同规则对双方资源配置效率的影响，而且这种配置是通过合同的风险分配完成的，建设工程合同中核心的经济学问题就是建设工程风险的有效率分配问题，而建设工程合同是业主和承包商之间建造任务共享、风险共享以及激励共享的三位一体合作载体。在不完全合同完整化过程中，建设工程合同效率存在着市场结构、信息不对称以及外部性等交易成本障碍，这种非充分博弈均衡是合同履行中的效率损耗隐患。与此同时，建设工程合同本身也蕴含着自我履约机制，声誉、行业惯例以及连续性合作期望等隐性合同会对业主和承包商形成一种非司法强制性的机会主义行为默认规则约束，使显性合同履行得以维系，从而使业主和承包商之间的不完全合同更接近于完全合同，成为“完整的不完全合同”。业主与承包商之间的合同合作模式也具有合同效率价值，主要表现在业主与承包商对建设工程发承包合同模式以及计价模式的选择上。在矩阵式合同、线性合同与工程总承包合同中，其合同灵活性、所需信息量、合同不完全性、合同价格以及承包商风险都依次递增，管理跨度、业主风险随之依次递减，而且价值工程应用空间逐步扩大。除此之外，基于团队的虚拟结构以及工程总承包也有助于提升合同效率。在计价合同模式中，设计深度是业主与承包商选择总价合同、单价合同与成本加酬金合同的依据，而且总价合同、单价合同与成本加酬金合同之中的风险分配与对价激励各不相同。在上述三种计价合同中，业主所承担的风险递减，承包商所承担的风险递增，与此同时业主所支付的合同对价也呈递增趋势。一般而言，基于价格的合同对业主具有强激励效应，而对承包商具有弱激励效应；基于成本的合同对业主和承包商都具有较强的激励，特别是成本加酬金合同的变体能够灵活调整业主和承包商之间的激励结构。在实践中，业主和承包商还可以组合利用建设工程发承包模式与计价模式，基于合同激励调整合同剩余控制权的分配，从而更有利于寻求业主与承包商合作效率的最佳路径。建设工程合同的不完全性是合同缺口来源，也是造成合同履行障碍的原因，合同缺口的补充规则旨在最小化交易成本，控制合同履行朝向有效率的结果逼近。补充规则的效率排序依次为协商补充、法律法规以及工程建设标准等第三方强行性规范、行业惯例以及法官推定。此外，还有两种工程建设实践补充规则，即DAB、DRB等准仲裁方式和合同网络。在实际履行与损害赔偿两种违约救济方式选择中，损害赔偿是第一顺序救济方法，实际履行是第二顺序救济方法，而在预期损失赔偿、信任赔偿与机会成本赔偿三种违约损害赔偿方式中，预期损失赔偿更符合合同效率原则。另外，不可抗力与情事变更则是合同状态调整条件下的合同对价变更，使其从不效率路径回归到效率路径。更多还原

【Abstract】 The market economy manifests contracts of a document of entitlement of exchange between the involved parties, with no exception to construction project contracts. Initially, disputes and problems in terms of tendering and bidding, illegal subcontracting, payment, time and quality, seem to be external influence factors to deter contract performance, but actually they are inherently a contract by themselves. Construction contracts are an incomplete deferrable contract that introduces heaps of uncertainties and risks. These uncertainties and risks might probably produce innumerable results among which the contract efficient result is expected.Both Employer and Contractor are supposed to be self-interested opportunists by the "contractual man" hypothesis. The construction contract proves to be a Pareto improvement to encourage their cooperation, but it does not necessarily lead to a social efficiency. It is contract efficiency that attempts to combine the individual Pareto efficiency pursuit with the social efficiency into a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, in purpose of achieving a possible public-interested improvement in the presence of individual limited rationality.This paper employs the theory of economic analysis of law, and builds itself on the philosophy framework of pragmatism, the economic man doctrine and the jurisprudent values combined with efficiency and fairness. Methodologically it succeeds to individualism in the normative and empirical studies on the efficiency theory, risk allocation, efficiency obstacles, contractual norm selection and efficiency remedy. It is believed that the contract efficiency meets the self-interested motivation of Employer and Contractor, as well as the economic requirement of cost minimization. The incompleteness of construction contracts determines that contractual rules have an effect on contractual resource allocating efficiency, and they are conducted by risk allocation. Accordingly, the core economics of construction contracts is defined as the efficient allocation of construction risks, which is expected to carry a sharing base of constructing tasks, risks and incentives. Although efficient risk allocation is capable of obtaining an entirety of incomplete contracts, the market structure, information asymmetry and externality can be transactional cost deterrence to construction contract efficiency. Meanwhile, it finds itself that construction contracts have a self-fulfilled mechanism by themselves, where reputation, industrial conventions and continuous cooperation prove themselves to be an implicit contract confine the opportunists’ behavior to default rules.In addition, the cooperative contract norms can be of efficient value in respect to construction task contracting and pricing. Regarding to matrix-formed contracts, linear contracts and turnkey contracts, contracting flexibility, required information, contract incompleteness, contract price, Contractor’s risk assumption and value engineering application increase accordingly, and conversely of management span and Employer’s risk assumption. Team-based virtual structure is usually helpful to enhance contract efficiency as well. In contract pricing norms, design depth is found useful to distinguish and select among stipulated-sum contract, unit-price contract and cost-and-fee (CPF) contract, which provide different risk allocation combinations and motivations. Generally, stipulated contracts have the largest risk bear to Employer and the smallest to Contractor, but Employer has the smallest and Contractor the largest in cost-plus-fee contracts on the contrary, where contracting price corresponds to Contractor’s risk. What’s more, price-based contracts are highly simulative to Employer, and weak to Contractor, but cost-based contracts are high stimulus to both Employer and Contractor, especially CPF variations can supply different appropriate incentive structures. But practice permits combination of contracting and pricing norms in order to establish the most applicable contract norm, and usually the efficient solution is easily found. Where there is a contract, there is a contract gap. Contract gap arises from the incompleteness of construction contracts, and it is the cause to contract performing obstacles. Therefore, contract gap needs make-up to approach a possible efficient performance in a possibly lowest transaction cost. The make-up rules are efficient increasingly in sequence of negotiation, laws, conventions and judge’s free appreciation, and there are two other make-up rules such as quasi-arbitrary and contract matrix. When one or two parties breach the contract, remedies as specific performance and compensation for damage are allowed to protect the injured, but compensation for damage proceeds to specific performance, and it requires by contract efficiency that expected loss compensation is preferable to trust compensation and opportunity cost compensation. Additionally force majeure and change of circumstances are consideration changes to the previous contract status, driving it from a deficient path to an efficient one.更多还原