【作者】 李琼；

【导师】 郑寅达；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 世界史， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 1979-1989年的阿富汗战争是20世纪世界历史上的重大事件。对于这场战争，国内外学术界已经从不同的角度进行了有益的研究和探讨。从现有的研究成果及其使用的资料来看，该课题尚有很大的研究空间可供挖掘。1979年12月，苏联试图以武力平息阿富汗动荡复杂的局势，于是悍然出兵阿富汗，扶植了傀儡政权。阿富汗伊斯兰抵抗组织以宗教为旗帜，掀起了反对苏联及其傀儡的“圣战”。美国出于对抗苏联的目的，插手阿富汗冲突，并成为抵抗组织的主要支持者，使这场冲突留下了东西方对抗的痕迹。本文将在总结前人研究的基础上，结合运用20世纪90年代以来解密公布的新史料，从苏联、阿富汗人民民主党、阿富汗伊斯兰抵抗组织、美国三国四方博弈的角度，对1979-1989年的阿富汗战争进行研究，力图揭示三国四方在这场博弈中的政策取舍及其成败得失，全面、深入地理解这场冲突的实质和影响。全文分为绪言、正文和结语三个部分。绪言部分回顾了有关阿富汗战争(1979-1989)问题的学术史，介绍本论文的选题主旨。结语部分从两个层面对全文进行提炼和剖析，深化论文主题。正文部分共分为五章展开论述。第一章论述从1919年阿富汗独立至1978年四月政变期间的苏阿关系、阿富汗伊斯兰抵抗运动的兴起和美国在阿富汗的政策。自阿富汗独立开始，苏联就试图置阿富汗于自己的利益范围之内，不断对阿富汗予以经济、军事援助。战后至70年代初，苏阿关系获得了显著发展，特别是阿富汗人民民主党成立后即成为苏联在阿富汗的代理人。达乌德在阿富汗执政后，苏阿关系出现了波折，但双方仍保持着正常的国家关系。60年代中期，阿富汗伊斯兰组织在反对国家改革政策和左翼力量的斗争中发展起来，并发动了零星的反政府武装斗争。美国最初并未重视阿富汗，直到50、60年代，美国才出于对抗苏联的需要，加强了对阿富汗的援助，70年代后这种援助减少。总体来看，美国对阿政策的目标非常有限。第二章论述1978年4月至1979年12月苏联与阿富汗人民民主党的关系、苏联是如何走上出兵道路的、阿富汗伊斯兰抵抗运动的发展和美国对阿富汗国内变化的反应。1978-1979年间，阿富汗人民民主党内部纷争不断，同时阿富汗国内反政府运动的发展使人民民主党政权岌岌可危。对这些事件，苏联最初的念度是，出面调解人民民主党两派之间的矛盾，不出兵帮助该党政权镇压国内起义。然而，随着事态的发展，苏联感到，人民民主党不但对国内混乱局面无能为力，而且其领导人阿明也越来越不受苏联的控制。在这种情况下，苏联决定武力干涉阿富汗内部事务，铲除阿明。就在苏联和人民民主党关系日益紧张的时候，阿富汗伊斯兰抵抗运动迅速发展起来，他们反对政府推行的带有社会主义性质的改革，并在巴基斯坦和伊朗建立了反政府武装基地。对于阿富汗国内形势的变化，美国政府内部有不同意见，但总的反应比较平静。不过，中央情报局这时候在布热津斯基的支持下开始了对阿富汗抵抗组织的秘密援助。第三章论述1980年至1984年期间苏联在旧的政治思维指导下在阿富汗推行的政策、阿富汗伊斯兰抵抗运动的高涨和美国在阿富汗的干涉。苏联在这一时期频繁更换领导人，它在阿富汗的政策虽然一度有松动的迹象，但总的来看，苏联并不打算离开阿富汗。苏联一面促使卡尔迈勒扩大执政基础，一面对圣战者发动了大规模的“清剿”。但卡尔迈勒没有获得国内支持，反抗烈火越扑越旺。抵抗组织中以马苏德的抗苏运动最为突出，他在与苏军对抗的同时进行了停战谈判，但双方终因根本立场不同而无法实现真正的停火。美国对苏联入侵阿富汗做出了激烈的反应，但随着时间的推移，美国的态度逐渐不甚明朗。里根上台后对阿富汗圣战者的援助渐趋公开化，并有所发展。不过，美国政府内部在对阿政策方面仍然存在分歧，而且其政策并无明确的战略目标。第四章论述1985年至1987年期间苏联在阿富汗政策的转变、抵抗组织对苏阿政策的反应和美国在阿富汗干涉政策的加强。戈尔巴乔夫上台后，在军事手段仍然无效的情况下，决定从阿富汗退出。他在积极推动日内瓦谈判的同时，敦促纳吉布拉政权实施“民族和解”政策，以便为苏联脱身创造条件。然而，纳吉布拉与其前任一样，不具备苏联人期待的执政能力，“民族和解”没有达到预期的效果。针对人民民主党的“民族和解”政策，阿富汗抵抗组织采取了一系列破坏瓦解措施，并加强了联合作战。美国则希望苏联继续背着阿富汗这个“包袱”，因此，加强了对圣战者的政治支持和军事援助，同时对日内瓦谈判持消极、不配合的态度。在此过程中，美国的政策和以往一样，表现出明显的犹豫和谨慎。第五章论述1988年至1989年期间苏联是如何推动并实现撤军的、有关各方的反应和苏联开始撤军后各方的政策。从1988年初开始，苏联加快了撤军阿富汗的步伐，更加积极地推动日内瓦谈判进程。阿富汗人民民主党为“配合”苏联撤军，在已经失败的“民族和解”政策上继续做表面文章。阿富汗抵抗组织提出了自己的临时政府方案，但这样的方案显然已经无法产生什么影响了。美国则以“对等原则”为借口继续阻挠日内瓦谈判。这时，急于撤军的苏联不再理会外界的政策，在苏联的努力下，日内瓦协议终于在1988年4月得以签署。然而，日内瓦协议只解决了苏联撤军问题，战争并没有离开阿富汗。苏联开始撤军后，阿富汗抵抗组织在巩固力量的同时，向人民民主党展开了夺权斗争。苏联和美国继续向交战双方提供武器援助，阿富汗随即陷入内战。更多还原

【Abstract】 The War in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 is a very important incident in 20 century. Lots of Chinese and foreign scholars have made instructive research and analysis from different point of view on this war. But looking about the present academic findings and materials they used, we would find that there has a wide research space for us to probe.In December 1979, In order to quell the turbulent and complex situation in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union stubbornly sent its army to Afghanistan. The Afghan Islamic Resistance began the "Jihad" to the Soviet and its puppet in the country under the flag of religion. The United States interfered the Afghan conflict to resist the Soviet Union and became the main holder of the Resistance. This made a trace of rivalry between east and west. On the basis of the other research before and the new materials declassified since 1990s, this dissertation would study the War in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 from the angle of game among the Soviet Union, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the PDPA), the United States and the Afghan Resistance. For understanding the essential and influence of the Afghan conflict roundly and deeply, it tries to discuss the success and defeat, the gains and loss of the four sides in the three countries.This dissertation is composed of three parts. The introduction reviews the studies nowadays on the War in Afghanistan and shows the object of this study. The conclusion makes summaries and analysis of the whole dissertation to deepen the subject of the study. The main body contains five chapters.The first chapter discusses the relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan from the independence of Afghanistan in 1919 to the coup of April 1978, the rise of the Afghan Islamic Resistance and the policy of the United States. Since Afghanistan gained its independence, the Soviet Union had been tried to make it in its own confine and given Afghan economic and military assistance. The two country’s relations had great progress after the Second World War and especially when the PDPA was founded in 1965, it became the agent of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The relations of the two country appeared twists and turns after Daud came into power, but their relations were normal. The Afghan Resistance developed when opposing the reform of the government and the leftists in 1960s, and occasionally, they made anti-government battles. The United States made little of Afghanistan at first. In 1950s and 1960s, the United States added its assistance to Afghanistan in order to resist the Soviet Union, but the assistance declined after 1970s. In words, the policy of The United States was limited.The second chapter discusses the relations between the Soviet Union and the PDPA from April 1978 to December 1979, how the Soviet Union decided to send army to Afghanistan, the development of the Afghan Resistance, and the reaction of the United States to the situation in Afghanistan. In 1978-1979, the internal struggle of the PDPA was continued and at the same time the regime of the PDPA is in danger because of the anti-struggle movement. Considering these incidents, the Soviet Union tried to mediate the contradiction between the two fictions and would not send army to Afghan to help pressing the rebels. But according to the situation, the Soviet Union thought the PDPA had no ability to the internal situation, and more importantly its control of the Afghan leader Amin was more and more difficult. So the Soviet Union decided to interfere Afghan internal affairs by force and get rid of Amin. At this time, the Afghan Resistance developed rapidly. They opposed the socialism reform of the Communist regime and established anti-government base in Pakistan an Iran. The officials in the United States government had different ideas about the situation in Afghanistan, but their reaction was peace. The CIA began secret assistance to the Afghan Resistance with Brzezinski’s endorse.The third chapter discusses the Soviet Union’s policy in Afghanistan under old thinking in 1980-1984, the running up of Afghan Resistance’s struggle and the interference of the United States in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s leaders changed several times in this period and its Afghan policy appeared flexible. But the Soviets weren’t going to leave Afghan in fact. When the Soviets encouraged Karmal extended the base of the regime, they made strong aggression to the Resistance. But Karmal couldn’t only obtain the sustenance of domestic and the resistance movement was more and more severe. Massoud’s resistance was the most extraordinary one. He did his best to be against the Soviets and negotiated with them on ceasefire. Because of the different basic stand, the negotiation was failure. The United States made an ardent reaction to the Soviet Union’s invading Afghanistan, but its attitude gradually became faint. After Ronald Reagan was in power, the United States’ assistance to the Resistance was open and had some development. However, the differences were still among the officials and the government’s Afghan policy had no accurate object.The forth chapter discusses the change of the Soviet Union’s policy in Afghanistan in 1985-1987, the reaction of the Resistance to the Afghan situation and the intensifying of the United States’ policy. Gorbachev decided to retreat from Afghanistan when he found the military aggression was in vain. He drove the Geneva negotiations positively and urged Najibullah to put the policy of National Reconciliation into practice in order to ease the Soviet Union’s retreat. But Najibullah had no ability of carrying out the policy successfully and the Soviets didn’t get their object. The Afghan Resistance took steps against the National Reconciliation and tried to combine their operations. The United States hoped the Soviet Union being trouble in Afghanistan, so it increased the assistance to the Resistance and was passive to the Geneva Negotiations. The Americans were clearly hesitate and cautious on its Afghan policy as before.The fifth chapter discusses how the Soviet Union drove and achieved the retreat from Afghanistan, the reaction of relevant sides and their policy after the Soviet Union’s leave. From 1988, the Soviet Union mended its pace of leaving Afghanistan and drove the Geneva process more positively. The PDPA continued the failed National Reconciliation to work in the Soviet Union’s policy. The Afghan Resistance brought forward its own project of transitional government, but it couldn’t have great influence already at that time. The United States stuck to the Symmetry threw obstacles in the Geneva way. Because the Soviet Union was then anxious to leave Afghanistan it didn’t consider other sides’ attitude any more. It made great effort and the Geneva Accord was made finally in April 1988. But the accord only settled the Soviet Union’s problem of retreat and the war didn’t disappear in the country. The Afghan Resistance began to aggression the PDPA for seizing power. The Soviet Union and the United States continued providing weapons to the two rivalries in Afghanistan and the country got into a civil war subsequently.更多还原