【作者】 符蓉；

【导师】 干胜道；

【作者基本信息】 四川大学 ， 企业管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 在中国经济高速发展、中国公司建立现代化企业制度的背景下，对那些处于成熟期、有着丰富现金流资源的企业，通过一个可观测角度----企业的现金流量----决策行为(开支状况)----来研究企业的业绩变化，结合中国国情，寻找降低自由现金流量代理成本、减少随意性支出、以保持企业的业绩增长的对策，是我国企业财务管理理论和实践中的前沿问题。本文从股东的立场出发，以企业的自由现金流量和支出行为作为着眼点，从企业层面的“流动性过剩”的角度来分析企业业绩变化，并对其进行理论分析和实证检验，希望籍此揭示企业决策行为背后所隐含的意图，以帮助企业的利益相关者保护好切身利益，完善公司治理，并为企业管理和相关宏观管理机构提供相应的决策依据。在借鉴资本结构论、公司控制权市场论、契约论等研究成果的基础上，詹森提出了自由现金流量理论，该理论主要讨论了股东与管理者之间存在的代理成本问题，认为股东应该“促使管理者吐出这些现金，而不是将剩余现金以低于资本成本的收益率进行投资，或者在低效率的组织中耗费”。詹森针对自由现金流量代理成本，提出了两种依靠外部力量的解决办法：负债和收购。本文梳理了自由现金流量理论的发展历程，从企业财务管理的筹资、投资和股利分配等各环节阐述了该理论的基本内容及实质，评述了该理论的中外研究文献，对自由现金流量理论在中国的应用提出了自己的看法。在探讨自由现金流量理论的基础上，本文认为随意性支出是企业自由现金流量代理成本的一种有力证据。当企业在生产经营中产生了正的自由现金流量时，企业管理层就可以更有机会、更加便利地为自己谋取福利，包括建造商业帝国、在职消费等等支出增加，从而其中的随意性支出也就增加了。随意性支出是与公司未来增长无关的支出，剔除之后既不影响公司正常经营活动，又不影响企业的健康发展。随意性支出有诸如投资失误、投资过度、利益输送、公司“脂肪”等随意性经营支出(又细分为随意性收益支出和随意性资本支出)和随意性非经营支出的表现形式。本文还具体分析了中国上市公司比较突出的一些随意性支出现象，如改变募集资金投向、委托理财、非相关多元化以及费用异常增长等。企业的随意性支出将会反映到公司的业绩变化上，即高自由现金流量就很可能引起高随意性支出，而随意性支出的增加又将阻碍企业业绩增长。这种结果无疑将减少成熟期企业的吸引力和生命力，使投资者本应在企业成熟期享受到的投资回报大打折扣。同时，本文对自由现金流量→随意性支出→公司业绩变化这一关系推理进行了实证分析。在检验中，本文采用了中国A股上市公司2000年至2005年的5000余个数据，得到的主要结论是：(1)、缺乏成长机会而拥有高自由现金流量水平的企业，其随意性支出显著高于有较好成长机会而自由现金流量水平低的企业，“高自由现金流量且低机会”企业的高随意性支出既是高自由现金流量的结果，又是存在自由现金流量代理成本的一个有力证据；(2)、“高自由现金流量且低机会”企业，其随意性支出与当期和上期的自由现金流量水平之间的正相关均具有统计显著性；而“低自由现金流量且高机会组”的随意性支出与当期和上期的自由现金流量水平的正相关关系均不显著。这就从另外一个侧面说明了存在自由现金流量代理成本的企业，其随意性支出受自由现金流量水平的影响更大；(3)、“高自由现金流量且低机会”企业提高负债将使自由现金流量与随意性支出之间的显著性正相关关系削弱，但中国上市公司的债权人监督力度与其他国家比相对较弱，中国金融体制的改革尚待深入；(4)、自由现金流量水平与以经济增加值和资产报酬率表示的企业经营业绩是同向的，企业有自由现金流量本身并非坏事，而由此引发的自由现金流量代理成本，即随意性支出与企业业绩是反向的，随意性支出阻碍了企业本应达到的经营业绩；(5)、连续三年的自由现金流量水平与以经济增加值增长和资产报酬率增长表示的企业业绩增长负相关，随意性支出与企业业绩增长也是负相关。较高的自由现金流量，并没有带来企业业绩更快的增长。相反，自由现金流量水平越高，随意性支出越高，业绩增长越慢，这就是自由现金流量代理成本。针对中国国情，本文还分别从企业内外层面提出了减少企业的自由现金流量代理成本及随意性支出的对策。在研究中，本文有以下创新：(1)、提出了经营者自由现金流量这一概念，并认为这是经营者实现自身效用最大化这一财务目标的基础，研究自由现金流量代理问题的着眼点就在于经营者自由现金流量。(2)、辨析了随意性支出的相关概念，在汉克尔等对随意性支出“两分法”的基础上，结合我国国情，提出了“新两分法”，即随意性支出包括随意性经营支出(又细分为随意性收益支出和随意性资本支出)和随意性非经营支出；并进一步剖析了随意性支出的表现形式和一般量化方法，本文认为“利益输送”这种随意性非经营支出形式在中国尤为严重；提出了随意性资本支出可以从主观与客观角度划分为投资失误和投资过度。(3)、对自由现金流量、随意性支出和企业业绩变化之间的关系进行了逻辑推理。本文认为，当成熟企业的自由现金流量水平较高时，容易引发自由现金流量代理成本，表现为随意性支出增加，并导致企业业绩增长减缓，降低了企业经营效率。(4)、发展了相关经济理论在随意性支出、自由现金流量代理成本上的解释能力。对于信息不对称理论，本文认为由于不对称信息的存在，使企业管理者的随意性支出的发生成为可能，并在正的自由现金流量下得到放大；对于行为财务理论，本文认为公司管理层的过度乐观和过度自信情绪使得其决策是非完全理性的，而这正是发生随意性支出的心理学和行为科学基础，是投资过度和投资失误的内在原因；对于财务分层管理理论，本文认为管理层在充裕的自由现金流量的“催化”下，随意性支出就有可能发生并加大，因此，所有者有必要构建有效的财务机制来引导经营者实现所有者的财务目标，减少经营者的自由现金流量代理成本。尽管本文的研究是基于主流的财务管理理论之上的逻辑推理，并用中国上市公司作为样本进行了实证检验，但作为一种创新，需要进一步的研究来支持和改进。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid development of China economy and the establishment of modern corporate system in China, how to find a way to reduce the agency costs and discretionary expenditure to keep the sustainable growth in those companies, which have substantial cash flow during the mature period, is a current problem in modern financial theory and application. The paper is on shareholder’s behalf to probe into the corporate performance decline from a more observable angle. We explores the superfluous cash flow of company how to influence corporate financial policy, such as expenditure behavior and how to encumber the growth of corporate performance. The paper wants to exposure the hidden intention behind the financial policy and help corporate shareholders protect their own rights and enhance corporate administration and supervision. Also it provides guidance to corporate managers and correlative government institution to support their decision-making through theory analysis and empirical study.Based on the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of the ownership structure of the firm, Michael C. Jensen developed a hypothesis of free cash flow. He points out "Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies are especially severe when the organization generates substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies. " Then Jensen had given two ways to solve the problem: debt and takeover. In the paper, firstly the free cash flow theory and relative researches are summarized and analyzed from every process of corporate financial management, such as corporate financing, investment and stock dividend etc., and I provide my own ideas to apply and develop free cash flow theory in China, that is, we should pay attention to the fact of the incompleteness of markets, the gamble on the markets, the flaw of internal control systems and the means to reduce agency costs of free cash flows etc. Secondly, discretionary expenditure is an important evidence of agency costs in my eyes. When the company generates large free cash flow, managers have incentives to act in their own best interests, such as making their firms grow beyond the optimal size, enjoying luxury office facilities and so on, that means the increase of discretionary expenditure. Discretionary expenditure is irrelative to the future growth of company. It neither gains short-term profit nor achieves long-term development. Discretionary expenditure shows in the forms of investment failure, tunneling, over investment and "corporate fat" etc. The paper also analyzes some distinct phenomenon in Chinese public listed companies, such as changing the direction of raised money, unrelated diversified investment and abnormal huge expenditure etc. Thirdly, discretionary expenditure will result in the growth of corporate performance decline, in another word, large free cash flow leads high discretionary expenditure, and high discretionary expenditure baffles the sustainable growth of corporate performance. Eventually this will make the mature companies lack attractive and energetic, which is harmful to shareholders.The paper also provides support for my viewpoints with empirical study. I have used over 5000 financial data of China public listed companies from 2000 to 2005 as the sample to examine and find evidence of a free cash flow problem. My conclusions are as follows:(1)The firms with less profitable investment opportunities and large free cash flows, compared with those firms with large and highly profitable investment projects but without free cash flow, previous ones have higher level of discretionary expenditure. And the high discretionary expenditure is not only as a result of high free cash flows, but also is an important evidence of agency costs. (2)The relation between discretionary expenditure and free cash flow of current period or previous period is a remarkably positive correlation in the firms with huge free cash and less profitable investment opportunities. This illuminates that the level of discretionary expenditure is influenced by free cash flow, especially in those firms with agency costs of free cash flow. (3) Debt reduces the positive correlation between discretionary expenditure and free cash flow, but compared with other countries’ findings, the benefits of debt are weaker. So the financial system in China should be intensified. (4) The relation between free cash flow and corporate performance denoted by EVD and ROA is positive correlation, which shows free cash flow itself is not harmful to the corporate, but it could cause agency costs so that the relation between discretionary expenditure and corporate performance denoted by EVD and ROA is negative correlation. (5) I find out the relation between free cash flow and corporate performance increase denoted by EVD and ROA in the three consecutive years is negative correlation as well as the relation between discretionary expenditure and corporate performance denoted by EVD and ROA is negative correction. More free cash flow did not bring corporate higher performance. Indeed there are more free cash flows; there are higher discretionary expenditure and slower corporate performance improving. This is the agency cost of free cash flow.Facing the current situation of China, this paper provides the related strategies from internal level to external level to help corporate reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and discretionary expenditure.In this research, this paper has the following innovations: 1) Created "Management Cash Flow" Concept. In terms of financial objective, this concept explains that management is trying to maximize own interests. Researching free cash flow agency should focus on Management Cash Flow. 2) Discussed Discretionary Expenditure and the related terms. Based on Hackle’ s theory of discretionary expenditure dichotomy, according to China’ s reality, firstly brought forward the concept of "New Dichotomy", which means discretionary expenditure includes discretionary operation expenditure (divided to discretionary income expenditure and discretionary capital expenditure) and discretionary non-operation expenditure. Furthermore, This paper has researched discretionary expenditure’ s outlook and common scalability. This paper illustrates that "tunneling" , which is one of the forms of discretionary non-operation expenditure, is very common in China. Viewed from subjective and external angels, Discretionary capital expenditure can be divided to investment mistake and over investment. 3) This paper also completes the logic illation of relationship of free cash flow, discretionary expenditure and corporate performance. The conclusion is that a mature enterprise, which has vast cash flow, is ease to have free cash flow agency issue. Discretionary expenditure increasing leads to the slower growth and lower efficiency. 4) This research empowers the related economy theories explain discretionary and free cash agency cost. As for the information asymmetry theory, this paper concludes management has discretionary expenditure problem because of information asymmetry, it will be worse if cash flow is positive. As for conduct financial theory, this paper illustrates management’ s over optimism and over confidence causes the decision is not totally rational. It is basis of psychology to explain discretionary expenditure. This is main reason caused over investment and investment mistake. As for the financial layered management, management is easy to conduct discretionary expenditure with abundant free cash flow. Therefore, it’ s necessary for the shareholders construct a set of effective financial system to supervise management fulfill the financial objective so that the management free cash flow agency cost can be reduced.Also this paper makes logical illation basing on mainstream of the financial management theories while the conclusions are supported by China public listed companies as the sample to have been processed empirical validation. Although as a creative research, it needs the deeper researches to be verified and improved in the future.更多还原