【作者】 胥胤；

【导师】 张衔；

【作者基本信息】 四川大学 ， 政治经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 对企业控制权的配置的研究由来已久，在梳理已有研究文献的基础之上，本文比较为系统地整理研究了企业控制权的契约基础、控制权的组织效率、控制权的初始安排和企业运行中控制权的动态调整。本文论证的主线是承担风险的专用性投资，对企业企业生存发展的关键要素决定了企业初始控制权，而决策效率要求知识、信息与控制权的匹配，由此决定了控制权的分权、授权的动态调整。在此基础上，本文进一步研究了控制权主体，控制权的激励功能和制约机制以及控制权的历史演变。本文的论述分为七个章节。第一章对与企业控制权相关的理论进行了简要的回顾与评述。第二章，对控制权进行了界定和探讨了控制权的权力基础。我们将控制权分为两类，即基于不完全契约的控制权和基于实际占有决策知识、信息，决策资源而存在的实际控制权。我们意识到，企业是要素的契约联结，缔约基础是契约主体间的平等、自由，雇员之所以接受雇主、工人之所以接受资本家某种程度(在接受域内)的指挥，肯定在于前者接受后者指挥，能给他带来比自己单干更多的收益或降低风险。通过后者提供的诸如金钱，地位等诱使前者接受，并且后者可以通过实施经济制裁的方式来保障权力的实施，探讨了控制权的契约基础，本章还通过控制权调节带来的组织效率节约和控制权成本探讨了控制权的根源和存在的合理性。第三章讨论了控制权的初始安排和控制权的动态调整。初始控制权配置取决于资本所有者的资产专用性及其对应的承担风险的意愿和能力，它既是当事人拥有的财富、掌握的知识、信息的反映，也受到制度环境，如政治制度、法律、文化、意识形态等变量的制约。本文根据当事人初始地位，从资产专用性和风险承担和知识、信息资本对企业生存发展的重要性决定控制权初始配置竞争力的角度，研究了三类企业，分别是古典资本主义企业、现代公司制企业和新型知识型企业的控制权的初始配置，并分别建立了一个轮流叫价的谈判模型；随后根据由于知识和信息、决策权的适配效率和知识、信息资本积累，员工谈判的意识增强，客观上要求将权力通过授权，分权的方式下放给掌握知识和信息的参与者，并建立了一个控制权分权的均衡模型研究了控制权的分权调整。证明了控制权授权的程度取决于控制权损失与分权收益之间的比较约束。第四章探讨了控制权主体，我们将企业控制权主体分为股东、董事，经理和工人阶层四类，这个分类体现了风险承担与控制权保护和知识、信息与决策权相适配的原则。股东控制权具有本源性和终极性，其它主体的权力最终来源于股东授权，但由于股东的集体决策成本且缺乏决策所需知识和信息，他们将大部分经营决策权授权给董事会。董事会是公司权力配置的核心，制定和决定公司重大决策。但由于担任执行董事的经理阶层的崛起，董事会逐渐空壳化，或任由经理阶层主宰，经理权力虽然来源于董事会授权，但由于股权信托制，投票代理机制等强化经理权力的法律制度以及一些非正式的制度安排，作为执行董事的经理，由于具有决策知识和信息，往往掌握实际控制权。第五章探讨了控制权的激励功能以及对控制权的制约机制。权力的激励功能是不言而喻的，伴随着控制权收益的控制权尤其如此。至关重要的是，如何通过制度安排，主要是内部治理机制和外部制约机制对控制权主体进行制约，以防止控制权的滥用、管理腐败等代理问题。结合我国国情，笔者认为规范证券市场，对上市公司国有股权结构调整，加强经理市场建设，应是治理机制的重中之重。第六章探讨了企业控制权的历史演变，伴随着企业形态由低级到高级，简单到复杂、规模由小到大，分工逐渐复杂的发展过程、管理决策与承担风险两种职能的逐步分离。在业主所有制中，所有权和控制权合二为一，在公司制企业中，股东提供资本和承担经营风险，但不一定具有经营管理所需要的决策知识和信息，通常将部分决策权授权给董事和经理阶层有利于发挥职能专业化分工的比较优势。经理革命使企业控制权逐渐转移到经理手中，对此股东越来越难以制约。机构投资者的崛起，对公司治理的积极介入，有望实现所有权回归。针对我国国情，我们对我国国有企业控制权机制的改革、内部人控制问题进行了研究。第七章是结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 with the long history of the research into the allocation of control authority of the enterprise, the thesis focuses on the research into the initial arrangement of control authority and the adjustment of the control in enterprise running on the base of present research works. And with the premise that the initial enterprise control depends on the special investment taking on the risk while the efficiency of decision-making depends on the allocation of knowledge, information and enterprise control, the thesis further studies the structure of the subject of enterprise control, the stimulus function and restricting system, as well as the centralization and decentralization of the authority.The thesis consists of seven chapters.Chapter one focuses on the brief review of the theory about the enterprise control.Chapter two focuses on the definition and the base of enterprise control. The enterprise control is embodied as decision making and decision management. And the first one is about the selection of the board, while the latter is distributed among the various classes within the enterprise. We realize that the enterprise is the agreement binding various elements together, with the base of equality, freedom between all the subjects. The reason why the employer can accept the employee or the workers can accept the capitalist’s conducting in some degree, lies in that their employees can bring them more benefit and less risk than they do it themselves. And at the same time, the employees can protect their right though carrying out theeconomic sanction, just the foundation of enterprise Control. Chapter three focuses on the allocation and adjustment of enterprise control. In the initial debate of enterprise control, as the investors of special material take on the risk of being cheated by others and obtaining the uncertain surplus, they are more stimulated to seek for the protection of enterprise control, which is called the born right of the investors. Otherwise, it can result in the insufficiency of investment. And in fact, in the enterprise running, as a result of specialization, the top subject of enterprise control is more likely or forced to distribute the authority to the knowledge and information holders, which cannot only bring the comparative advantages of specialization into play, but also get full exploitation of the participants’ knowledge and information.Chapter four focuses on the subjects of enterprise control, which can be classified as four categories, share holders, the board, managers and workers. The classification better explains the principle of the adaptation between risk taking and authority protection as well as that between knowledge and information and decision-making authority.Share holders have the original and top control. And the other subjects’ rights originate from the authorization of the share holders. However, for the lack of knowledge and information needed when making decisions, the share holders always authorize most of the decision-making authority to the board, the core of the placement of enterprise control and responsible for making and deciding the important strategies of the company. With the rising of the managers, the board is gradually becoming the formalized part, led by the class of managers. Though the managers’ right is from the authorization of the board, the managers are likely to have the practical control authority for their rich knowledge and information about decision making.Chapter five focuses on the stimulus function and restricting system of the enterprise control. The most important point is how to make use of the system arrangement, especially the restriction of both the internal and external system, to prevent the enterprise control’s abuse, the management corruption, and so on. According to the present situation in China, the author holds the idea that the most important thing is the regulation of the stock market and the structure adjustment of the state-owned shares within quoted companies.Chapter six focuses on the evolution of the enterprise control, the process of gradual split of the two functions: managing decision making and the risk taking. In the proprietor ownership system, ownership and control authority are brought together. In the enterprise, the share holders provide the capital and take on the risk. But for the lack of needed knowledge and information, they often authorize part of authority of decision making to the board and the managers, and this can bring the comparative advantages of specialization into better play. Meanwhile, the manager revolution results in the authority shift to the managers, which is difficult for the share holders to restrict unless the investors’ active anticipation into the company management. We make a research into the reform of the control authority in the state-owned enterprise as well as the problem of internal control.更多还原