【作者】 覃毅延；

【导师】 唐焕文； 郭崇慧；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 随着经济的全球化、顾客需求的多样化和科学技术的进步，市场竞争愈演愈烈。市场竞争不再是单一企业之间的竞争而是供应链之间的竞争，这就要求供应链各成员之间密切合作以谋求供应链的最大竞争优势。但在通常情况下，供应链各成员分属不同的经济实体，因而他们都将以各自目标的最大化为原则进行决策，导致整个供应链的绩效低下。因此，寻求促进供应链协调的方法成为供应链管理的重点。而在这些方法中，通过定价折扣来协调供应链各方利益的研究越来越受到学者们的关注。本文在弹性需求条件下，运用定价折扣对供应链中供应商(制造商)和销售商(零售商)的协调问题展开深入的研究，主要内容如下：(1)在弹性需求下，建立了易变质物品的库存模型，推广了经典的EOQ公式。证明了销售商的出售价格随着其购买价格的降低而降低，从而销售商的需求随购买价格的降低而增大。在此基础上给出了销售商针对供应商数量折扣表的订货批量、订货周期的计算方法。分析了变质率对销售商订货批量和订货周期的影响，分析表明：当物品变质率增大，订货批量和订货周期减小。(2)在弹性需求下，在一对一分散式供应链中，利用Stackelberg博弈建立了确定供应商最优数量折扣的数学模型。对供应商利用数量折扣协调供应链产生的系统利润与供应商和销售商联合决策时所产生的系统利润进行比较，结果表明数量折扣对供应链的协调是有效的，但不能实现供应链的完美协调，即在分散式决策时系统的利润不能达到集中式决策时系统的利润。同时也分析了价格敏感系数和变质率对数量折扣的影响。(3)在弹性需求下，研究了单个供应商和单个销售商的协调问题。在分散式决策时，用Stackelberg博弈建立了确定供应商最优总量折扣的数学模型。证明了在分散式决策中，供应商采用总量折扣不能使供应链达到完美协调，要使供应链达到完美协调，供应商在集中式决策时给予的折扣要大于在分散式决策时给予时的折扣。由此供应商要失去部分利润，为弥补损失，供应商可以采用给予总量折扣和收取特许购买费用的方法实现供应链的完美协调。对供应商采用数量折扣和收取特许购买费用协调供应链的方法与采用总量折扣和收取特许购买费用协调供应链的方法进行了比较，结果表明，采用数量折扣和收取特许购买费用的方法增加了供应链的周转库存，减少了系统利润。而采用总量折扣和收取特许购买费用的方法给予的折扣要大，产生更大的需求，增加了系统利润。总量折扣和收取购买费用的方法具有扩大需求、增加供应链利润和降低周转库存等优点，因此总量折扣和收取特许购买费用的方法适合于由供应商和需求量相对较大的销售商组成的供应链。(4)在由一个供应商和多个不同的销售商组成的分散式供应链中，在弹性需求下研究了供应商最优总量折扣表的设计问题。分析了折扣前不同需求量的销售商对总量折扣表的反应。分析发现，在折扣前需求量大的销售商选择的折扣点不小于折扣前需求量小的销售商选择的折扣点。在此基础上，将供应商最优总量折扣表的设计问题转化为一带约束的非线性规划模型。然后提出了基于模拟退火和传统优化算法相结合的启发式算法。对供应商采用总量折扣表和数量折扣表协调供应链进行了数值分析。分析结果表明，总量折扣表对供应链的协调效率远大于数量折扣表的协调效率；需求的价格弹性越大，采用总量折扣的协调效果越好；总量折扣可以使供应链协调效率有很大提高。总量折扣表适合于多个不同的销售商的情形。更多还原

【Abstract】 Due to economic globalization, proliferation of customer demand and technological progress, effective coordination plays an important role in the successful operation of supply chain. Today supply chain often consists of stages with different owners. Each stages of a supply chain may have conflict objectives, as a result, each stage tries to maximize its own profits, resulting in actions that often diminish total supply chain profits. Thus, to achieve effective coordination between each stages of supply chain is a current managerial and an important issue. This research studies how to develop discount pricing policies to achieve effective coordination in a supply chain with price sensitive demand. The main contents of this research are as following:(1) An inventory model is developed to find the replenishment schedule for an inventory system, in which items deteriorate at a constant rate and demand is price-sensitive when supplier gives quantity discounts. It is shown that when the supplier gives quantity discounts, the buyer’s demand increases. Sensitivity analysis with the numerical example shows that order quantity and replenishment cycle are very sensitive to the deterioration rate, but the retailer’s average profit per unit time is not. The retailer’s unit selling price and average profit per unit time are very sensitive to the price-sensitive parameter.(2) We address the problem of how a supplier develop a discount pricing structure for deteriorating items with price-sensitive demand when the supplier and the buyer make their decisions independently. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the supplier acts as the leader by announcing its pricing policy to the buyer in advance and the buyer acts as the follower by determining his unit selling price and thus the sales volume per unit time is determined. It is shown that when the supplier gives quantity discounts, the supplier and the buyer’s profit increases. Sensitivity analysis with numerical example shows that quantity discounts increase as the price-sensitive parameter increases and decrease as deterioration rate increases. We compare the profits achieved when the supplier and buyer work independentlyand that achieved when they work jointly. It is shown that quantity discounts are effective to achieve channel coordination.(3) We consider volume discounts and franchise fees as coordination mechanisms in a system consisting of a supplier and a buyer with demand that is price-sensitive. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the supplier acts as the leader by announcing its pricing policy to the buyer in advance and the buyer acts as the follower by determining his unit selling price and thus annual sales volume is determined. We compare the discounts that the supplier gives to the buyer when they work independently with that when they work jointly. It is shown that volume discounts are not sufficient to guarantee the system’s profit maximization. By charging the buyer franchise fees to offset an amount equal to or more than his loss due to giving the buyer more discounts than his optimal volume discounts, the coordination and profit maximization of the supply chain can be achieved. We also compare the mechanism of employing volume discounts and franchise fees with that of employing quantity discounts and franchise fees to achieve channel coordination. When demand is price-sensitive, the channel profit achieved by employing volume discounts and franchise fees is larger than that achieved by quantity discounts and franchise fees, but the channel cycle inventory is smaller than that raised by employing quantity discounts and franchise fees. Numerical examples are provided.(4) We present an analysis of a supplier’s volume discount decision for a group of independent and heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer faces a demand that is a decreasing function of its retail price. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game whereby the supplier acts as the leader and buyers act as followers. Based on the analysis that a larger buyer prefers to a larger break point. A simulated annealing (SA)-based heuristic to solve the problem is developed. It is shown that a common volume discount schedule that is designed according to buyers’ individual cost and demand structures and their rational economic behavior is able to signifcantly stimulate demand, and substantially increase profits for both the supplier and buyers. Furthermore, It is also shown that when demand is price sensitive, the profit that achieved by using volume discounts is larger than that achieved by using quantity discounts. Numerical examples are provided.更多还原