【作者】 范静；

【导师】 孙立城；

【作者基本信息】 吉林农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 “三农”问题已经成为国民经济和社会发展的制约“瓶颈”。农村金融体制作为农村经济发展中最为重要的资本要素配置制度，它对破解“三农”问题将发挥十分关键和不可替代的作用。但是现有农村金融制度安排仍然不能满足农村经济发展的多层次、多元化的金融需求。农村信用社支农主力军作用独木难支，农村信用社的合作金融制度的特征与功能基本丧失，其制度性绩效差，其不良贷款比重增大。农村信用社产权制度改革已经成为我国农村金融体制改革的难点和焦点。农村信用社改革成功与否，事关农村经济发展全局和全国农村金融制度改革的成败，其战略意义十分重大。因此，系统深入分析农村合作金融运行的内在矛盾，应尽快实施以明晰农村信用社的产权归属、完善内部治理结构为核心的农村信用社产权制度改革与创新，探索真正意义上的中国农村合作金融产权制度创新的模式与路径，这是农村金融制度改革的突破口，也是本论文研究的目的或出发点。本文以货币金融理论、合作经济理论、新制度经济学、产权经济学为理论指导，充分吸收国内外相关研究成果，以农村合作金融的产权制度为主线，探索国际合作金融制度变迁的规律和趋势，建立农村合作金融产权制度研究的理论框架，对我国农村信用社产权制度绩效进行实证分析，提出以明晰农村信用社的产权归属、完善法人内部治理结构为核心的农村信用社产权制度创新基本框架和支撑体系。本文运用比较分析法和演绎分析法，对各国合作金融制度及其变迁轨迹的比较分析，归纳出国际现代合作金融制度变迁的一般规律。并运用演绎分析法，借鉴现代合作金融产权制度的一般模式，探索我国农村合作金融产权制度的基本模式。运用实证和规范分析相结合的方法，在采用问卷调查方式对吉林省农村信用社产权制度的缺陷问题及其产生机制进行实证分析基础上，运用规范分析提出农村信用社产权制度变革所需的政策环境和体制环境创新的思路。本文通过系统研究取得了以下主要研究成果。1、通过对国际合作金融制度的历史变迁与经验考察，即对国际合作金融制度发展历程的纵向比较研究，探索不同历史阶段的合作金融制度变迁过程中的规律性，即合作金融制度变迁的特点和原因。并对我国农村合作金融制度异化的过程、特点及原因进行实证分析。提出国际合作金融制度变迁是合作金融制度内在缺陷与外部环境变化矛盾运动的必然结果，合作金融制度是以一种动态的、发展运动的状态存在。就某一具体合作金融组织而言，单一合作金融组织制度变迁的轨迹应该是：由非营利合作转向营利性合作，由劳动联合转向资金联合，由以“为社员服务为宗旨”的信用合作组织转向商业性金融组织。而从全社会角度考察，无论在发展中国家还是在发达国家的金融市场，商业金融和合作金融并存是各国农村金融市场发展的共同特征。或者说，商业性金融不会取代合作金融。本文对这一规律的揭示为研究我国农村信用社产权制度改革提供科学的理论依据和借鉴。2、在回顾我国农村金融体系演化历史的基础上，分析现阶段我国农村金融发展的阶段性特征。从制度需求角度论证我国发展农村合作金融的客观必要性及合作金融在农村金融体系中的职能定位。提出我国农村合作金融制度是满足农村弱势群体融资需求的制度保证，合作金融组织的产权结构和分配方式能够适应我国现阶段生产力水平的多层次性和不平衡，特别是能够适应我国农村经济发展的需要。农村合作金融是弥补农业本身弱质性的客观需要。本文关于我国发展农村合作金融的客观必然性的理论阐述是对目前理论界存在的“农村合作金融在中国没有生存的土壤”观点的澄清和修正。3、本文创见性提出了农村信用社产权制度的理论研究框架。在农村信用社产权制度传统的研究模式中，一般多从农村合作金融制度的“自愿性、互助共济性、民主管理性、非盈利性”的四项原则入手进行分析。本文摒弃了这种传统研究模式，从农村信用社的契约性质入手，提出在农村信用社契约中，农村信用社产权制度安排应该遵循“契约性”逻辑，由信用社股东、人力资本所有者、储蓄者以及职工共同享有信用社组织租金的实际占有权和控制权。在分析探讨我国农村信用社法人治理的特殊性基础上，首次明确提出股东治理逻辑并不适合农村信用社的法人治理模式，农村信用社法人治理目标是实现相关者利益最大化，农村信用社法人治理模式是利益相关者共同治理模式。该研究框架的提出在理论和实践上具有建设性指导意义。4、关于我国农村信用社产权制度现状问题研究，本文通过对吉林省农村信用社问卷调查的实证分析，得出以下结论：规范的合作金融所要求的“自愿性、互助共济性、民主管理性、非盈利性”四项原则在我国农村信用社实践中未能得到真正的体现。一是入股和退社的非自愿性。入股和退社的非自愿性主要产生于政府行政性推动或政策干预所致。二是农村信用社产权主体的虚置性，表现在农村信用社现有股权结构过于分散和缺乏法人股、投资股股东，社员资格股实质是“存款化股金”和农村信用社集体积累产权不清等方面。而目前农村信用社股权定价机制不合理和缺少市场退出机制是农村信用社产权主体虚置性产生的内在原因。三是法人治理结构的无效性，表现在社员代表大会、理事会和监事会形同虚设，以及政府行政干预下的内部人控制。本文进一步探讨了农村信用社法人治理结构无效性产生的内在机制：即剩余索取权与剩余控制权的配置分离，委托人与代理人之间效用函数不一致而形成的利益上博弈关系，农村信用社缺乏改革治理结构的内在动力和压力。从而推进对我国农村合作金融产权制度问题的理论研究提升到制度层面高度。5、本文系统提出了农村信用社严杈制度创新的一个基本框架。农村信用社产权制度创新的目标定位是，坚持服务“三农”的功能定位，坚持市场化的“四自”方向，坚持因地制宜地选择适合于不同地区经济发展水平的多样化产权制度。我国农村信用社产权制度创新模式——因地制宜地选择多元化产权制度。提出股份制农村商业银行这种模式只适合工业化程度较高、对农业信贷要求不多而支农任务相对较轻的经济发达地区。农村合作银行能够实现追求一定盈利和为社员服务并举，顺应了合作金融与农村经济发展的需求，对我国经济欠发达地区农村信用社而言是一种可行的金融制度安排。合作制农村信用社不以盈利为目的，主要任务是为农民社员搞好金融服务，是适合于我国贫困落后地区的农村信用社的一种产权制度安排。本文提出的农村信用社产权制度创新的一个基本框架的重要意义在于，它把国际合作金融制度变迁过程中的一般规律性与中国具体国情相结合，构建适合于中国特殊国情的农村信用社产权制度安排。6、本文设计了农村信用社利益相关者共同治理模式路径：建立农村信用社利益相关者共同治理的核心就是通过信用社内部的正式制度安排来确保每个产权主体具有平等参与企业所有权分配的机会，同时又依靠相互监督的机制来制衡各个产权主体的行为；通过适当的投票机制和利益约束机制来稳定利益相关者之间的合作，以实现相关者利益最大化这一共同治理目标。共同治理模式包括两个并行的机制：理事会中的共同治理机制是通过在理事会中建立共同的决策机制来保证各利益相关者有平等机会参与信用社重大决策。监事会中的共同治理机制则是通过利益相关者进入信用社的监事会，以改善监事会对理事会和公司经理人员的监督效率，以确保各个产权主体平等地享有监督权从而实现相互制衡。共同治理机制的一个重要监督机制是建立公开透明的信息披露机制。建立“三会”相互制衡机制和对代理人的激励机制。7、农村信用社产权制度创新，必须要以良好的外部政策环境和体制环境为基本保障。本文从税收政策、利率市场化政策、完善农村金融体系、建立农业保险体系和存款保险制度、金融监管体制、农村合作金融立法和省级信用联社职能定位等方面提出了外部政策和体制环境的基本构架。更多还原

【Abstract】 "Three Fs" (Agriculture, Rural Areas and Farmers) problems restrains the nationaleconomy and society development. As the core of capital allocation in rural economy, RuralFinancial System (RFS) performs the essential functions in solving the issues of "Three Fs".Whereas RFS can’t satisfy the comprehensive financial demands for rural economydevelopment. Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC) performance is imperfect and bad loansproportion has been increasing. The property right institution of RCC has become focus anddifficulty of rural financial system reform.Reform of RCC has an important significance in the reform of rural financial system.Therefore, it is the breakthrough of rural financial system reform and research purpose of thisthesis. It explores the innovation pattern of rural credit cooperative property rights (RCCPR),analyzes the inherence contradictions of RCC and clears property rights in order to improvecorporate governance,On the basis of theories of money and finance, cooperative economics, the newinstitution economics and property rights economics, this thesis takes the property rights ofRCC as the masterstroke, sets up the research framework of RCCPR, and explores vicissitudelaw of international cooperative financial institution (ICFI), analyzes empirically theperformance of RCCPR, and puts forward the innovation framework of RCCPR.Through comparative analysis, this dissertation analyzes different cooperative financialinstitution and its evolution, sums up the vicissitude law of modern cooperative financeinstitution, explores the pattern of ICFI in china. Through deduct analysis, it analyzesempirically the present faults and issues of RCCPR by adopting questionnaire. On the basis ofnormative analysis, it puts forward the thoughts to innovate policies and exterior institutionsof RCCPR. The main research tasks and conclusions can be summed up as following:Firstly, this dissertation focuses on the vicissitude law of ICFI through reviewing thehistoric vicissitude process of ICFI, analyzes the vicissitude features and causes for RCCPRin China. The findings of this dissertation are that vicissitude of ICFI resulted from thecontradiction between the inner imperfection of ICFI and the exterior environment change. Asfar as a cooperative finance organization is concerned, its change path should be transformedfrom profits-seeking into nonprofits-seeking, from labor association into capital association,from credit cooperative organization, which serves to members into commercial financialorganization. Across the world, whether developing countries or developed countries, it is acommon characteristic of rural financial market in all countries that commercial finance institution and cooperative finance institution coexist. In other words, commercial financeinstitution can’t replace cooperative finance institution. This conclusion provides the theorybasis for RCCPR reform in China.Secondly, on the basis of the current characteristics of rural finance development, interms of institution demand, this dissertation demonstrates the inevitability of developingrural cooperative finance and the cooperative finance function orientation in rural financesystem in China, proves that RCFI is the guarantee to satisfy the capital demand of thedisadvantaged rural people and RCFI adapts the extensive and imbalance of productive forcesin China, RCFI is necessary to overcome the agriculture weakness. Above-mentionedviewpoints clarify and correct the fallacy that RCCPR isn’t appropriate to China.Thirdly, this dissertation establishes creatively the theoretical framework of RCCPR. Inthe contract of RCC, the arrangement of RCCPR should adhere to the logic of contract thatstockholders of rural credit cooperative, depositors and manpower capital owners share thepossessing right and the control right of RCC. On the basis of the corporate governanceparticularities of RCC, the author cast doubt on the fact that the logic of stockholdersgovernance doesn’t suit the corporate governance pattern of RCC for the first time. Thecorporate governance goals of RCC should be the maximization of stakeholders’ interests. Itscorporate governance model should be co- governed by stakeholders and stockholders.Fourthly, the dissertation studies the status quo of RCCPR by questionnaire and drawssome conclusions: the RCC should be defined as the cooperative finance institution that isowned and managed by members, provides services to members and operates on the basis ofcooperative principles, but the above principles of normative cooperative finance aren’treflected genuinely in China. Member enrollment is compelling and decentralizing. They areuseless of the general meeting of members, the board of directors and the board of supervisors.The RCC can’t operate effectively and self-reliant, assume sole responsibility for its profits orlosses. It is very serious of the phenomenon of inside control under administrativeintervention. In short, the three principles of cooperative finance in RCC aren’t reflectedgenuinely. Meanwhile, the author points out that the inner mechanisms result fi’om the issuesof RCCPR. The inner mechanisms are as follows: The separation between residual claimrights and residual control rights, the problems of Principal-Agent, the asymmetricinformation of RCC, the shortage of enough impetus and pressures to reform the corporategovernance structure of RCC. Above-mentioned researches promote the theory of RCCPR toinstitutional level.Fifthly, the dissertation designs the basic reform framework of RCCPR. The reform goals of RCCPR are to insist on serving "Three Fs", operate self-reliant, assume soleresponsibility for its profits or losses and select diversified property rights according to localconditions. Rural commercial bank is suitable for the developed area where the level ofindustrialization is high and the demand for agricultural loan is little. Rural cooperative bankcan fulfill profits and provide service to members. As far as the RCC of undeveloped areas isconcerned, it is a feasible financial institution. Normative RCC serve members and doesn’tseek profits, therefore, it is suitable for the poverty areas.Sixthly, The dissertation brings forward the co-governance pattern of stakeholders. Thecore of co-governance of stakeholders is that, every property entity should have equal chanceto participate the allocation of ownership. Meanwhile, the behavior of very property entity arerestricted by the mechanism of supervision, the stabilization of stakeholders cooperationdepends on the mechanism of ballot and the mechanism of interests restriction in order torealize the maximization of stakeholders interests. The mechanism of co-governance ofstakeholders must guarantee that every property entity should have equal chance to participatethe important decision-making by setting up the mechanism of co-decision-making of theboard of directors. The mechanism of co-governance of stakeholders must guarantee thatevery property entity should share equal right of supervision to fulfill the balance of power bysetting up the mechanism of co-supervision of the board of supervisors. The supervisionmechanism of co-governance of stakeholders is societal supervision by establishing the openand transparent mechanism of issuing information.Seventhly, This dissertation puts forward the basic framework that the reform of RCCPRshould strive to establish and improve the polices and institutions of RCC, which includetaxation policy, free interest rate, rural financial system, agricultural insurance systems,deposit insurance systems, supervision system, rural finance administration and functionorientation of province-joint rural credit cooperative and so on.更多还原