【作者】 王颖；

【导师】 张祥； 王方华；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 企业管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 在渠道关系治理的理论和实践中,较之与正式契约所代表的正式机制,以关系治理为代表的非正式机制对于渠道关系组织和运行的重要性,越来越受到人们的重视。渠道成员之间为什么会选择关系契约来发展并治理彼此之间的关系,以及关系契约和信任等非正式因素是如何实现渠道成员的关系管理意图的等问题都引起了业界和学界的广泛兴趣。对于这些问题,营销学者借鉴交易成本理论为代表的经济学提供了自己的答案。在交易成本理论“交易特征—治理结构”解析模式的影响之下,分析重点放在了渠道关系的交易特征上,其一般逻辑是先从资产专用性、不确定性和交易频率三个维度观察渠道交易特征,然后选择特定的治理结构与之匹配。交易特征是自变量,治理结构是因变量。这种经济理性逻辑引导下的解构主义研究范式,实质是将交易结构和交易治理结构看作是同构的,渠道关系缔约被视为资产专用性的产物。正因为此,关系治理的关键机制——关系契约本身却没有体现什么实质内容。再探深一步,关系契约概念实际上是从(法学)关系契约理论借鉴而来,交易成本理论为代表的经济理性逻辑的这种借鉴是不彻底的,对渠道关系治理的分析也是不彻底的。在另一条研究路径上,营销学者对关系规范倍感兴趣,从关系契约理论中援引若干关系规范,进行了实证研究,对业界实践提供了丰富的社会学、社会心理学角度的解读,希望以此回答渠道关系治理的重要性和作用机理等问题。但是纵观其研究,方法论上“百花齐放”,认识论的“百家争鸣”,给学界和业界带来的似乎更多的是浑沌与争议,也给经济学留下了批评的口实。这两种学术脉络之间是否存在共通之处?本文认为答案是肯定的:一方面,经济理性逻辑研究路径上,关系契约理论初始便推荐了“嵌入性”分析范式。根据关系契约理论的经典结论,契约是一种关系;契约行为是一段时期的过程,这些都是嵌入性分析的必要因素。交易成本理论援用了关系契约概念,却把它的精神留在原地,这是嵌入性观点所批判的“社会化不足”的表现。另一方面,社会学方法对社会规范的研究则表现出“过度社会化”的缺陷,它们常常谈到的是“经济交换嵌入于社会关系之中”这样的大而无当的理念,在具体的嵌入性分析上缺乏可操作化概念与分析框架。本文尝试着融通二者,其沟通路径就是嵌入性分析。通过借鉴、融合经济学(交易成本理论)和社会学(新经济社会学)的研究成果,形成了以关系和关系契约为核心、以嵌入性分析为脉络的综合分析模式,建立了结构维度(外部和内部嵌入机制)与过程维度(前向和后向嵌入机制)相结合,组织层面与个人层面(角色关系与个人关系的交互嵌入机制)相嵌套的嵌入分析框架来探讨这个问题,希望对渠道关系治理问题给出一个更为系统的回答。论文主体部分(即第一章序论、第九章结论除外)分了七章(内容上可归为五个部分)来解读该话题。第二章介绍了全文的分析对象“渠道关系”,为全文奠定分析基础。得出的主要结论是:第一,渠道关系主要有交易型渠道关系和关系型渠道关系之分。第二,渠道关系具有长期导向性、稳定与灵活结合、集体利益导向性等特征,这些特征与关系契约、关系规范和信任特性相吻合。第三,渠道关系存在结构与过程两个维度。第三章首先介绍了以交易成本理论为代表的经济理性逻辑视角下的关系治理一般含义,接着分别利用抵押模型、声誉模型和关系契约激励模型对关系契约自执行机制在渠道关系治理中的体现做了详细解析,最后,对经济理性逻辑对渠道关系治理的解释作了综合评价。得出的结论是:第一,经济理性逻辑有关关系治理的核心观点是资产专用性催生了渠道关系缔约,而关系契约的自执行是渠道关系治理的精髓。第二,该分析范式依靠的是经济理性主义,因此存在“社会化不足”的缺陷:因剔除了关系因素使得分析结论不能全面解析现实;因以交易为基本分析单元使得关系规范、过程维度的研究被忽视,等等。这些不足之处为嵌入性分析的导入留下了空间。第四章和第五章是在嵌入性的视野之下对渠道关系治理的全面分析。第四章在网络性嵌入、时间性嵌入、交互嵌入范畴的基础上建立了本文的基本分析框架;第五章在以嵌入性分析为脉络的基本分析框架之下,从组织和个人两个层面切入渠道关系治理的结构与过程维度,揭示了渠道关系治理的循环均衡机理。通过这一部分的研究,得出如下结论:第一,分析框架方面,本文的嵌入性分析以“关系”为基本分析单元,认为关系因素的导入使得交易与交易治理是不同构的,因此,渠道关系治理是在结构和过程两个维度上展开的,应对它们予以同样的关注,关注在过程维度中治理结构的变化,二者结合才构成关系治理的全部内容与过程。同时,渠道关系治理分析应该从组织和个人两个层面同时、交叉进行。组织层面的嵌入,主要通过赋予个人以“角色”并由个人嵌入社会来完成,这是一个角色关系与人际关系之间交互嵌入(嵌入与反向嵌入)的过程。本文在此认识基础上,从“结构”和“过程”两个维度以及“组织—个人”两个层面来深化、细化对关系规范治理的嵌入性分析。第二,关系治理是嵌入性的关系契约通过关系规范的治理。不是契约本身,而是契约所嵌入的社会关系决定了契约的有效性。关系规范是关系契约的实质内容和准则,是关系规范的自执行性决定了关系契约的自执行性,所以关系治理指的是嵌入性的关系契约通过关系规范的治理。第三,关系规范的具体作用机理为:特定关系规范的内生或内部化使关系契约被具体化和特定化,在组织(渠道成员企业)层面,关系契约具体化为规范契约;在个人(渠道成员的管理人员或一般员工)层面,关系契约具体化为心理契约。这些关系契约与正式契约通过制度化和正式化路径相互配合形成关系治理的动态均衡。其中,组织层面,规范契约与正式契约之间的关系可以用“正式化”程度来衡量。在渠道关系发展初期,正式化程度较高,关系规范的作用有限,在渠道关系建立、成熟后的维护期,正式化程度有所下降,因为关系规范的作用日益明显,正式契约成为规范契约的镜像。在个人层面,渠道关系“制度化”成为衡量渠道关系治理的重要指标。制度化是一个社会化过程,它把工具性的交易转型为一种社会嵌入关系,途径是在该交易中注入规范和价值观,这些规范和价值观允许关系超越其始创者的时间束缚(如任期)而重复再生并得以永续。当渠道关系被制度化时,将出现三种结果:一,渠道成员个人层面的人际关系日益补充正式的角色关系;二,心理契约日益替代正式法律契约;三,随着渠道关系的存续期限向最初的缔约代理人的时间限制(如任期)之外拓展,正式契约日益成为非正式的谅解和承诺的镜像。综合地看,组织层面的正式化与个人层面的制度化是互逆的测度,二者的实质意义是一样的,都反映了关系治理过程维度之中的结构维度变化。第六、七两章集中论述了与关系契约治理机制相伴随的信任问题。第六章介绍了信任一般,提出了信任的嵌入性分析模式;第七章分析了信任特殊,阐释渠道关系治理中的信任问题。信任研究实际上为渠道关系治理研究开辟了另一条观察路径、拓展了另一个空间维度。对关系规范的分析实际上还是在分析关系契约本身,因为关系规范是嵌入性关系契约的实质内容与准则。而对信任的分析,则走到关系契约之外来“反观”关系治理。通过这一部分的研究,得出如下结论:第一,信任与关系契约(关系规范)的关系如下:一方面,从关系内生的角度来看,在通过内生关系规范进行渠道关系治理的过程中,信任是嵌入性关系契约运作的产物,此时的信任性质是算计性、半强、情境信任,信任是嵌入关系的主要特征;另一方面,从关系外生的角度来看,在通过社会规范内部化进行渠道关系治理的过程中,信任是嵌入性关系契约运作机制的内容,此时的信任性质是非算计性、强、品质信任,嵌入的网络机制是信任。综合地看,关系契约(关系规范)和信任在关系发展的结构维度和过程维度中,不论是内生还是外生的,都体现出功能上的相互融合、相互促进,由此体现出关系契约和信任在关系治理中的多元性、动态性。第二,经济理性逻辑以“交易”分析“关系”,剔除了“交易”所嵌入的社会关系因素,因此其基本视点为“信任是关系、关系契约治理内生的”,即治理机制保障之下的内生半强信任,是经济算计的产物,因此,必然可以被经济算计到其他高效机制所替代,无怪乎威廉姆森等经济学家对信任的作用评价较低。嵌入性分析的基本视点是,信任既可为关系外生也可为关系内生。关系内生情形下的信任,正是威廉姆森所揭示的经济算计产物;而关系外生情形之下,信任体现为受信方一种天生的可信任性,它被用于完善人性内核假设。这一观点可以对交易成本理论进行完善,使之更贴近现实。最后一部分暨第八章,通过仿真程序模拟了渠道关系治理机制及与之伴随的信任的作用机理,为以上部分的主要结论提供佐证。总的来看,本论文研究得到的核心思想是:关系治理是嵌入性的关系契约通过关系规范的治理。对于渠道关系的治理,交易成本理论为代表的经济理性逻辑认为就是关系契约自执行机制,而嵌入性分析认为,关系规范是关系契约的实质内容,是关系规范的自执行性决定了关系契约的自执行性,所以关系治理指的是嵌入性的关系契约通过关系规范的治理。总的来看,方法论上,本论文在几个层面上做出了一些探索性的尝试。第一,对嵌入性概念作了细化和深化,以期使之更具可操作性但又不失普适性,便于对渠道关系治理中的关系契约和信任问题展开深入而系统的研究;第二,在嵌入机理的支撑下,对学界初现的渠道关系治理的结构维度和过程维度分析方法进行了进一步的探索运用,增强其可操作性;第三,区分了关系规范和关系契约的经济属性(工具属性)和社会属性(关系属性),使得这两个概念以及以它们为基石的“关系治理”概念更具有可操作性。第四,关系内生与外生的区分视角,也是本文的一步尝试。通过该视角,本文得以将关系规范和信任二者结合起来对关系治理问题进行整合分析,可以为渠道关系研究提供独特的视野。认识论上,论文首先指出,(内生的和外生的)关系规范是关系契约的实质内容与准则,是关系规范的自执行性决定了关系契约的自执行性,所以关系治理指的是嵌入性的关系契约通过关系规范的治理;其次,渠道关系治理过程中的关系内生信任是是关系规范的产物,是治理机制的产物;而关系契约治理过程中相伴随的关系外生信任是一种规范,是治理机制本身,“嵌入的网络机制就是信任”。更多还原

【Abstract】 The point that relational contracts are of great importance to the organizing and running of channel relationships is much appreciated by marketing fields, both theoretically and practically. Researchers in this field attempt to find out why channel members would like to choose informal instruments such as relational contracts and trust rather than rely on those formal ones to cultivate and develop their relationships, and how these informal mechanisms work effectively and smoothly.As to these questions, marketing literature draws on economics such as Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) to display its own answer. In this stream, focus is put on the three key dimensions of any transaction: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency, which put together, call for a distinct and specific form of governance to be match a certain transaction, under the fundamentals of the TCA. This theory reflects the conditions in channels such that the attributes of channel transactions could stand for independent variable, and governance structure of channel relationships for dependent variable; put in another way, the latter is the function of the former. Under this logic of economics, the structure of governance of transaction and the structure of transaction per se are strictly of isomorphism, and relational contracting in channel practice is deemed as the outcome of asset specificity. Furthermore, although the concept of relational contracting is draw from the Relational Contract Theory (RCT), this theoretical transplant does not reach the core of the issue, which results in the superficialness of the analysis of the relational governance of channel relationships.In the other stream, marketing literature shows its interest in relational norms, and tries reinterpreting the relational governance of channel relationships from the perspective of sociology, rather than economics. However, opinions varying in this stream give birth to controversy among researchers and criticism from others as well.Is there any common conception between these two streams? A positive answer to this question is posted in this paper, which build up its own analytical framework on the critical construct of“embeddedness”. On the one hand, under the logics of economics, transactions between channel members is isolated from social relationships, which is criticized to be an opinion of under-socialization; on the other hand, under the logics of sociology, the proposition that“transactions between channel members is embedded in social relationships”is not only too over-socialized but too extensive to predict the specific problem in distribution channel.This paper attempts to accommodate these two different and even conflicting opinions. Drawing on economics (especially the TCA) and sociology (especially the New Economic Sociology, NES), we set up a comprehensive analytical model, based on the notion of“embeddedness”, centering on the conception of“relational contract(s)”, extending in two ways– structural dimension (outward embeddedness and inward embeddedness) and process dimension (forward embeddedness and backward embeddedness), and displayed on two each levels– organizational and personal. Under this model, the core of this paper containing seven chapters (Chapter 2 - 8, which can be implicitly classified into five parts) elaborating the theme of“relational governance of channel relationships”as follows:Chapter Two introduces the“target”of this paper, distribution channel relationships. We draw conclusions that, firstly, channel relationships embody in two forms– transactional channel relationship and relational channel relationship, and secondly, channel relationships have some important features (long-term orientation, flexibility combined with stability, and collective interest orientation, etc.) which resembles the basic features of relational contracts, relational norms, and trust as well, and thirdly, channel relationships develop in their structural dimension and process dimension.Chapter Three explains the general concepts of“relational governance”and“self-enforcing”from the perspective of economics (TCA), and shows how the hostage model, reputation model and relational contract incentive model operates under the specific condition of channel relationships. In the last subsection of this chapter, we appraise the positive and negative effects of TCA on the study of relational governance of channel relationships. In this chapter, we will find these points: firstly, self-enforcing of the relational contracts is the essence of relational governance of channel relationships; secondly, this stream of analyzing is based on the economic rationalism, which is defective for its being“under-socialized”– analysis being partial due to its ignorance of social relational factors, study being superficial due to its choosing“transaction”instead of“relationship”as the basic analytical unit, and so on. These defects lead to gaps between practice and theory; and to make up these gaps, we could turn to the embededness analysis.Chapter Four and Chapter Five expatiate on the issue of relational governance in channels from the perspective of embeddedness. Chapter Four introduces the notion of relational governance in general, basing the whole analytical framework of this part on some concepts such as network embeddedness, temporal embeddedness, and iterative embeddedness. Chapter Five analyzes the conception of relational governance specific in the filed of channel relationships and demonstrates that the process and structure of channel relationships development is actually a dynamic and balanced cycle.In this essential part, we get some crucial findings: first of all, the analytical framework based itself on the basic genetic conception of“relationships”, which will prove that transaction structure and the governance structure are in essence of no isomorphism, thus, the relational governance of channel relationships develops in two dimensions– the dimension of structure and process, and on two levels– the organizational and personal level. On the organizational level, the embeddedness is mainly set by persons acting as a“role”–“role relationships”and“personal relationships”are iteratively embedded in each other (which could be labeled as“embedded”vs.“counter-embedded”). Second, relational governance refers to the governance under embedded relational contracts through relational norms. It is not the contracts but the social relationships in which the contracts are embedded that determine the effectiveness of the contracts. Following this view, relational norms are the essential elements of relational contracts. It is the self-enforcing of relational norms that determine the self-enforcing of relational contracts. Third, the mechanism of relational norms operates in such way: the endogenesis of relational norms and the internalization of exogenesis relational norms make them specified, which helps the relational contracts turn to be“normative contracts”on the organizational level and “psychological contracts”on the personal level. These particular types of relational contracts interact with formal (legal) contracts through the processes of institutionalization and formalization and eventually arrive at the state of“dynamic cycle”. Respectively, on the organizational level, the construct of“formalization”could measure the conditions of the relationships between normative contracts and formal contracts; the construct of“institutionalization”could measure the performance of the relational governance on the personal level. As to the former situation, at the outset stage of the channel relationships, the degree of formalization is relatively high, and the relational norms have less effect on the relational governance; however, once the channel relationships were set up and kept growing, the degree of formalization decreases, for the effect from relational norms increases and formal contracts turn out to be the mirror of normative contracts. As to the personal situation, institutionalization is actually a process of socialization, which changes the instrumental transactions into social relationships, through the way of importing norms and values to transactions, for norms and values could make the relationships between creators transcend the limitation of personal conditions (e.g. tenure). Once the channel relationships were institutionalized, three outcomes would show up: First, personal relationships between the employees of channel members would compensate formal role relationships little by little; Second, psychological contracts would replace the role of legal contracts gradually; Third, the channel relationships would survive the tenure of specific personal members or agents who have built up the relationships. Synthetically, the formalization on the organizational level is the counterpart of the institutionalization on the personal level, both of which reflect the structural transformation through the process dimension– the only difference between them is the direction of embeddedness.Chapter Six and Chapter Seven focus on the issue of trust in the relational governance of channel relationships. Chapter Six introduces the general concept of trust, and provides an embedded model for analyzing trust; Chapter Seven elaborates the particular issue concerning trust in the governance of channel relationships, through employing the embeddedness analysis model. Generally speaking, the foregoing part concerning relational norms is analyzing the relational governance itself, for the norms are the intrinsic contents and rules of relational contracts, while this part on trust is trying to explain the issue of relational governance away from the channel relationship itself. In this part, we draw conclusions as follow: First, the relationships between trust and relational contract (as well as relational norms): from the perspective of relational endogenesis, in the process of governance through endogenesis relational norms, trust emerges as the outcome of relational contracts, and trust of this type is calculative, half-strong, and situation-specific in nature, and trust is just the character of this particular channel relationship; Meanwhile, from the perspective of relational exogenesis, in the process of governance through internalized exogenesis relational norms, trust is the essential content (rather than the character) of this particular channel relationship, and in this situation, trust is non-calculative, strong, and individual-specific in nature. Synthetically and comprehensively, relational contracts (and relational norms) and trust are accommodative and promoting to each other in an endogenesis and exogenesis way, structurally and procedurally, which demonstrates the pluralism and dynamism of relational contracts and trust in the relational governance of channel relationships. Second, under the logic of economics, trust is endogenesis in nature, and it is the product or by product of calculative designs. Now that trust is to be designed or constructed by rational agents, it also stands that trust could be replaced by other mechanism of higher efficiency, such as legal contacts. No wonder that TCA devaluate implicitly the importance of trust in transactions. On the contrary, embeddedness analysis looks at trust in either exogenesis way or endogenesis way, and believes that exogenesis trust is inherently the trustworthiness of a certain agent, which could explain the essence and the function of trust in channel relationship better and more actually.Chapter Eight is the last part of the core of this paper. We apply the agent-based economics to simulating the relational governance mechanism and the function of trust in the process and structure of the governance, so as to provide demonstration for the foregoing analysis.Generally speaking, the central opinions of this paper are following: Firstly, relational governance refers to the governance under embedded relational contracts through relational norms. According to the logic of economics (such as TCA), the governance of channel relationships is self-enforcing of relational contracts in nature, while the embeddedness analysis points out that relational norms are the essential elements of relational contracts; It is the self-enforcing of relational norms that determine the self-enforcing of relational contracts , therefore, relational governance refers to the governance under embedded relational contracts through relational norms.The primary innovations of this dissertation are summarized in the following: In methodology, we make some try in the following way. First, we investigate the conception of“embeddedness”in a deeper way, which makes the notion of“embeddedness”more operationalized, so as to smoothized analyzing of the issue of relational contracts and trust in the relational governance of channel relationships; Secondly, we attempt to explain the relational governance of channel relationships in two dimensions– structural dimension and process dimension, from a perspective (i.e. an embeddedness analytical framework) different from the earlier research.Thirdly, this paper distinguishes instrumental attributes (economic attributes) from relational attributes (social attributes) so as to make the notion of“relational governance”more operationalized.Fourthly, the dichotomy perspective of“endogenesis vs. exogenesis”pushes this study further in methodology, which, visibly different from some popular analytical mode, facilitates our analysis of relational norms and trust in relational governance in an integrated way.In epistemology, this paper contends that relational norms is the essential contents of relational contracts (either in an exogenesis way or endogenesis way), therefore, relational governance refers to the governance under embedded relational contracts through relational norms. Within the structure and during the process of the relational governance of channel relationships, trust either stems from or reflects relational contracts (and relational norms in particular), either in an exogenesis way or endogenesis way, just like the relational norms.更多还原