【作者】 李军；

【导师】 周生春；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 本文回顾了有关电信管制理论及其发展，通过运用制度经济学理论分析了电信管制作为一种制度均衡，是整体性的制度安排，其变迁存在着多重均衡和路径依赖。同时结合社会文化学等学科知识，对中国电信市场管制的结构、变迁过程、制度环境、电信运营商的产权结构以及管制机构公职人员、电信运营商经理人目标进行了深入的研究，并运用管理学知识分析了中国电信产业改革开放、引入竞争之后的宏观绩效成果，发现了在管制机构“多重机构、两种目标”、电信运营商国有产权以及经理人双重身份的结构下，存在着“由管制机构引起的电信运营商被动的市场共谋”与“电信运营商主导的价格改革”并存的现象，得出结论：1、中国电信管制的改革过程和结果具有内在的现实性和合理性，在实际实现的最终绩效上总体符合电信管制各参与方的利益目标以及社会福利的增加；2、在中国特殊的制度、文化背景下，目前是大力推动中国电信管制体制改革的最佳时机，即在目前国有电信运营商收益较高的情况下，消费者获得更多的剩余，可以较好地平衡各方的利益；3、由于中国电信运营商经理人的双重身份和中国特殊的政治经济环境，使得信息不对称的道德风险和逆向选择问题有所弱化。在此基础上，笔者以电信价格管制为例，对管制经济学理论在中国电信市场管制实践的应用进行了分析和研究。由于中国电信管制的结构、特殊的政治经济环境以及目前的信息结构和管制机构的能力，作为电信价格管制方案总体适合于收益率管制方案，适合于渐进式的改革模式，并在实践中通过电信管制各方的不断博弈过程得到完善，最终形成适合于中国电信市场并可自实施的制度——电信法和管制体系以及互补性的非正式制度。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper reviews the telecom regulation theory concerned and its development, and by applying institutional economic theory, argues that telecom regulation, as an institutional equilibrium, is an overall system arrangement whose variance is fraught with multiple equilibrium and path dependence. Then, integrated with socio-cultural theory and other subjects related, it gives a deep research on the structure, evolution, system environment of Chinese telecom market regulation along with the ownership structure of the telecom operators, the target of the public officers of regulatory agencies and the target of the managers, and studies on the macroeconomic performance of Chinese telecom industry after reform and opening up using management theory. It can be found that "the telecom operators’ passive collusion due to the regulatory agencies" and "the price reform led by the telecom operators" coexist under the structure of Chinese regulatory agencies, that covers ’’multi-organization, two goals", the telecom operators’ state-owned property right and managers’ dual identity. After the finance data analysis, This paper then reveals the inevitability of the presence of this phenomenon and comes to a conclusion that the process and outcome of the regulatory reform in Chinese telecom market have inherent reality and rationality, and that the practical ultimate achievement generally meets the interests of all participants along with the enhancement of social welfare through data analysis. Now is the best time for the Chinese telecom reform under the background of Chinese special institute and culture. The moral hazard and converse selection of the Chinese telecom operators will be lower as under the managers’ dual identity and Chinese political surroundings.Based on the above analysis, the author takes the telecom price regulation as an example and studies on the application of regulation economics theory to the practice of Chinese telecom market regulation. Due to the structure, the special political and economic environment of Chinese telecom regulation along with current information structure and the ability of regulatory agencies, the telecom price regulation program is generally suited to the yield control program and the progressive mode of reform, consummates itself in practice through continually interaction among different parties in telecom regulation, and finally forms a system that fits in Chinese telecom market with self-implementation—Telecom Act, regulatory system and complementary informal regulation. Meanwhile, as the telecom industry is an important basic industry, the role of the consumer is a force that can not be ignored, and getting the consumer to play an important role in the game of telecom regulation is a significant factor contributing to the healthy development of the telecom industry.更多还原