【作者】 陈波；

【导师】 余伟民；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 世界史， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 冷战时期的美韩同盟，是以美日同盟为轴心的美国亚太同盟体系的支撑之一，扮演了遏制苏联和中国的双重角色。李承晚统治时期是美韩同盟形成的奠基阶段，同盟对外遏制共产主义与对内规制盟国行为的功能通过美国对该政权的政策得到了生动体现。以往对美韩同盟的研究多以大国在朝鲜半岛的利益角逐立意，当我们把视线转向同盟内部时，就会发现李承晚政权的行为及其在美国人眼中的定位，以及由此决定的决策倾向和最终结果是一个有意义的学术命题。本文以美国现有美韩关系史专著和论文为起点，以国家安全委员会文件、中央情报局文件、国务院关于韩国内部事务的解密档案及《美国对外关系文件集》为史料基础，运用历史唯物主义的研究方法并适当借助西方国际关系理论，通过解读美国对李承晚政权内外行为的政策，揭示该政权在美国决策层眼中形成“价值”与“负担”的两重特质，进一步剖析美国在冷战背景下由国家安全和制度竞争双重目标矛带来的决策困境——遏制共产主义与规范盟国行为之间的两难选择，从而更加深入地理解冷战在地区问题上表现出来的结构与本质特征。论文分为绪言、正文和结论三个部分。绪言部分回顾了李承晚时期美韩关系研究的学术史，并由此出发介绍选题意义和写作思路。结论呼应绪言提出的研究目标对正文记述进行总结概括，全面阐发论文选题的立意。正文则分为五个章节展开论述。第一章从“美国国务院—美军政当局”和“美军政当局—南部政局”两个层次，论述战后美苏走向对抗的国际局势与朝鲜南部左右分化的本土格局相互纠缠、影响，而最终导致李承晚单独政权的建立。冷战朝鲜化的直接后果之一就是美苏就朝鲜统一问题的联合委员会谈判难以为继，双方在意图判断、政策规划和在朝行动上不断走向两极化，使分化对抗最终取代了协调合作。李承晚因其亲美反共的特性恰好迎合了美国在南部建立单独政权的政策设计而成为其对朝政策“执行人”。第二章将对朝(韩)基本纲领NSC 8系列文件与具体政策相结合，分析美国在朝鲜战争之前对韩政策逻辑。正是美军急于撤出朝鲜半岛，援助才成为实现这一目标并将消极影响降至最低的手段。国务院还不得不规范李承晚政权的内外行为以保持朝鲜南部的稳定，维护这样一个反共桥头堡的同时又不至卷入与社会主义阵营的直接冲突。美韩关系奠基阶段的一些关键词，如“边缘”、“象征性”和“稳定”等对于理解整个李承晚时期的美国对韩决策有着重要的意义。第三章是论文的重点章节。美韩之间围绕“三八线”和停战问题的分歧与争斗充分表明美国全球战略与地区国家利益的矛盾冲突，而韩国在美国朝鲜战争政策调整中的从属地位则体现了二者关系的不平衡性。在1952年韩国宪政危机和1953年美韩结盟谈判过程中，华盛顿对李承晚政权逐渐形成了“价值与负担”的决策认知，并在决策层出现了不同的政策倾向。国务院应付这两起事件所表现出的决策游移反映了在冷战背景下，对外遏制共产主义与对内规范盟国行为的两难困境。第四章通过分析美韩在日内瓦会议、中立国监察委员会事件以及经济和军事援助问题上的争执与协调，说明李承晚政权作为美国西太平洋军事同盟体系一环的重要价值，同时又给美国的全球战略部署带来的政策负担。这一阶段是美国规制政策遭到削弱的时期：为了维护李承晚政权的反共价值，强化远东遏制社会主义阵营的反共体系，美国不断对韩国政府失当的军事、政治和经济政策进行姑息妥协，从而为其最终走向覆灭埋下了祸根。第五章叙述了国内、国际合法性丧失殆尽的李承晚政权在“四·一九”起义洪流中土崩瓦解的历史，而美国政府在此过程中表现出来的消极被动，与以往的决策游移如出一辙。李承晚政权的覆灭引发了美国决策层的思考，成为调整其对韩政策目标排序的思想源流。1960—1961年针对李承晚、张勉和朴正熙三个政权的外交实践，美国试图寻找自身政策诉求与韩国社会现实之间的最佳结合点。朴正熙军事统治体制建立后，美韩同盟关系在新的起点上得以继续。更多还原

【Abstract】 As one of the mainstays of American Asian-Pacific alliance system, the Korean-American ally played a duel-role of containment of Soviet and China. The Syngman Rhee administration laid the foundation of the alliance which functioned as containment of communism and as regulation of allies. Most existing studies focus on the rivalry for the Peninsular among great powers and fail to cast a light on the internal alliance. By glimpsing inwardly, researchers will find it quite interesting how the US viewed, evaluated and responded to Rhee’s conducts. The American decision-makers’ perception of Rhee regime and the ensuing various orientations in decision-making process deserve more academic concern.This dissertation refers to the relevant monographs and articles and bases its arguments on the declassified archives from National Security Council, CIA files, Department files on Korean internal affairs and Foreign Relations of United States, etc. International relations theories are expected to be fused into historical narrative to demonstrate the impact of Rhee’s domestic and foreign actions on the Department, which resulted in a duel-perception of asset and liability of Rhee regime. This perception, together with Washington’s double aims — national security interests and ideological rivalry between the two camps — contribute to the American decision-making dilemma between containing communism externally and regulating allies internally during the Cold War. What’s more, this case exemplifies the structure and nature of the Cold War through regional affairs.The dissertation is composed of three parts. The introduction reviews the studies nowdays on the US-Korea relations during the Rhee period and puts forward research project on this subject. Correspondingly, the research questions discussed in the dissertation are summarized in the conclusion. The main body explains the research questions following the logic of America’s selecting, bolstering and losing Rhee regime.The First Chapter examines the interaction between the Soviet-US global confrontation and bipolarized politics in the South on two levels — Department-USMG and USMG-South Korean politics. The Cold War in Korea caused the end of the Joint Commission negotiation and hence the US-USSR cooperation was replaced by adversarial intensions, policies and actions. Rhee came into power just because his strong pro-America and anti-communism attitudes satisfied the American strategy in the South.The Second Chapter combines the NSC/8 and its crystallizations to analyze the American policies toward ROK before the Korean War. It’s the Department’s hope to disengage from the Peninsular that rationalize its assistance policy to minimize the negative influence of withdrawal and regulation of Rhee’s conducts to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet or China. Some oft-repeated words in this period, such as periphery, symbol and status quo, matter greatly in understanding American policy toward Rhee administration.The Third Chapter highlights the dissertation and mirrors US-Rhee’s divergence on the 38° demarcation line and the Armistice, which embodies the contradiction of American global strategy with ROK’s national interests. The affiliated role of ROK in the American war policy shifting from military engagement to limited war shows the inequality of the two partners. The constitutional crisis in 1952 and armistice negotiation with ROK in 1953 led Washington to form the duel-perception of asset and liability of Rhee, which fostered different policy priorities when handling him. The two cases reflected an American dilemma oscillating between containment and regulation.The Fourth Chapter unfolds US-Korea controversies and mediations on the Geneva Conference, NNSC, military redeployment and economic assistance policy. Those facts cemented Rhee as not only asset of anti-communism fortress in Western Pacific area but liability to the US global strategy and ideological competition. This period witnessed the undermining regulation policy of US toward Rhee regime and compromises to Rhee’s misconducts which led to his final collapse.The Last Chapter retraces the downfall of Rhee who had lost its international and domestic legitimacy. The passivity of the Department in the April Revolution repeated the dilemma before. Reexaminations among the top officials in the Department triggered by the incident preluded JFK’s policy changes toward Korea. The experiences of dealing with Syngman Rhee, Chang Myon and Park Chung-hee reveal that the US was trying to accommodate his policy to Korean social environment. With the Park regime being established, the Washington-Seoul alliance step into a new era.更多还原