【作者】 彭溆；

【导师】 朱榄叶；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法学院 ， 国际法学， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 国际条约和国际惯例是国际法最重要的两个渊源,但是,当今一些国际司法机构做出的裁决在国际法中的地位日渐突出,典型的代表是欧共体法院和世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization,简称WTO)的争端解决机制。根据《国际法院规约》第38条的规定,这些国际司法机构的裁决居于国际法渊源的第四位次,传统上认为其不具有与国际条约和国际惯例相同的强制拘束效力。1随着国际社会的法制化和国际争端解决的司法化,国际条约在适用过程中,由于条约规定的不明确或者立法缺失而产生的争端,越来越多地倾向于通过司法机构对条约做出司法解释来解决,而不是寻求立法程序修订条约或者重新制定规则。2这些司法机构的裁决不仅对争端当事方产生强制拘束力,而且会随着判例效应扩及到所有成员,由此产生了司法造法的效力,逐步发展成为国际法中地位日益重要的法律渊源。在众多的国际司法机构中,WTO的争端解决机构无疑是最受瞩目同时也是备受争议的一个。一方面,WTO的争端解决机构自1995年成立12年来取得了显著的成就,无可争议地成为全球“最有效的争端解决机构”,3为WTO规则得到切实遵守和执行、保障多边贸易体制的有效运转提供了有力的保证;但另一方面,WTO争端解决机构的司法造法活动也加剧了WTO决策机构同司法机构之间的不平衡,产生了“宪法性危机”、“民主赤字”等诸多问题,引起了成员方和国际社会的普遍关注。对WTO争端解决机制的审查和改革的谈判自1997年开始,但到目前为止尚无任何正式的结果。因此,深入研究WTO争端解决中的司法造法问题,对于促进WTO争端解决机制的完善、分析司法造法在国际争端解决司法化中的作用及发展趋势,研究司法造法这一国际法规则的创设形式给国际法带来的新变革具有重要的理论和实践意义。本文的目的是籍WTO的争端解决为例,分析司法造法在国际争端解决的司法化过程中发挥的作用,并预测其发展。文章主体共分为三部分。第一部分为概述,包括概念界定、背景介绍和历史回顾三个方面。首先界定司法、司法化、司法能动主义的概念,然后介绍WTO争端解决所处的国际争端解决的司法化进程背景,再回顾从拟建中的国际贸易组织到关税与贸易总协定再到WTO争端解决的演进。第二部分通过对WTO争端解决中发展的新规则的考察,论证WTO争端解决机构的司法性质以及争端解决机构创立新规则的造法本质,从而确认WTO争端解决中确实存在司法造法行为。文章的第三部分对WTO争端解决中的司法造法现象进行评价,既分析在WTO争端解决中出现司法造法的必要性和现实性,也指出司法造法进一步发展的局限性。最后探讨了面对WTO司法机构与决策机构严重失衡的宪法性危机,WTO成员方应如何做出努力完善WTO争端解决机制,从而保障多边贸易机制的有效运作。本文主要采取实证研究和比较研究的方法。作者以WTO争端解决机制的大量案例为基础,研究争议双方和第三方的诉讼主张,以及专家小组和上诉机构的报告中对事实部分的认定和对法律问题的分析。其次考察包括欧共体、美国等在内的发达国家成员方和众多发展中国家成员方政府对待争端解决结果的国内政治反响及立法调整,包括对争端解决结果的尊重和执行情况,以及对DSU审查和改革提出的建议。同时通过梳理大量的非政府组织以及国际法和国际政治学者对WTO争端解决机制的批判观点了解市民社会的愿望。运用比较法的研究方法,目的是为了借鉴国际法院、国际海洋法法院、欧洲共同体法院、欧洲人权法院等高度司法化的国际司法机构及普通法国家国内的判例法实践,一方面突出WTO争端解决机制的特殊性和显著发展,另一方面为WTO争端解决机构的司法造法寻求理论基础和实践指导。WTO争端解决制度设立的背景是国际争端解决的司法化潮流。首先,国际争端解决的司法化应当意味着传统的外交争端解决机制逐步被司法或准司法机制所代替。其次,国际争端解决的司法化应当意味着国际法规则由“软法”向“硬法”的过渡和转变。再次,司法化应当意味着国际体制的宪政化。所谓的宪政化意味着三权分立、权力制衡及司法审查制度的设立。WTO的争端解决制度最初的雏形是《哈瓦那宪章》中所设计的高度司法化的争端解决模式,由于ITO的流产未能付诸实施;在GATT生效的近50年间形成了以政治和外交手段为主解决争端的实践,但在GATT后期也表现出了较强的司法化倾向;WTO成立以后,建立了全新的争端解决制度,其强制管辖权的确立、上诉机构的设立以及裁决结果的强制拘束力显现出高度司法化的特征,无可争议地成为最有效的国际争端解决机构。在经历了早期GATT的外交解决争端模式之后,WTO的争端解决机制回复到了ITO设想的高度司法化的机制。法官在案件审理中确实在造法,这一点连国际法庭的法官也不例外。国际司法机构或准司法机构在争端解决过程中,通过对国际条约做出有拘束力的解释和澄清创设新的国际法规则,产生了司法造法的效力。在WTO争端解决中同样存在司法造法的现象。专家小组和上诉机构在解释WTO各涵盖协定的过程中创造性地确立了一系列程序性和实体性的规则。程序性规则例如“法庭之友”陈述材料的采用、举证责任的分担;实体性规则如合理期待原则的确定,关于贸易与环境等非贸易问题的冲突解决等。2000年在“美国1916年法案”中,专家组和上诉机构正式使用了“WTO case law (WTO案例法)”这一提法。虽然在“日本酒税案”中上诉机构明确指出,“裁决报告除对争端当事方之外,它们是没有拘束力的。”但人们不难发现,在WTO专家组和上诉机构报告中大量反复引用先前通过的裁决报告,形成了事实上的先例制度。WTO争端解决过程中的司法造法行为是必要的,也是可行的。WTO庞大复杂的法律框架中,不可避免地存在规则模糊不清甚至缺失的情况;而决策机制中严格的“一致同意”原则导致政治决策机构几乎无法及时有效地补充、修订和创设新规则,争端解决机构在无所适用的情况下必然要“造法”,以便顺利有效地解决争端,打破政治谈判的僵局,保障多边贸易体制的正常运行。与决策机构的表决机制相反,乌拉圭回合确立的“反向协商一致”原则使得专家组和上诉机构的裁决报告在DSB得以准自动通过,这也为争端解决机构的造法活动创立了便利条件。但WTO争端解决中的司法造法也受到种种限制,制约其过度发展。WTO争端解决机构的司法造法活动不仅承受来自WTO内部的政治压力和外部以NGO为代表的国际市民社会的监督,也同时受到争端解决机构的自我约束。首先, DSU明确规定争端解决机构不得增加或者减损成员方的权利义务,因此司法造法缺乏法律依据。其次,在WTO内部,法官在一定情况下,须适度且必要地向政治妥协。一旦专家小组和上诉机构的裁决被认定违反了DSU的规定增加了成员方的义务,将不可避免地导致成员方的行政机构受到施压而对争端解决程序的结果置之不理,甚至有大国以退出WTO相要挟。另外,低水平的救济措施也反映了成员方对待司法机构的谨慎态度。第三,虽然没有国内宪法中规定的对司法权力专门形式的制约,但是在WTO中,争端解决机构要始终考虑其自身的合法性和有效性问题,这使得司法机构会不断自觉反省,以求达到和政治决策机构的一致。最后,NGO和其他非成员方的压力也提出了WTO体系的外部合法性问题。同强大的司法机构相比较,WTO的政治决策机构显得软弱无力、效率低下,这一问题自WTO成立以来就始终存在。对于如何解决目前WTO中决策机构与司法机构失衡的问题,存在截然不同的主张。有的主张恢复GATT的外交解决争端模式;有的主张进一步强化争端解决机构的权力。在国际争端解决日益司法化的趋势下,重拾GATT的外交解决争端模式无疑是逆潮流而行;如果要进一步加强司法机构的权力,则缺乏对争端解决机制施行有效控制的安全阀,成员方只会更加坚持手中的否决权,况且能否得到进一步加强司法化所需的充分政治支持仍然是一个值得怀疑的问题。这样非但不能加强多边贸易机制的合法性和有效性,反而会使之遭受损害,甚至瓦解。WTO成员方应当采取积极的措施,譬如充分利用《建立世界贸易组织协定》第IX:2条“授权解释”可能是一种有益的尝试。总之,一个法律体系应当是法制化的,但是也应当注意到,争端解决机制有可能会发生过度法制化的现象。一方面我们不能混淆政治与司法的界限,应当对WTO争端解决中的政治与司法行为加以区分,而另一方面也必须保证这个以规则为基础,司法化的争端解决机制不会导致过度司法化的结果。更多还原

【Abstract】 International treaties and customary law are the two primary sources of international law. Yet today, decisions handed down by international courts such as the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), or other adjudicatory bodies, such as the WTO, are increasingly prominent on the international landscape and in relations between countries. These decisions, however, are ranked as the fourth source in international law and have not been traditionally considered binding like treaties or customary law. Increasingly, treaties have left their interpretation to some form of adjudicatory body rather than resorting to amending the treaty or creating new law legislatively.Among all the international judicial organs, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is undoubtedly the most absorbing as well as the most controversial one. On the one hand, since its inception in 1995, the system has worked reasonably well in providing an effective mechanism through which WTO Members are able to resolve disputes and is therefore called“the most efficient dispute settlement body”. On the other, the imbalance in the WTO between ineffective rulemaking procedures and highly efficient judicial mechanisms raises intractable questions of democratic legitimacy, which attracts serious attention both of the Members and of the international society in general. Negotiations to review and reform the DSU have been taking place since 1997, however, without yielding any result so far. Thus, studying judicial lawmaking in the WTO dispute settlement assumes great importance both theoretically and practically in improving the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, in evaluating the role that judicial lawmaking plays in the judicialization of dispute settlement and in predicting its general trend, as well as in assessing its influence on the development of international law.This paper is divided into three parts. Part one offers the definition of judicial, judicialization, and judicial activism, then describes the judicialization of international dispute settlement as a general trend, and reviews the history of WTO dispute settlement mechanism during the ITO and GATT periods. Part two examines the new rules created by the WTO dispute settlement body and justifies them as judicial lawmaking in terms of the judicial organ of the WTO dispute settlement body, as well as the lawmaking nature of the WTO dispute settlement’s interpretation of rules. Part three argues that judicial lawmaking in the WTO dispute settlement is both inevitable and necessary. However, further development of the judicial lawmaking in WTO dispute settlement will meet both textual and political constraints. At the end this paper addresses the constitutional crisis problem generated by the imbalance between the WTO decision-making organ and judicial organ, and suggests various ways in which the WTO Members can contribute to the improvement of the dispute settlement system.This study takes a positive study and a comparative study approach. It builds on masses of GATT and WTO cases, complemented by the political responses of the Member states as well as opinions from the international society. Both, the claims of the disputing parties and the panel and Appellate Body reports are examined concerning the fact finding and legal reasoning. This paper also presents the WTO Members’implementation of the dispute settlement rulings, and their recommendations on the improvement of the DSU, which is crucial to acknowledge their attitude towards judicial lawmaking and their political response. Additionally, critiques from NGOs and international law scholars targeting the dispute settlement are exposed for the purpose of discussing the external legitimacy of the WTO. This paper takes a comparative study approach to compare the WTO dispute settlement mechanism with those of the International Court of Justice, International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, European Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights. It also draws on the case law theory in the Common Law system. By doing so, it identifies the uniqueness of the WTO dispute settlement and the outstanding progress it has thus far made; meanwhile it seeks to draw lessons from others for the improvement of the WTO dispute settlement system.Judicialization of the international dispute settlement is the context of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. First of all, judicialization of the international dispute settlement brings the transformation from the traditional diplomatic method to judicial or quasi-judicial method. Secondly, during the process of judicialization, more and more international law rules have gradually changed from soft law into hard law. Lastly, judicialization also leads to the constitutionalization of the international regime which is characterized by the separation of powers as well as judicial review mechanism.The WTO dispute settlement mechanism can be traced back to the ITO. The ITO Charter designed a rather elaborate procedure of third-party adjudication. Unfortunately, the ITO treaty did not come into force finally, due to the refusal by the United States Congress to ratify it. The first years of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism were characterized by the employment of the diplomatic method. The Tokyo Round trade negotiations, however, made a series of reforms to codify and legitimate the core elements of the adjudication procedure. The WTO established a new dispute settlement mechanism. The compulsory jurisdiction, the addition of the Appellate Body and the availability of meaningful and significant sanctions make it much more like a juridical order. After an initial diplomatic period, the WTO dispute settlement system returned to the legalistic model of the original International Trade Organization. Judges make law and this is the case even with international judges. International judicial organs or quasi-judicial organs, by interpreting and clarifying the treaty provisions during the dispute settlement process, create binding international rules and engage in judicial law making thereby.In the WTO dispute settlement, the panels and the Appellate Body create a series of new rules by interpreting the covered agreements of the WTO. The procedural rules include, inter alia, the adoption of the amicus curiae briefs, and the burden of proof rules. The substantive rules include, inter alia, the causation analysis in anti-dumping cases, reasonable expectation principles, and the trade-environment linkage issue. The US 1916 Act case panel and the Appellate Body, for the first time, used the term of“WTO case law”. Although the Appellate Body, in Japan― Tax on Alcoholic Beverages case, stated that the reports adopted by the DSB are not binding on anyone other than the disputing parties, it is not difficult to find that prior adopted panel reports and Appellate Body reports are largely, repeatedly and frequently quoted. Some scholars call it“de facto precedent”system.Judicial lawmaking in the WTO dispute settlement is both necessary and feasible. Judicial lawmaking inheres in the incompleteness of any system of rules. The WTO legal framework is so complicated that it is inevitable that there are some vague rules or even gaps. On the other hand, the WTO Agreement sets out a high standard of consensus for decision-making, except where certain specific fallbacks and exceptions are provided. This creates rigidities in the system which makes it rather difficult to amend old rules or create new rules. In addition, the panels and the Appellate Body have to respect Article 17.12 of the DSU, which states that, the "Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised . . . during the appellate proceedings." When confronted with a situation where there is no clear pre-existing rule, the judge must make a new rule to help with breaking the deadlock of multilateral negotiations, and to solve the disputes efficiently, although judges are reluctant to admit that they engage in judicial lawmaking. The negative consensus rule of the dispute settlement facilitates the judicial lawmaking since it makes the process virtually automatic.Judicial lawmaking in the WTO dispute settlement is, meanwhile, subject to many restrictions. The restrictions come from both, the internal forces by the Member States, and the external forces by the NGOs. In addition, the possibility of politically hostile reactions makes the judges exercise self restraint. First of all, according to DSU, "Members recognize that the dispute settlement system serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of public international law.”Therefore the judicial lawmaking in the WTO has been faced with the difficult task of obtaining legal credibility. Secondly, under certain circumstances, it is necessary for the judges to compromise with political actors. Otherwise, if panels and the Appellate Body decisions are seen as creating new obligations, the inevitable result will be to increase pressure on the Administration to ignore the results of the dispute settlement process; some powerful countries even claimed that they were prepared to leave GATT rather than give up certain important policies. The weak remedies, although might seem to be contrary to the conventional wisdom of a strengthened WTO dispute process, offer another good example of the restrictions on the DSB by the Member States. Thirdly, more than formal controls set in the domestic Constitution, it is the considerations of legitimacy and effectiveness that over time will keep the WTO judiciary in check with the WTO political branch. Their sensitivity to the fragile legitimacy makes international judges sometimes avoid rendering their opinions on particularly contentious issues, or refuse to clarify vague rules. Lastly, non-state actors, such as NGOs, small businesses, and the civil society in general, can and do influence the WTO political process even without a formal say or vote in WTO decision-making. They do it by questioning its external legitimacy.The political decision making process appears weak and inefficient compared with the new dispute settlement process. There can be no doubt that the tensions between the dispute settlement process and the political decision making process have grown since the establishment of the WTO in 1995. If legislative response to judicial developments is not available or not working, the independent judiciary becomes an uncontrolled decision-maker and is weakened in its legitimacy. This is called“democracy deficit”of the WTO. There are different answers to this problem. Someone suggests reverting to a GATT like diplomatic dispute settlement process. The author would argue that it would be“a regression towards some of the very important problems in the GATT era”4 and risk an ineffective world trade regime. The other suggests further strengthening the judicial power. This was exactly one of the reasons used to sell majority voting in the E.C. in the wake of judicial activism by the ECJ. 5 Countries would insist even more on their veto rights. It is highly questionable that sufficient political support is available to make such further legalization digestible. Some of the most powerful members could walk away from their obligations. This, in turn, may undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the trade regime, or even make it collapse. The Member States should take active measures to help with the situation. Employment of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement could be a good try.A legal system should be legalistic, but on reflection it is clear that a dispute settlement system can become overly legalistic. In addition to separating and not confusing the political and legal aspects of WTO dispute settlement, it is also necessary to ensure that the implementation of a rule-based, legalistic dispute settlement system does not result in what might be called“over-legalization”.更多还原