【作者】 董志强；

【导师】 蒲勇健；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 本文专门研究显在或潜在的监督合谋对公司治理制度安排的影响,或者说公司治理监督制衡体系将怎样对显在和潜在的合谋做出适应性反应。所谓合谋,通俗地讲就是相互勾结。公司治理作为一种监督制衡体系,其中的合谋行为或潜在的合谋威胁是不可回避的问题。董事会-管理层勾结、财务舞弊、审计合谋等大量的合谋现象,已证实这个制衡体系中的多个代理人之间常常可以串通一气剥夺外部投资者的利益。但是,由于公司治理领域的研究一直未能引入组织合谋理论等分析框架,因此学术界对其合谋现象的理论研究是很缺乏的。同样,来自组织合谋理论领域的专家,似乎又未曾对公司治理中的合谋现象研究给予充分关注。因此,本文尝试运用组织合谋理论的分析框架来分析公司治理领域的监督合谋现象,并寻找恰当的公司治理制度安排。这样的研究应当具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。本文从纯粹的经济理论视角研究了三个具体议题:一是试图从监督合谋的角度回答如何设计独立董事的报酬?二是试图从监督合谋角度解释为什么有的国家选择单层制治理模式而另一些国家选择双层制模式?三是回答如何防范审计合谋。关于独立董事的报酬,学术界存在两种不同的观点。一种观点认为从“独立性”考虑,独立董事与公司的利益瓜葛应尽可能少,因此支付固定报酬是最恰当的;而另一种观点从代理理论出发,认为没有利益瓜葛也就意味着独立董事对公司将漠不关心,因此必须对独立董事支付激励报酬,以激励他们尽心尽责。而本文的理论模型表明,当声誉市场的约束足够强,对独立董事支付固定报酬是合适的。如果缺乏声誉市场,但是对投资者保护足够强,也可以支付给独立董事以固定报酬。但是,如果既没有好的职业市场声誉约束,又缺乏良好的投资者保护,则有必要对独立董事支付激励报酬以防范他们与公司控制者合谋。就我国而言,可能正是最后一种情况。关于公司治理模式选择问题,一个众所周知的现象是:选择单层制的国家,通常投资者保护较好,而股权比较分散或者集中度相对比较低;选择双层制的国家,通常投资者保护较差,而股权也相对比较集中——大股权控制企业是很常见的。这种现象究竟是偶然,还是有其内在的经济逻辑?学术界似乎一直缺乏一套理论来对此进行解释。本文发展了一个公司治理模式选择的理论模型,揭示出双层制正是对较弱的投资者保护和大股权控制的适应性制度安排。在强或中偏强的投资者保护下,股权将相对分散,公司将缺乏大股东或者大股东的能力难以控制更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation addresses the effects of explicit or implicit collusion on corporate governance (CG) system. In other words, it focuses on that how the balancing institution arrangements of CG will react felicitously to the explicit or implicit collusion.Collusion, in popular speaking, means a secret agreement between two or more agents for a fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful purpose, which is harmful for principal. As a monitoring and balancing system, corporate governance faces a lot of collusive behaviors. Many collusion facts such as board-management collusion, financial cheating, and audit collusion show that, in this counterpoise system each agents can collude with the others for their private benefits at the costs of investors especially outside investors. However, the theoretical research on collusions in CG is very few, because the organizational collusion theory is absence in CG research fields, and economists from economics of organization pay little attention to collusion in CG. This dissertation tries to apply the theory of collusion to analyze the collusion phenomenon in CG fields, and tries to find out the appropriate institutions arrangements of CG.This dissertation studies three themes from pure economic theoretical angle. The first themes is how to design the compensation for independent outside director; the second tries to explain why some countries choose one-tier CG system while the others choose two-tier CG system; the last discusses how to deter the audit collusion. The research angle is from collusion theory for each theme.For the independent outside directors’compensation system, there are two different views in academe. One of the two views claims that the fixed compensation is more suitable, because it is helpful for keeping the“independence”of outside director. The other view is contrast, and it protests that the incentive compensation is much better, because the agency theory tells us one who has few benefits in company will do not care the company. The model in this paper shows that, the fixed compensation is more suitable while there is a strong reputation market for directors; if reputation market is weak, and law protection of investor is good, fixed compensation is also a wise choice; however, it is necessary to establish collusion-proof incentive compensation with weak reputation market and bad investor protection. In our china, the fact is just the last case.For CG model selection, a well-known fact is: there are often good protections of更多还原