【作者】 雷勇；

【导师】 蒲勇健；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 论文研究企业员工有效激励模式与退出机制，注重激励机制与退出机制的结合研究，包括两层含义：一是从裁员视角下研究企业如何构筑有效的激励机制，二是在有效激励模式下研究企业如何设计退出机制。 为了构筑裁员视角下的有效激励机制，论文通过把外生的裁员概率或基于绩效的内生裁员概率引入激励模型之中，针对员工类型相同与相异，企业是否设立利润分享激励模式以及员工素质是否对称多种情形，分别建立了若干个包含裁员概率的委托．代理激励模型，在模型中，委托人企业是风险中性的，代理人员工是风险中性或是风险规避的。研究表明：非对称信息会诱导同类员工偷懒行为，外生裁员概率抑制员工的劳动积极性，对员工的有效劳动构成一种威胁，但裁员概率降低了代理成本；外生裁员机制并不影响信息非对称下的晋升激励和固定收入组合机制持有的避免员工道德风险的功能，实现员工对称信息下的努力程度；以绩效评估为特征的内生裁员机制能够促使异类员工更加努力工作，提高产量，相应地也增加了工资支出；高能员工比低能员工更努力，提高员工裁员绩效标准和高能员工比例，有利于降低代理成本。 为了设计有效激励模式下的退出机制，论文明确了企业基于绩效裁员的原则，通过连接裁员概率与标准绩效，使裁员概率内生化，在假定员工实际产出可观测条件下，针对企业是否设立利润分享激励模式与员工素质信息是否对称多种情形，分别建立了多个企业裁员模型，在模型中，委托人企业与代理人员工都是风险中性的，以企业利润为目标，留用概率和员工分离补偿为特征，根据显示原理，采用最优化理论求解模型，对比有无利润分享激励模式下的裁员机制，再对裁员机制中所涉及相关参数进行比较静态分析，在企业采取自愿性裁员与强制性裁员两种不同方式下，分别探讨不同裁员退出机制设计与影响问题，整个裁员退出机制都采取菜单式员工自选择合同形式，可以避免裁员出现逆向选择。研究表明：企业存在最佳裁员规模，企业最佳裁员方案总是裁减更多低能员工，留用更多高能员工，对退出的员工应按不同类型支付最低分离补偿金，利润分享模式会降低补偿金，但对信息租金无影响；非对称信息会导致企业扩大裁员规模与支付信息租金，信息不对称程度越强，信息租金越大；裁员方式会影响分离补偿支付，企业在自愿性裁员方式下对两类员工的分离补偿支付要多于强制性裁员方式下的付出，裁员方式不影响裁员规模。 针对裁员中可能出现的逆向选择问题，论文还设立了最低保证金与目标考核两种信息甄别机制，用于揭示员工素质真实信息，便于不同类型员工有效分离。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis studies the efficient incentive mode and layoff mechanism of employees in enterprise, including two meanings: one is how to construct efficient incentive mechanism from the point of layoff mechanism, the other is how to design layoff mechanism in the case of the efficient incentive mode.In order to construct efficient incentive mechanism from the layoff mechanism, the thesis puts the exogenous layoff probability or endogenetic layoff probability linked with performance into the incentive model. Several principal-agent incentive models are respectively built up comprising layoff probability, aimed at the similarities and differences of employees, whether the mode of profit share is set up or not, and even symmetry or asymmetry information of the employees’ abilities. In these models, both the principal (owner) are risk-neutral, and the agents (employees) are also risk-neutral or risk-averse. The research shows that asymmetry information can cause sluggish behaviour for the same type of employees, the exogenous layoff probability can restrain labour positivity and threaten the efficient labour of the employees, and reduce the agent cost. While endogenetic layoff probability cannot impact on the function of the assembled mechanisms consisting of promotion and fixed income under asymmetry information, which can avoid the moral risk of employees to achieve the same degree of their labour under symmetry information. The endogenetic layoff probability characteristic of evaluating performance enables employees with different types to work harder, increase the output and accordingly gain higher payment. The excellent employees endeavor harder than those with lower ability. The higher standard of performance and proportion of employees with higher ability can benefit to depressing the agent cost.In order to study the optimal layoff mechanism, the thesis sticks to the layoff principle of performance to display layoff probability, by means of connection of layoff probability and standard of performance. When the employees’ output is observable and the employees’ abilities are complete information or in asymmetry information, whether the mode of profit share is set up or not, more than two layoff models are established. In these models, both owner and employees are risk-neutral, and the owner is the principal and the employees are the agents. Based on the mode of profit share and the performance principle and the object of the enterprise, the models contain layoff probability and severance pay. Following the revelation principle, we solve the更多还原