【作者】 朱振中；

【导师】 吕廷杰；

【作者基本信息】 北京邮电大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 双边市场是现代经济系统的重要组成部分。通过双边市场的相关理论研究，可以为企业制定合理的商业战略提供理论依据，可以为制定产业发展战略、建立反垄断和规制制度提供参考，为完善产业组织理论做出贡献。同时，对双边市场开展细致研究对于我国相关双边产业的发展与改革也具有相当重要的现实意义。 本文利用博弈论、信息经济学与产业组织理论，主要研究双边市场框架下的产业竞争与公共政策问题。本文共分三大部分，第一部分为理论基础，第二部分为产业竞争分析，第三部分为公共政策分析，本文的公共政策主要是指涉及竞争问题的反垄断与规制政策。 第一部分包括第二章和第三章。第二章探讨双边市场的概念与特征，分析了双边市场的成立条件，总结了双边市场实例，并对双边市场进行分类总结。 第三章主要对双边市场研究进行文献综述，并提出了双边市场理论的研究框架。 第二部分包括第四到八章，这是本文的重点。第四章通过构建平台竞争的古诺模型，分析了非对称均衡的存在性以及不同竞争体制的福利意义。 第五章构建了一个具有负外部性的双边市场模型，以考察由消费者和广告资助的媒体企业之间的双寡头垄断竞争。然后应用该模型分析了媒体与广告商组建垂直联盟的激励问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Two-sided market is the important component of modern economic system. Performing theoretical research on two-sided market could provides us with theoretical foundation for firm’s business strategies, afford us helpful reference to industry development strategies, antitrust and regulation system, and contributes to a perfect industrial organization. At the same time it also has significant practical meaning for development and reform of two-sided industry in China.Based on game theory, information economics and industrial organization, this dissertation mainly studies the issues on industry competition and public policy from two-sided market perspectives. The dissertation consists of 3 parts, in which the first part is the theoretical foundation on two-sided market, the second part is the analysis on industry competition and the third part is the analysis on public policy including antitrust and regulation which mainly deal with competition.The first part includes chapter 2 and 3. Chapter 2 explores the concept and characteristics of two-sided market and analyzes the condition where two-sided market comes into existence. Finally a large number of examples of two-sided market are sum up and types of two-sided market are measured off according to relevant literature.Chapter 3 provides a summary on two-sided market literature and develops a research framework of two-sided market.From chapter 4 to chapter 8 are Part 2 which is the kernel of this dissertation. By developing a Cournot model of platform competition, the fourth chapter discusses the equilibrium condition of asymmetry platform competition and welfare implications for different competition regime.In order to investigate duopoly competition between firms financed by both consumers and advertisers, chapter 5 extends an existing model of two-sided market with negative network externality and applies it to analyze the incentive of medium firms to form vertical alliance with advertisers.Based on a developed framework of competition analysis, the sixth chapter explores更多还原