【作者】 刘惠萍；

【导师】 张世英；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 自从独立董事制度被引入我国上市公司治理以来,独立董事虽然发挥了一些作用,但由于种种原因,特别是由于我国独立董事制度各种具体运行机制的不健全,导致我国独立董事在有效监督经理层、完善公司治理结构等方面的作用的充分发挥受到限制,使得对我国独立董事制度具体运行机制的研究迫在眉睫。然而,目前对独立董事制度运行机制的研究主要侧重于定性研究、实证研究,对定量研究非常缺乏。本文运用博弈论与委托代理理论,主要针对独立董事的激励机制、防范串谋机制、评价机制、市场准入与退出机制等进行了定量化研究与分析。其主要内容及成果如下:(1)就我国独立董事最优监督水平决策问题建立了模型,并对最优监督水平的影响因素进行了分析。(2)基于我国市场经济制度尤其是企业家选择机制和社会信誉评价机制不健全的实际国情,设计了一个声誉激励机制与显性激励机制相结合的最优动态契约模型,并对于如何有效发挥声誉激励机制在我国独立董事制度运行中的激励作用提出了一些具体建议。(3)分析了我国独立董事和管理层之间串谋行为的可能性及其原因,分别建立了内生报酬来源情形、外生报酬来源与再监督机制情形、同时防范事前串谋与事后串谋情形三种情形下的独立董事最优防范串谋契约模型,分析了最优契约条件,并在此基础上提出了一些具体建议与防范措施。(4)根据我国独立董事制度的特点,建立了适于我国独立董事的个体业绩评价指标体系,设计了基于网络层次分析法的独立董事模糊综合测评模型。(5)从市场、法律、组织、机构、提名制度等几个方面对设计与完善独立董事市场准入与退出机制提出了建议;采用博弈论方法,建立了独立董事市场的不完全信息动态博弈模型及引入市场清退机制的不完全信息动态博弈模型,得出了市场清退机制与市场信用制度替代关系等结论。(6)分析总结了我国独立董事面临的风险,对于建立与完善我国独立董事责任追究制度与独立董事利益保护机制提出了有益的建议。(7)对于本文所建立的独立董事声誉激励机制进行了模拟分析;对基于网络层次分析法的独立董事模糊综合测评模型进行了实证分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since independent director system is applied to listed corporates’ governance inChina, independent directors have played definite role. For a variety of reasons,however, especially because specific operating mechanisms of Chinese independentdirector system isn’t perfect, independent directors don’t give full play to functions ofsupervising managers and perfecting corporate governance. So it’s urgent to researchon operating mechanisms of Chinese independent director system. Whereas, now theresearch on that lays particular emphasis on qualitative analysis and demonstrationanalysis, the research based on quantitative analysis is lack. This dissertation focuseson the quantitative research about incentive mechanism, collusion-proof mechanism,assessment mechanism, market admittance and exit mechanism, adopting gametheory and principle-agent theory. The main contents and result are as follows.(1) A model about decision of optimal supervision level of independent directorsis made and effect factors of optimal supervision level are discussed.(2) In view of the situation of China that market economy system, especially itsenterpriser selection mechanism and social credit valuation mechanism, isn’tamplified, a model of dynamic optimal contract about combining reputation incentivemechanism and explicit incentive one is designed. Some proposals about how to bringthe incentive of reputation mechanism into full play are tabled.(3) The possibility and reasons for that there is collusion behavior betweenindependent directors and managers are analyzed. Three models of optimalcollusion-proof contract are designed, respectively under the case of endogenousreward, one of exogenous reward and re-supervision mechanism and one of ex-antecollusion-proof and ex-post collusion-proof simultaneously, their optimal conditionsare found and some measures of collusion-proof are put forward.(4) Considering characteristics of independent director system of China, anassessment index system of independent directors is made and a model of fuzzyintegration measurement of independent directors based on Analytic Network Processis established.(5) Suggestions to designing and perfecting independent directors marketadmittance and exit mechanism on aspects of law, organization, institution andnomination system are made. Utilizing game theory and method, dynamic gamemodels of imperfect information with and without market exit mechanism are set up,conclusions such that market exit mechanism and market credit system havesubstitution relationship are provided.(6) Risks that independent directors are confronted with are summarized. Thenadvices about how to set up and consummate independent director duty affixationsystem and benefit protection mechanism are offered.(7) In this dissertation, simulation analysis about the model of dynamic optimalcontract about combining reputation incentive mechanism and explicit incentive oneis engaged. Moreover, an experimental study on a model of fuzzy integrationmeasurement of independent directors based on Analytic Network Process isconducted.更多还原