【作者】 侯强；

【导师】 沈玉志；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁工程技术大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 现有公司治理的研究是以股权分散下的股东与管理层之间的利益冲突为重点的,但对我国民营上市公司而言,公司的股东并非完全是缺位所有者,利益的冲突不仅包括股东与管理层之间的利益冲突,更重要的是控股股东与小股东以及控股股东与其最终委托人之间的利益冲突。因此,对控股股东的掏空行为进行有效的约束将构成现阶段我国民营上市公司治理的重要内容。在现有资料的基础上,本文借鉴产业组织的SCP的分析范式,以民营控股上市公司为研究对象,通过对民营控股上市公司的股权结构,绩效和控股股东行为的理论和实证分析,以解决核心代理问题为目标,使民营上市企业各行为主体形成有效监督,取得良好的市场绩效,进而为实现证券市场良好运行提供支撑。本文系统的分析了我国民营上市公司的股本结构,绩效现状及其治理特点。从财务绩效的角度其低于非民营上市公司,但市场绩效高于非民营上市公司,不同的上市方式其绩效表现存在明显差异。我国的民营上市公司从形式上建立了“三权分立”的治理模式,但由于一股独大,股权制衡弱,控制权配置市场失效,退市机制的缺位等因素的影响,使得控股股东滥用控制权,中小股东的共益权几乎被完全剥夺,自益权也难以保障。本文首先从核心代理问题的研究范围入手,研究了核心代理问题的形成机制,分析了我国民营上市公司存在控股股东掏空中小股东和上市公司利益的成因,同时分析了现金流权与控制权分离程度和股权分置对核心代理问题的影响。其次按照利益侵占的方式和手段,结合我国上市公司最近几年所暴露出来的各类事件,分析民营上市公司核心代理问题中控股股东的掏空行为。控股股东为了自身利益可以通过关联方交易的方式从上市公司转移资源,具体包括资产销售、转移定价、借款担保、剥夺公司机会,甚至是直接占用等,控股股东也可以在不转移任何一种资产的情况下,增加控股股东的份额,如内部人交易、秘密并购等方式实施掏空行为。再此基础上分析了内外部治理对核心代理问题中控股股东的行为的影响,即对外部监管的有效性,股权制衡和独立董事对控股更多还原

【Abstract】 The research emphasis of the corporate governance problem is the benefits conflictbetween shareholder and manager for a long time, which in the case of share scattering,indeed, is the center. To our Listed private companies, the shareholder is completely notabsence owner, and the benefits conflict not only lies in between shareholder andmanager, but also controlling shareholder and small shareholder, also controllingshareholder and its end client. Therefore, making valid restriction mainly constitutesgoverning our Listed Private Companies at present.This paper draws lessons from the SCP analysis type of the industrial organization,aiming at Listed private companies, through whose Equity Structure、behavior、resultstheory and empirical analysis, it aims at restricting shareholder’s tunneling, and thenstudies the optimization and approach of Listed private companies governing structure,in order to form valid supervise to the actor of Listed Private Business, obtain the goodmarket performance, and provide supports for stock market good.The paper systematically analyses present conditions and governmentcharacteristic of our Listed private companies. From the angle of the finance results, it islower than non-Listed private companies, however, from market performance, it ishigher, so performance is obviously different in a differently listed way. Our Listedprivate companies formally established " separation of powers—balances" model, butdue to the influences of “the final-say as a big shareholder” expiration of controlling themarket and lack of the market withdrawal mechanism, it makes controlling shareholderto abuses the power, meanwhile, identity and self-interest right of the small shareholdersnearly to be deprived. Commencing on central agency problem, it analyzes theformation mechanism, explaining origins and factors that controlling shareholdercorrodes small shareholders and listed company benefits in our Listed privatecompanies;at the same time, it analyzes the influence of untradeble share andseparation degree of control rights and cash flow rights on central agency problem.According to means of benefits occupation, it analyzes shareholder behavior of thelisted company, joining together what our listed companies have exposed in recent years.The big shareholders transfer the resources from the listed company through theconnection trade for the sake of the self interest, including the property sale, transfer ofthe list price, the debt guarantee, deprivation of company opportunity, even occupationetc;Another method is increasing shares of controlling shareholders under the situationof big shareholders not transferring any property, such as the trade the internal person,secretly booking etc.The paper analyses the impact of the internal and external governance on behaviorsof the controlling shareholders, namely the validity of external supervision;It analysesthe effectiveness that equity restriction and independent directors restrict tunneling ofcontrolling shareholders. Unified with central agency problem, it also analyses thepresent situation of stockholder’s rights structure, the behavior, the performance;andproposes hypothesis, then carries on it based on public data from the listed privatecompanies.The paper proposes policies and recommendations to solve the central agentproblem, whose formation mechanism acting as a breakthrough on the basis of thetheoretical and empirical analysis. Reforming the vote style, expanding the scope ofaccumulative ballot system, improving exercise way of voting right and carrying outavoidance system enhance inner shareholders equity forces, thereby reduce tunneling ofcontrolling shareholders;Enhancing faith obligation of controlling stockholders as innerrestraints, enhancing external administrative market and law restraints, consummatingultimate controllers disclosure of information system of listed companies, strengtheningsupervision to companies with a high degree of separation of control rights and cashflow rights, perfecting tunneling of controlling shareholders;Regulating the disclosureof information, increasing market warning system, setting up shareholder derivativelitigation system and introducing civil compensation increase tunneling costs, reducethe incentive for violations, thereby address central agency problem in order to restrictcontrolling shareholders tunnelling and protect the interests of small shareholders.更多还原