【作者】 梁劲；

【导师】 王先甲；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 系统工程， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 在过去相当长的时期内,世界各国一般都把电力工业作为一个整体划入垄断行业,并制定可相应的法律法规,对电力工业按垄断产业进行管制。但是,对于发电、输电、配电和售电四个环节,我们会发现情况差异是非常大的。在发电侧和用电侧存在多个竞争者,引入竞争是必要的,也是可行的;而在输电和配电环节,一般不允许多个竞争者存在直接进行竞争,否则就会造成严重的重复建设,浪费社会资源。因此,输配电市场的经济特性在市场组织、经营目标、运作模式、竞争手段、经济信息等方面都具有自己的特点,必须进行深入的研究。只有充分认识输配电网的经济特性和技术特征,才能有效地组织输配电市场,制定合理可行的输配电价与激励机制,并对输配电的自然垄断环节进行必要的激励管制和契约管理,从而发挥市场在提高效率、促进资源优化配置中的重要作用。本论文是在我国电力工业改革,以电力市场建设为背景,研究输配电市场不同利益主体间存在不对称信息及利益冲突时,各参与人间采取行动时的博弈与均衡,因此,输配电市场运营的激励和契约机制设计是本文主要的研究内容。 本文主要运用综合研究评价模型、激励理论及博弈论等相关知识在电力市场不同利益主体间不对称信息的获取,冲突博弈与激励机制设计中的应用,结合输配电企业运营的管理现状,分析了输配电企业运营的冲突与合作的相关问题,全文共分八章,形成八个部分相对各自成体而又完整统一、相互联系的研究内容。总体概括起来,第一章提供了论文研究的背景和意义,第二章介绍了研究的理论方法,第三、四、五、六、七章是理论方法的具体应用,论文第八章最后总结了全文并提出了展望。 第一章为绪论,提出本文研究的背景和意义,电力市场改革的发展与输配电经济特性的介绍,分析了目前输配电市场上管理机制上存在的问题和介绍了现行的对自然垄断性行业中引入其激励机制一些方法,并对本论文的研究内容和相关文献作了概述。 第二章介绍了本文研究的理论原理与方法。在电力市场上已经形成多元利益主体的局面,势必各利益主体间存在冲突与一致、竞争与合作的新型关系,这就需要新的理论和方法来分析。这里介绍了模糊综合评判决策来获取消费者的偏好更多还原

【Abstract】 In the past years, the power industry is generally regarded as a monopoly property by all over the counties and the government sets down the relative laws to regulate the power industry. However, we find that it is different for power plant, transmission, distribution and sale sector. It is necessary and essential to introduce competitive mechanism into generation-side and supply-side but not to transmission and distribution, or else it will lead to repetitive construction and social resource waste. So the economy characteristic of transmission and distribution market that involves market organization, management aim, operational model, and competitive means and economic information is unique. Only sufficiently knowing economic and technical characters of transmission and distribution market can we organize effectively power market operation, establish reasonable electricity price and incentive mechanism, and control the natural monopoly necessarily of transmission and distribution market with incentive methods and contract management so that market mechanism plays an important role in improving efficiency and collocating social resource. On the background of electricity reform and of establishment of the power market in China, this paper researches the conflicts and action equilibriums of the multi-interest units in the transmission and distribution market when they take actions under asymmetry information. Therefore, the principal research content in this paper is the incentive and contracts’ mechanism design in electricity transmission and distribution operation.This paper uses fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model, incentive theory and game theory and something like that to obtain information, to solve conflict and to design incentive mechanism among the interest units. According to the present management situation of electricity transmission and distribution operation, this paper analyses the relative conflicts, coordination, competition and cooperation problems of electricity transmission and distribution operation. This paper is divided into eight chapters, which are respectively unattached relatively, as well as formed a correlativeintegration. The first chapter, as a whole, presents the basic surroundings and realistic significance, the second chapter gives theoretical methods, the third, the fourth, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh are involved in the material application of the theoretical methods and the final chapter of the paper is a summary and expectation of the overall content.The first chapter introduces the background, signification, the present power market reform and the economic characteristic. Also, it analyzes some existing problems in the current management system of electricity transmission and distribution market. Additionally it recommends some popular incentive methods to run in the present natural monopoly industry, and finally summaries the main research work.In chapter two, the basic concepts and academic methods of this paper are introduced. In the power market, there is a multi-interest-unit patter, in which all the interest units have constituted a new type of relation involved in conflicts, competition and cooperation, therefore the new theories and methods will be necessarily adopted. Here, the paper employs the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model decision to acquire consumers’ preferences; and the solution of Nash negotiation model accords with a certain rational and fair principle, so this kind of model is widely applied to the negotiation among the conflictive interest units. The principal-agent theory is applied to study asymmetry information which have an influence on consequence of market operation, and how to set down market rules to avoid the asymmetry information which transforms power market into higher efficiency level.In chapter three, the electricity consumers’ behaviors and preferences are researched. But he electricity consumers’ behaviors and preferences are private information, which it is difficult to know for utility company. This paper comes up with two kinds of models both single-valued and interval- valued fuzzy comprehensive evaluation for utility company to get about users’ sufficient information on demand-side consumption identity, which are effective measures for utility company’s marketing research.In chapter four, the operation mechanism of contracts model for interruptibleload management in power market is studied. Under informational asymmetry between utilities and customers, how to found successful incentive management for utility company to induce all kinds of customers to take part in it and voluntarily reveal their true outage costs information, the paper builds two types of interruptible load management models both static and dynamic ones based on an incentive compatible contract model to avoid inefficiencies in interruptible load management when the proposed model allows customers having maximum interruptible load as maximizing the utility or minimizing the total outage cost of customers.In chapter five, with the development of the reform in electricity market step-by-step and introducing competitive situation in it, it is necessary for the large user to carry out immediately the policy of direct power-purchase. In this paper the mathematics models on power supply contract between regional energy utility and the large users are established in both monopoly and competitive environment in which not only consumers’ preference under incomplete information, but also other competitors’ strategies be taken into account. In order to sign contract with various types of consumers, the regional energy utility must design different contracts, which an incentive compatible contract model is developed for different consumers. This paper will surly be beneficial to the test for the direct power-purchase for the large user.In chapter six, Nash principle of negotiation of hearing witness of ferm i is introduced and through it this sector discusses the negotiation for getting more cooperation surplus that is a base of negotiation between utility company and customer for maximizing their own benefits. Through Nash principle of negotiation, the fair and reasonable benefits can be gained. Eventually, not only the character of Nash negotiatory price but also the factors to influence Nash negotiatory price are investigated.In chapter seven, the pricing regulation model of power transmission and distribution is studied. In this paper, the incentive mechanism models are designed under asymmetry information about product cost and market demand, which can induce the utility company to report true private type and control the over pricesuccessfully. The models can the incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint required for participants and can maximize social welfare.In the end of the paper there is a summary and expectation for the whole paper.更多还原