【作者】 朱中云；

【导师】 王先甲；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 系统工程， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 存款保险制度是为了保护存款人的合法利益、维护金融体系的安全与稳定而建立专门的存款保险公司,规定吸收存款的金融机构必须或自愿地按吸收存款的一定比例向存款保险公司进行投保,在金融机构出现支付危机或陷入破产境地时,由存款保险公司向其提供资金援助或直接向其存款人支付部分或全部存款的一种制度安排。由于存款保险公司、银行和存款人三者之间存在的信息不对称,存款保险制度将主要带来两方面的问题:逆向选择问题和道德风险问题。 本论文以不对称信息的存款保险为研究背景,对存款保险公司、银行和存款人三方由于信息不对称而引发的系列问题作了系统分析,将信息经济学、机制设计的研究方法引入“信息匮乏”的存款保险决策问题,设计了满足个体理性约束、激励相容约束和帕累托有效性的存款保险机制以克服不对称信息下的逆向选择和道德风险问题。本论文所研究的理论方法对于建立我国的存款保险制度,保护存款人的合法利益,维护金融体系的安全与稳定,保障存款保险资金的安全性,深化金融体制改革,防范和化解金融风险具有重要指导意义。 本论文共分七章,各章主要内容如下: 第一章 绪论 本章首先分析了论文选题的背景与意义,然后对存款保险制度各国实践及研究状况进行了综述,将美、德两国存款保险制度进行了比较,最后对本论文研究的主要内容作了概述。本章通过对关于存款保险制度设计中的基本问题的各国实践及研究状况进行综述后指出,运用信息经济学、机制设计的理论与方法来研究不对称信息下的存款保险是今后研究的一个重要方向。本章在对美、德两国存款保险制度中存款保险的管理、存款保险的范围、存款保险资金的筹集、存款保险制度的运作情况等方面不同特点进行剖析的基础上,认为美国、德国的存款保险制度对于如何设计我国的存款保险制度有以下启示:必须妥善处理好存款保险更多还原

【Abstract】 Deposit insurance system is one kind of system arrangement that establishes special deposit insurance corporation to protect the legal benefit of the depositors and maintain the safety and stabilization of the financial systems. The deposit insurance system prescribes that the financial institutions which absorb the deposits should pay some deposit insurance premiums according to some percents of the deposits to the deposit insurance corporation compulsively or voluntarily and the deposit insurance corporation should supply fund aids to the financial institutions or directly pay to the depositors fully or partially when the payment crisis arises or the financial institutions become insolvent. Because of the asymmetrical information existing among the deposit insurance corporation, the banks and the depositors, the deposit insurance system will bring two key problems that are adverse selection problem and moral hazard problem.This discourse analyzes systematically a series of questions related to asymmetric information among the deposit insurance corporation, the banks and the depositors in the research background of deposit insurance with asymmetric information. The research methods of information economics and mechanism designing are introduced into the "lacking information" deposit insurance decision-making. Meanwhile the deposit insurance mechanism under constrains of individual rationality, incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is designed to overcome the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. The theory and methodology in this discourse will show their importance in guidance to establish the deposit insurance system in our country, protect the legal benefit of the depositors, maintain the safety and stability of the financial systems, assure the safety of the deposit insurance funds, deepen the innovation of financial systems, prevent and resolve the financial risk.This discourse is divided into seven chapters, the main contens of each chapter are as followes:Chapter 1 IntroductionIn this chapter, firstly the background and significance of this discourse are analyzed, afterwards the practices and research status of deposit insurance system in all countries are summed up, the deposit insurance system are compared between America and Germany, finally the main contents researched in this discourse are summarized. After the basic problems in designing deposit insurance system about the practice of each country and the situation of study and the literature concerned with deposit insurance are reviewed, the study shows that utilizing information economics and the theory and methodology of designing mechanisms to research the deposit insurance in case of imperfect information should be an important research field in future. Based on the analysis of the distinct characteristics of deposit insurance system of America and Germany in such aspects as the administration of deposit insurance, scope of coverage, funding of the deposit insurance scheme etc, the study shows that the deposit insurance system of America and Germany have following revelations about how to design our country’s deposit insurance system, dealing with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard properly, not copying other countries’ model, establishing two tiered deposit insurance system.Chapter 2 Game Analysis of Bank-runs and Deposit InsuranceThis chapter undertakes the game theory to analyze the bank-runs and deposit insurance. This chapter first models the game of bank-runs without deposit insurance and then models the game of deposit insurance averting bank-runs. The study shows that, deposit insurance is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it has the positive effect of averting bank-runs and stabilizing the banking system; on the other hand, because the depositors decrease market restriction on the bank, the bank has the incentive of risk-taking excessively, instead it is likely to increase the risk of the banking system. We must feel our way when we design the deposit insurance mechanism and handle such two decision tools as deposit insurance coverage and deposit insurance premium properly specially.Chapter 3 Adverse Selection in Deposit InsuranceThis chapter designs an optimal deposit insurance mechanism overcoming adverse selcection in the case that the information about the risk type of bank loan portfolios possed by the deposit insurance corporation at no cost is given by utilizing the theory and methodology of mechanism designing. The study shows that, we can design a sort of deposit insurance mechanism with flat-premium satisfying incentive compatible conditions in the deposit insurance market with asymmetric information, however, compared to the deposit insurance mechanism with perfect information, the bank with low-risk loan portfolios subsidizes the bank with high-risk loan portfolios.Chapter 4 Optimal Audit Mechanism in Deposit InsuranceThis chapter designs an optimal audit mechanism overcoming adverse selcection to relax the incentive constraint of the bank by utilizing the theory and methodology of mechanism designing. In the mechanism, the deposit insurance corporation pays some cost to audit the bank and examine whether the bank report its risk style of loan portfolios truthfully and punish the bank who give false information about the risk style of loan portfolios. The study shows that if the likelihood of audit exits, optimal deposit insurance mechanism should satisfy maximum punishment principle and the risk-based deposit insurance premium could be brought into effect and only the bank with low-risk loan portfolios comes under audit with stringent probability and its deposit insurance premium will not be distorted.Chapter 5 Moral Hazard in Deposit InsuranceThis chapter designs an optimal deposit insurance mechanism overcoming moral hazard in the case that the information about the effort level possed by the deposit insurance corporation at no cost is given by utilizing the theory and methodology of mechanism designing. The study shows that, we can design a sort of deposit insurance mechanism satisfying incentive compatible conditions to overcome the moral hazard in the deposit insurance market with asymmetric information, however, compared to the deposit insurance mechanism in case of perfect information, the deposit insurance coverage and deposit insurance premium decrease.Chapter 6 Optimal Monitoring Mechanism in Deposit InsuranceThis chapter designs an optimal monitoring mechanism overcoming moral hazard to enhance the incentive and surveillance to the bank by utilizing the theory and methodology of mechanism designing. In the mechanism, the deposit insurance corporation can monitor and acquire more information about the activity of the bank at some cost. The study shows that, if the likelihood of monitoring exists, the optimal monitoring mechanism should satisfy maximal punishments principle; compared to the optimal deposit insurance mechanism while the participation constrains of the bank is binding in case of symmetrical information, the deposit insurance premium doesn’t change but the deposit insurance coverage decreases; compared to the optimal deposit insurance mechanism while the participation constrains of the bank is not binding and the incentive constraint of the bank is binding in case of asymmetrical information, the deposit insurance premium and deposit insurance coverage increases.Chapter 7 Conclusions and ProspectsThis chapter summarized the research conclusions of this discourse and bring forward some policy suggestions about establishing our country’s deposit insurance system and point out the problems to be researched more in future.更多还原