【作者】 蓝海涛；

【导师】 李岳云；

【作者基本信息】 南京农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2001， 博士

【摘要】 本论文从动态的角度,站在国际农业贸易制度层面,透视WTO 农业协议的形成机理、变迁规律及运行效果,准确定位我国农业政策与WTO 农业规则的冲突点,提出了针对性较强的一套农业政策调整方案。在选题分析与文献回顾的基础上,首先借助国际制度理论、博弈论和集体行动理论等工具,构造了国际农业贸易制度创立与变迁的理论模型,并以典型的WTO 农业协议与共同农业政策为案例进行了实证检验,且预测了新一轮多边农业贸易谈判的方式、持续时间及可能的结果。主要结论为,农业贸易领域“囚徒困境”现象是国际农业贸易制度形成的直接动因;潜在利润的出现,吸引政治企业家从事制度创新,推动了国际农业贸易制度的变迁;有关国家对一项国际农业贸易制度安排具有一定共识,只是为制度变迁创造了可能性。究竟变迁能否发生,还取决于这些国家能否寻找到利益交汇点;国际农业贸易制度的需求国家与供给国家常常重叠,但从国内利益集团角度观察,二者又是分离的。其次,依靠博弈论和新古典经济学的生产理论等分析手段,构建了国家的农业政策调整行为模型,以WTO 农业协议框架下各国的农业政策调整行为,检验了相应假说。结果表明,尽管各国农业政策调整的目标相同,但采取的行为方式却不尽一致。实力雄厚的农业贸易大国往往以主动式调整为主、被动式调整为辅,必要时可通过修订游戏规则的方式,来达到战略调整的目的;而力量较弱的农业贸易小国多表现为被动、服从式调整,当然对符合国家长期利益方向的政策也会主动调整,但没有能力独自以规则修订者的身份来设置例外条款,以保障本国的特殊利益。不论何种类型的国家,遇到农业政策冲突点问题时,往往要进行成本收益的权衡分析,决定是否及如何调整,才能使反映主导利益集团愿望的国家利益最大化。再次,以WTO 农业协议为例,运用计量模型和一般统计分析技术,从该协议对成员国农业政策的影响、对世界农产品贸易的影响以及执行情况三个角度,分析了国际农业贸易制度的运行效果。得出了以下几点结论:一是WTO 农业协议对成员国农业政策有一定影响,但不够明显。二是WTO 农业协议短期内没有对世界农产品贸易产生显著影响。三是WTO 农业协议大致上得到执行,但有不少因素影响了其执行效率。第四,在对WTO 农业规则进行全景理论透视,并描述中国农业政策主要特征的基础上,辨识了WTO 农业规则与中国农业政策的冲突点,且进行了分类。结果表明,中国一系列特殊的农业政策安排,与WTO 农业规则之间的主要冲突,似乎并没有人们想象的那么多。大多数研究都比较关注直接、显性的规则冲突,而对隐性的体制冲突未给予足够重视。在一系列规则冲突中,以弱势冲突为主,强势冲突为辅。前者主要更多还原

【Abstract】 The thesis has a through understanding of the formation mechanism, change law andmove effect from international trading regime in agriculture (ITRA), precisely finds outconflicts between the Chinese agricultural policies and the WTO agricultural rules,provided a scheme of adjustment on agricultural policies in China.At first, on the basis of project analysis for research work and literature review, thestudy establishes a theoretical model on formation and change of ITRA, positively testifiesthe model with the WTO agreement on agriculture and common agricultural policy, andpredicts the fashion, continuative time and possible results of the new multilateralnegotiation of agricultural trade. The paper draws the main following conclusions: (1) Thesituation of “prisoner dilemma”in agricultural trade is a direct reason to form ITRA. (2)The appearance of potential profit attracts some political entrepreneurs to embark uponinstitutional innovation, and then to promote change of ITRA. (3) It creates the possibilityof international institution change that concerned countries have somewhat commonunderstanding about an arrangement of ITRA. After all, whether the institution change isprobable to appear still depend on whether these nations can find out point of intersectionon national benefit. (4) The demand country of ITRA always overlaps the supply one, butthey are separate from domestic interest groups again.Secondly, building on game theory and production theory in new classic economics,the paper set up a national behavior model of agricultural policy adjustment, testifyingthose corresponding hypothesis in terms of various nation’s behavior of agricultural policyadjustment restrained by the WTO agreement on agriculture. The results show thatalthough various countries have similar objective in agricultural policy adjustment, theirbehavior fashion is not always similar. A strong and great country in agricultural tradeprincipally make the active adjustment, meanwhile make the passive adjustment less, andcan modify “game rules”to attain its aim of strategic adjustment when necessary. However,a weak and small country in agricultural trade chiefly implemented the passive andsubmitted adjustment. Of course, the country can actively adjust those policies suitable fornational long-range benefits, but can not set some exceptional articles on its own to ensurethe special interest in this country. Despite which kind of country meets conflicts inagricultural policies, it normally analyses the cost and benefit of every adjustment, decidewhether or how to adjust before it is able to maximize the national interest, which showsthe domestic principal interest group.Thirdly, the move effect of ITRA, which the WTO agreement on agriculture is used as更多还原