信用信息共享和中国征信模式选择研究

【作者】 张周；

【导师】 司春林；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 信用在现代经济和社会生活中的地位非常重要。但是我国的信用体系存在着较大的问题,严重制约了我国经济发展和社会进步。 信用问题很大程度上是由于信息不对称造成的。本文从信用的基本概念和特性出发,分析了由信息不对称引起的信用缺失和供给不足等问题。提出授信者之间的信息共享是解决这些问题的一种有效方法。 通过建立一个银行和借款人重复博弈的声誉模型,分析参与人在一次博弈和重复博弈之间的差异。我们发现在重复博弈的条件下,声誉机制就开始发生作用了。其中事先的平均违约率是一个影响信贷关系的重要因素,直接关系到银行对信用申请人的判断,从而影响信贷行为的发生。尽管如此,违约率降低到一定程度仅是信贷行为出现的必要条件,而不是充分条件。违约率降低可以减少对损失的担忧,以及机会主义收益的诱惑,但是即使是没有违约也无法完全消除机会主义收益的诱惑;随着违约率的增加,对损失的担忧对于决策的影响越来越大,直至成为主要的影响因素。 客户信息作为银行私有信息的价值就在于这些信息能够产生信息租金。信息租金的大小与市场份额,及其优质客户的数量成正比。这表明信息租金是银行对其优质客户剩余的“榨取”。正因为如此,信息租金为银行带来超额利润,并且在与外来银行的竞争中保持竞争优势。 但是本地银行占有信息租金的前提条件是银行之间没有信息共享。如果通过信息共享,各个银行获得同样的信息,将会通过竞争而获得行业平均利润,于是信息租金重新回到客户手中,提高整个信用市场的贷款水平。信息共享能够实现信用市场上的帕累托改善。 通过理论模型,以及美国、英国以及意大利等国家银行环境和征信机构发展历程证实:信息租金成为决定银行是否参与信息共享体系的一个重要变量。竞争激烈则共享程度降低;竞争缓和则共享程度提高。 如果没有信息共享,那么银行将获取其客户的剩余,将导致借款人不再努力,从而使信用市场崩溃。如果仅仅是银行之间的分散式的信息共享,需要客户之间相互沟通信息以确保各个银行是诚实的,而客户没有这样做的激励,使得这种模式不能持续。信息共享的信用局方式可以通过银行支付一定的成本,确保银行之间的相互信任,从而使得信息共享能够实现。这就解释了为什么在现实中,银行之间的信息共享方式大多以征信机构的方式存在。 研究征信机构的运作首先要区分公共征信机构和私营征信机构。公共征信机构的首要职能是金融监管,而私营征信机构是为授信者提供信用决策信息服务。更多还原

【Abstract】 Credit plays a very important place in modern economic and social life. But in our country, big defect lies in the system of credit, which restrains the economic and social development.On a great degree, the problem of credit is caused by information asymmetry. Coming from the basic concept and characteristics, the paper analyzes the loss and lack of credit caused from information asymmetry and put forward one effective method for the solving these problems is the information sharing between creditors.Through building a reputation model of repeated game between bank and borrower, the paper analyzes the players’ different actions between once game and repeated game. We find the reputation mechanism take effect on the condition of repeated game. We also find default rate is an important factor to the creditor-borrower relation. Default rate is directly related to the expectation for credit seeker from bank, and therefore affects the creditor-borrower action. However, the drop of default rate is the essential requirement, but not the adequate requirement. The drop of default rate can reduce the worry of loss and the temptation to opportunistic profit as well. But the temptation to opportunistic profit cannot be eliminated absolutely even under the condition of no default. When the default rate increases, the worry of loss will make a larger and larger effect on the decision, and at last become the main factor.As the private information of bank, the value of customer information is the information rent it causes. The range and marketing quota of information rent have a direct ratio to the number of high quality customers, which indicates that information rent comes from the squeeze to high quality customers’ surplus. Therefore, information rent provides bank super profit, and furthermore, help bank maintain the competitive advantage among foreign banks.However, the premise of local banks’ occupation to information rent is that no information sharing exists. If every bank obtains same information by the way of information sharing, fair competition will encourage the immergence of industrial average profit. Information sharing can make the Pareto Improvement of credit market come true.By theoretical model, the development of national bank environment and creditregisters in America, Britain and Italian, it can be proved that information rent has become one important variable for bank to decide whether take part in the system of information sharing or not. The intense the competition is, the lower the information sharing degree and vice versa.If there’s no information sharing, then bank will obtain the surplus of its customers, which can make borrower work less hard and lead to the collapse of credit market. If there is only decentralized information sharing, which need the communications among customers and the guarantee of honesty of banks, but customers don’t have the incentive to do that, so this pattern is not able to sustain. Credit bureau of information sharing can pay certain cost through bank, which ensures the inter-trust among banks, can realize information sharing. These analyses explain why in daily life, most of the information sharing among banks exists in the pattern of credit register.If we want to research the operation of credit register, firstly, we must distinguish the public credit register and the private credit register. The function of public credit register is financial supervisory, while private credit register provides the service of credit decision information for creditor. The former is initiated by governmental departments like central bank, set by laws and has compulsion, while the latter initiated by enterprises, non-compulsory and operated commercially. The former has a lower efficiency, a single data type and service kind while the latter is just opposite.Summing up the operating experience of credit registers in Europe, America and other countries and districts where credit system is developed, we find that almost all the credit registers face the same important problem during operating. There is no unified simple method to solve the problem, by contrast, we should base on different markets, laws and customs of different countries and districts, then trade off the method.The technical-economic characteristics of credit industry make credit register enlarges its coverage of data bank, until obtains all the customers’ information in order to pursue profit. This characteristic can be reflected in daily life. The development of credit registering industry is just the procedure of .continuous combination and concentration. During the research of the credit development in America and Britain, the trend of monopoly in credit industry can be proved, too.Through technological economic analysis, the credit registering industry obviously possesses the characteristics of network industry and so the method from更多还原