商业银行公司治理机制研究

【作者】 赵海；

【导师】 黄亚钧；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 世界经济， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 标准的公司治理理论强调银行对企业的监督作用,银行是一种重要的公司治理力量,而银行在企业的公司治理中发挥作用的前提是银行本身具有良好的公司治理机制。东亚金融危机的教训促使人们反思企业公司治理问题的同时,银行本身的公司治理问题也日益受到理论界关注,银行开始被作为公司治理的对象来研究。 本文用标准的公司治理理论来考察银行的公司治理中的特别问题,将理论分析与现实观察相结合,提出一些政策建议。标准的代理理论将公司治理问题定义为股权人和债权人如何影响经理人员的行为从而来最大化资本提供者的利益。和非金融企业一样,银行面临着标准的公司治理问题。然而,银行作为金融中介有着特别的属性,这些属性加剧了公司治理的问题。同时,普遍存在的政府对银行的规制和监管又使银行的公司治理问题呈现出与非金融企业公司治理不同的特点。银行业存在的严重信息不透明问题使所有传统意义上的公司治理机制,包括股权人和债权人参与公司治理的机制,产品市场、公司控制权市场上的竞争以及规制和监管的外部治理机制都受到严重的削弱。除了银行的不透明之外,政府力量在银行部门的存在对于各种公司治理机制有着深刻的影响:存款保险制度或隐性的政府担保降低了债权人监督银行的激励;对银行业的规制和监管限制了银行业的竞争和并购行为:而政府成为银行的所有者则使政府不再是一个独立的监督者,并且极大地削弱了私人部门对银行进行监督的激励,也极大地抑制了银行业的竞争。 本文在公司治理的一般模式的基础上,结合银行公司治理的特殊性,构建了银行公司治理机制的一般理论分析框架。在此框架下,本文将银行公司治理机制分内部和外部治理机制分别探讨。在银行内部治理机制方面,本文通过模型分析和实证分析,着重讨论了影响银行内部公司治理的三个关键性因素:所有权结构、激励约束机制和组织结构,其中所有权结构是银行治理结构的基础,激励约更多还原

【Abstract】 In the standard corporate governance theory, commercial banks are primarily viewed as a force monitoring firms. However, the premise for banks to play a positive role in corporate governance of firms is that the banks themselves are subject to effective corporate governance mechanism. The lessons from the East Asian financial crisis prompt people to reflect on the issues of corporate governance of both the non-financial firms as well as the banks. Thus, the corporate governance of banks has begun to attract attention of the researchers.This paper uses standard theories of corporate governance to highlight the special problems facing corporate governance of financial intermediaries and combines this theoretical perspective with international observations to make policy recommendations. Standard agency theory defines the corporate governance problem in terms how equity and debt holders influence managers to act in the best interests of the providers of capital. As non-financial corporations, commercial banks face standard corporate governance problems. However, as financial intermediaries, banks have some special attributes different from the standard corporation, which intensify standard corporate governance problems. Moreover, pervasive government involvement raises new impediments to effective corporate control. The severe opaqueness of banks hinders traditional corporate governance mechanisms. This opaqueness makes it more difficult for equity and debt holders to exert corporate governance of banks and it can weaken competitive forces in the product market and the market for corporate control. Besides, the external governance mechanism of regulation and supervision is hindered because of the opacity of banks. On the other hand, government involvement in the banking sector exacerbates corporate governance problems in banks. Deposit insurance and implicit or explicit government guarantees on bank liabilities virtually eliminate any efforts by debtors to monitor更多还原