股权分置与上市公司股权融资行为

【作者】 郑祖玄；

【导师】 张军；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 西方经济学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 本文研究中国上市公司的股权融资行为。基本的内容可总结如下:中国的股票市场存在着股权分置——公司发行的股票分为流通股与非流通股。两类股东之间存在着利益冲突,流通股股东以公司的市场价值最大化为目标,而非流通股股东则以每股净资产和控制权收益的最大化为目标。非流通股股东拥有公司控制权。在一定融资规模之内,为净现值小于零的项目发行股权融资合乎非流通股股东的最大化目标,这种股权融资因而是一种过度融资。过度发行股权融资导致公司财务质量下降,投资者的利益损失。由于非流通股股东并不以公司市场价值最大化为目标,因此外部投资者用脚投票的被动监管方式失灵;由于非流通股不能在公开市场竞价交易,因此外部投资者无法通过接管实现主动监管。为了保护投资者的利益,证监会制订出限制公司融资的一系列政策。限制性政策并不针对公司具体的融资项目,可能致使具有良好收益项目的公司失去发行资格,也可能致使没有良好收益项目的公司取得发行资格。严历的限制性政策可以更有效地制止过度融资行为,但却会对公司造假产生激励。 论文共分六章论述以上内容。第一章是本文的导论,主要介绍本文所研究之问题的背景,意义,本文的结构安排,创新之处与不足之处。 在第二章,本文回顾了代理成本理论的一些经典文献,将股权分置造成的非流通股股东与流通股股东之间的利益冲突归结到代理理论当中。同时也在这一章内回顾了国内学者对中国的具体现象进行的相关研究。 在第三章,本文通过对数据的考察,指出中国上市公司的股权融资行为并不能以资本结构理论来解释。其原因在于中国上市公司并不存在融资方式之间的权衡。随着发行融资的增加,公司财务质量在不断下降,因此这是一种过度融资行为。 为了解释中国上市公司过度融资行为,本文在第四章构建了一个过度股权融资模型。通过模型本文指出:基于控股股东的以每股净资产为最大化目标的收益函数,即使为净现值小于零的项目发行股权融资,对于控股股东而言依然有利。只要新股东可以从公司旧有项目中得到权益的补偿,那么发行即可实现,持有流通股的旧股东将受到损失。如果控股股东的行为不受证监会的限制,过度发行将导致股价与每股净资产相当。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper focuses on equity financing by listed companies in China. It is the main contents that there is special situation of separated equities in stock market and stocks are classed as circulating Equities and Non-circulating Equities. Circulating Equity stockholders concern of the market value of company, while Non-circulating Equity stockholders concern of the net assets per capital and benefits from control rights. There are conflicts between the two types of stockholders. Non-circulating Equity stockholders hold controlling rights of company, and financing strategy represents benefits of Non-circulating Equity stockholders. However in terms of pursuing more assets per capital and control rights advantages, stockholders who hold the controlling shares prefer to issue equities without consideration on whether project results in good returns. This kind of issue is over-financing. Over- financing leads to the decreasing of company finance quality and losses of investors. For Non-circulating Equity stockholders pay little attention to stock price, the supervision from outside investors is inefficient. For Non-circulating Equity can not be traded in public market, it is impossible for outside stockholders to take over the corporate controlling right. To protect advantages of investors, SEC formulates a series of policies to restrict corporation issue equities. It is possible that company with good returns project loses issueing qualification, or the company without good returns project gets the listing qualification, since restricted policy does not aim at respective project. Rigid restricted policy may efficiently constrict over-financing, however it can prompt companies publicizing inveracious information.This paper goes as follows: The chapter one is introduction, mainly introducing the context, meaning, structure, innovation and shortage of this paper.Chapter two reviews some classical papers about the theory of agent cost and ranges benefits conflicts, which between circulating Equity stockholders and Non-circulating Equity stockholders from separated stocks, to it. At the same time the paper has reviewed some researches related to Chinese detailed circumstance.Chapter three points capital structure theory can not explain equity financing by Chinese listed companies in the way of reviewing data. There is no tradeoff among the different financing ways. Companies finance quality constantly declines with the更多还原