【作者】 赵振元；

【导师】 曾勇； 银路；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 针对我国国有高科技企业员工持股计划改革(制)的研究缺乏统一逻辑框架这一缺陷,本文结合国有企业改革的实质、员工持股计划的基本功能、激励的内在机制、高科技企业的生产属性和人力资本的特性,对国有高科技企业员工持股计划改革(制)的基本逻辑框架和股权配置决策这两个基本问题进行了研究。主要结论和创新点概括如下。 1、在分析了员工持股计划的基本功能、国有企业改革的实质、激励的内在机制、高科技企业的生产属性、人力资本的特性和我国员工持股计划的法律背景的基础上,本文为研究国有高科技企业改革(包括员工持股计划改革)建立了一个统一的逻辑框架,即国有企业改革应当遵循“人力资本——产权——激励——企业生产性质——企业业绩——经济效率”这个基本逻辑框架。 2、应用上述框架,本文指出了国有高科技企业改革(制)时,政府应当在国有资产的收益权和控制权之间权衡,否则将会出现“自己管自己”的难堪局面。这种权衡使得政府的改革目标应当在国有资产保值增值条件下追求帕雷托效率,而不是直接对企业决策进行干预。因此,政府在国有高科技企业改革(制)中应当在一定程度上放弃国有资产的控制权。 3、在上述框架下,本文认为员工持股计划通过承认高科技企业员工人力资本的产权并对其进行产权激励,能够提高企业的经营效率,从而实现国有资产保值增值。这使国家放弃国有资产的控制权成为可能。因此,员工持股计划是实现国家在国有资产的收益权和控制权之间权衡的一种可行的选择工具。 4、基于上述结论,本文以既定国有资产保值增值率下实现帕雷托效率,为国家在国有高科技企业员工持股计划改革(制)中的决策目标,建立了国家与企业员工之间的股权配置模型,并给出了最优股权配置的计算公式。进一步,在国家与企业员工之间的股权配置基础上,本文应用合作博弈的方法建立了企业内部员工之间的股权配置模型,并给出了最优股权配置的计算公式。 5、对信息产业电子第十一设计研究院有限公司的员工持股计划改制进行了案例分析,从经验上为本文的逻辑框架和模型结果的正确性提供了证据,并指出需要进一步研究的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Focsuing on the defect that there is no uniform logical framework for the studies on the ESOP reform of Chinese Hi-tech state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper combines the nature of SOE reform with the foundational functions of ESOP, the inderent mechanism of motivation, the production attribute of Hi-tech firm and the proerties of human capital to build a uniform logical framework for the ESOP reform of Chinese Hi-tech SOEs and study the decision of equity allocation in such a reform. The main conclusions and contributions are as follows.1. Based on an anlysis of the foundational functions of ESOP, the nature of SOE reform, the inderent mechanism of motivation, the production attribute of Hi-tech firm, the proerties of human capital and the law environment in China, this paper forms a uniform logical framework for Chinese Hi-tech SOE reform (including the ESOP reform), that is. Chinese SOE reform should follow the inherent logics among human capital, ownership, motivation, the production attribute of firm, performance and economic efficiency.2. Applying the above framework, this paper points out that governments should trade off between the return and the control claims deriving from state-owned assets in the Hi-tech SOE reform in China, otherwise they are likely to face a tickler that they regulate themselves. This trade-off requires that governments should not directly intervene firm’s internal decisions but commit themselves to realize Pareto efficiency under the condition of the value preservation and appretiation of state-owned assets in Chinese Hi-tech SOE reform. Therefore, governments should, to some degree, give up the control claim on SOEs in such a reform.3. In the above framework, this paper concludes that adopting ESOP can enhance firm’s operational efficiency and achieve the value preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets by acknowledging the ownership of employees’ human capital of Hi-tech SOEs and stimulating them in means of the ownership characterized by equity. This makes it possible for governments to give up the control claim partly. Hence, ESOP is a feasible alternative for governments to trade更多还原