【作者】 李莉；

【导师】 蔡淑琴；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 信息技术为交易者构造了全新的交易环境与交易媒介——电子市场,在这一市场中,尽管信息发布与获取成本降低并且信息传递速度加快,但质量信息不对称状况并未得到根本的改善,商品与服务的质量不确定性以及由此引起的逆向选择风险状况较传统市场更为严重,给网络营销企业与交易平台组织者——网络中介提出了交易风险管理机制创新的课题。本文正是在这样的背景下,运用信息经济学、市场营销、电子商务经济学以及决策理论与方法,围绕具有广泛的实际背景和发展前景的面向电子市场逆向选择风险规避问题,从以下几个方面对逆向选择风险规避机制、决策模型及策略、决策方法进行了系统的研究:(1)电子市场质量信息不对称的成因以及逆向选择风险规避机制从分析商品质量信息对买方购买决策的影响出发,根据电子市场信息传播的特征,本文提出了区别于传统市场的形成电子市场质量信息不对称的成因;构建了基于质量价格服从正态分布的逆向选择模型,通过模型分析,得到逆向选择会严重影响电子市场的交易效率的结论;分析不同主体实施电子市场逆向选择风险规避机制——信号显示与信号甄别的有效性。(2)网络营销企业营销信号选择模型本文分析了适用于电子市场的营销信号,并根据信号传递所引起的成本类型的不同将上述营销信号分为四类,在分类的基础上,讨论了各类营销信号的具体特征及其影响网络营销企业信号选择的主要因素;以两家企业垄断市场为例,构造了网络营销企业信号选择的博弈模型,通过对分离均衡与混同均衡存在条件的分析,讨论了信号传递成本以及质量敏感与不敏感的消费者群体所占的比例对企业营销信号选择决策的影响;将营销信号运用条件与电子市场中消费者、竞争者与企业自身的具体特点相结合,分析了不同情况下的网络营销企业选择营销信号的策略。(3)网络营销企业质量相关价格信号显示模型本文在定义市场与企业的质量估计分布的基础上,在质量敏感需求的假定下,以单位时间预期收益最大化为目标,构建了网络营销企业质量相关价格信号显示模型;进而从给定价格时最优折扣水平的确定、给定折扣时最优价格的确定<WP=4>两个角度,对模型的最优性进行了分析。通过数值算例,探讨了在电子市场对商品质量具有不同的评价概率时以及模型参数变化时,网络营销企业的质量相关价格信号显示最优决策策略。(4)网络中介逆向选择风险规避模型从定义网络中介出发,本文阐述了网络中介参与交易的功能;在将电子商务的交易风险分为两类的基础上,对去除市场中介和网络中介参与的电子商务交易风险进行了比较;分别从三个不同的角度设计逆向选择风险规避机制并建立决策模型,即不考虑交易者风险偏好的逆向选择风险规避单目标决策模型、基于平均风险偏好的逆向选择风险规避单目标决策模型和基于平均风险偏好的逆向选择风险规避多目标决策模型,并分别对三个模型的最优性进行分析,给出了不同模型参数条件下的最优决策策略;从实证研究角度,对阿里巴巴、雅宝与易趣三个网络中介的风险规避运作进行了比较分析,验证了本章所建立的决策模型及其决策策略的有效性。其次,从产品导向与用户导向的质量角度,通过对多个网络中介逆向选择风险规避措施的分析,探讨了涉及不同交易类型的网络中介可以采用的风险规避措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 Information technology makes the new transaction environment and media, electronic markets, for trade parties. Though the cost of information publishing and obtaining is reduced and the speed of information transmission is quickened in this new markets, adverse selection causing by quality uncertainty of goods and service is more serious than traditional markets. Therefore, it presents an innovational problem of transaction risk management mechanism for network marketing firms and cybermediaries, the transaction platform organizers. Under the background, using information economics, marketing, electronic commerce economics and decision theory and methodology, this research investigates systematically the mechanism of avoiding adverse selection mechanism, decision models and strategies and the decision methods shown as following.(1) The causes of quality information asymmetry in electronic markets and avoiding adverse selection mechanism.At first, this dissertation analyzes the impact of quality information on buyer’s purchase decision, and presents the causes of quality information asymmetry in electronic markets to be different from in traditional markets. And then the research establishes the adverse selection model on the base of the assumption that quality and price submit to the normal distribution. The result that adverse selection will have significant effect on the transaction efficiency in electronic markets is gained by model analysis. Finally, the dissertation analyzes the validity of signaling and screening, avoiding adverse selection mechanism from different main body.(2) Marketing signal selection model for network marketing firmsThis dissertation firstly analyzes which signals are appropriate to be used in electronic markets, makes classification of signals according to the cost of signaling, and then describes the characteristic of each kind of signals. Based on the analysis above, the game model of signaling for firms is built in duopoly. The research studies the impacts of signaling cost and the proportion of different consumer on signal selection of the firm through the existence conditions of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium, <WP=6>combining with the properties of the firm, consumers and rivals in electronic markets, and presents the strategies of signaling product quality in different statuses finally. (3) Quality-contingent price signaling model for network marketing firmsDefining market’s and firm’s quality estimation distribution, this dissertation builds a model of quality-contingent price signaling for network marketing firms with quality-sensitive demand on the purpose of the optimization of expectation benefit per unit time. Then, this research analyzes the existence of the optimal solution from the determining optimal rebate with given price and determining optimal price with given rebate. Through numerical example, the dissertation examines the optimal price signaling strategies for network marketing firms when electronic markets have different estimation of quality, and then discusses the impact of parameters in the model on optimal decision. (4) Adverse selection risk evading model based on cybermediariesThe dissertation firstly describes the mode of electronic commerce enrolled by the cybermediaries, compares transaction risk of electronic commerce with cybermediaries to without cybermediaries, and designs the evading mechanism and builds decision models of transaction risk of cybermediaries from three different perspectives. Then, this research analyzes three models whether the optimal solutions exist respectively and presents the strategies of optimal decision under different parameters. This research compares risk evading operation of three cybermediaries empirically, that is, Alibaba,Yaboo and Eachnet, and verifies the efficiency of decision model and strategies. The measures of adverse selection risk evading are discussed from the quality of product oriented and user oriented, and then the role and applicable trade type of each measure is res更多还原