【作者】 刘仁军；

【导师】 张培刚； 张建华；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 西方经济学， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 20世纪80年代以来,在信息技术和经济全球化的直接影响下,分包制、特许经营、战略联盟、虚拟企业、产业集群等企业网络迅速在全球蔓延,企业网络带来了“亚洲四小龙”、“硅谷”、“第三意大利”和华人中小企业发展的巨大成功。企业间的网络化现象表明,企业内分工正朝着企业间分工转化,企业间的关系由对抗性竞争转向竞争与合作并存,企业网络将成为21世纪重要的生产组织方式。本文的目的就是探讨企业网络的形成和运作机制、形态变化规律以及对我国经济转型的影响。企业网络是一种复杂的经济现象,经济学、社会学、管理学和组织学等学科都有相应的企业网络理论,但是它们缺乏共同的微观基础。企业网络是介于企业与市场之间的组织形式,是企业之间为了某种共同的目标而达成的一种长期的和相对稳定的契约关系或契约关系集合,契约是研究企业网络问题理想的出发点。从契约的观点看,关系契约是企业网络形成和运作的基础,关系契约理论是企业网络的微观基础理论。在笔者看来,关系契约有两条基本形成途径,一条是由专用性资产而形成的双方依赖,另一条是动用个体的社会资本而锁定双方的关系。在宏观社会资本不足的情况下,人们表现出明显的机会主义行为,此时动用个体社会资本形成关系契约是降低交易成本的有效办法。当宏观社会资本足以使人们产生普遍信任时,资产专用性也要求契约双方采用关系缔约,因为资产专用性的诱惑是如此之大,以至于普遍信任也不足以阻止“敲竹杠”(hold-up)的机会主义行为。从资产专用性所形成的关系契约治理的角度看,关系契约是隐含的自我实施机制,它不同于法律和道德,是由重复博弈所形成的一种声誉机制,即算计性的信任机制。特许经营、战略联盟和铁路钢材采购中的长期关系表明,关系契约激励是企业网络运转中的首要问题,所有权安排和契约因素均可作为关系契约激励的重要手段。笔者认为,社会资本不仅是企业网络形成的外生环境因素,而且它也是内生的,日本分包网络、NUMMI合资企业和硅谷等企业网络在运作过程中就创造出了大量的社会资本(非算计性的信任、规范和社会网络),这些社会资本反过来会稳固和发展企业网络。由此可见,企业网络是以算计性的信任为主,非算计性信任、规范和社会网络等社会资本作为重要补充的运行机制。 <WP=4>根据正式契约对关系契约的影响不同,企业网络可分为契约型和关系型两大类。从关系契约理论可以得知,关系型企业网络是转型经济的特征,中国家族企业及其网络的发展和寻租性企业网络的大量出现是转型期的必然现象。企业网络从关系型向契约型的转变意味着中国从关系经济走向契约经济,也意味着经济转型的成功,即以正式契约为微观基础的市场经济确立。为此,必须明晰产权、重建市场主体,着力培育宏观社会资本。企业网络组织形态创新通常是针对契约型企业网络而言的。发达国家昔日工业化成功的经验和我国工业化的实践都表明,成功的企业网络组织形态创新对工业化有巨大的推动作用。中国在走新型工业化的道路过程中,面临着传统工业化和信息化的双重任务,企业网络创新不仅要借鉴发达国家昔日的工业化的成功经验,更要顺应当今信息时代组织变革的潮流,必须注意法律的根本保证作用和道德的辅助作用,注意政府的作用,发展多种声誉机制,注意企业网络中关系契约激励的差别。关系契约理论成功地解释了企业网络的形成和运作机制,是本文的理论创新。作为它的应用,对企业网络的转型、组织形态的创新以及铁路工厂钢材采购中的关系契约激励等问题的分析是本文的应用创新,它可用于理解和指导中国转型经济和工业化的实践。关系契约理论建立在交易成本分析的基础上,运用了经济学中契约理论、激励理论和博弈论等方法,并用社会资本理论对交易成本分析加以拓展。为了形象生动,案例分析在企业网络的运作机制分析中占有相当的比重,对个别案例还采用了问卷、访谈和数理模型分析相结合的方法。此外,通过历史的比较分析论证了中国新型工业化道路中企业网络组织形态的创新问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Under the direct impact of IT and economic globalization, business networks such as subcontracting, franchising, strategic alliances, virtual enterprises and industry clusters etc. have spread rapidly all over the world and resulted in enormous success of “the Asian Four Dragons”, “Silicon Valley”, “Third Italy” and the small and medium-sized Chinese businesses since 1980s. The phenomenon of inter-enterprise networking indicates that traditional labor division inside an enterprise is turning into labor division among enterprises, rivalrous competition among enterprises is evolving into coexistence of competition and cooperation, and business networks will be an important production organizational mode in the 21th century. The purpose of this paper is to probe into the mechanisms of business networks’ formation and their operation, the laws governing the change of business networks’ forms and their influences on China’s economic transition. Business networks are so complicated an economic phenomenon that there are related theories on business networks in many disciplines, such as economics, sociology, management science and organization studies. However, these theories lack a common micro foundation. Business networks, which are organizational forms lying between hierarchy and market, are a kind or a set of long-term and relatively stable contractual relations for a certain common objective between enterprises. Thus contract is an ideal starting point to study problems on business networks.From the viewpoint of contract, the relational contract theory can be taken as a basic micro theory on business networks because relational contracts are the basis of business networks’ formation and of their operation. On the author’s opinion, a relational contract can be formed by two ways, one is asset specificity facilitating bilateral dependence and the other is individual social capital locking both parties in. When macro social capital is so insufficient that opportunist behaviors appear, the relational contract formed by individual social capital is an effective method to reduce transaction cost. Even if macro social capital is enough to produce general trust, relational contracting is indispensable to both parties because the lure from asset specificity is so big that general trust cannot prohibit the “hold-up” opportunist behavior. From the viewpoint of governance, since relational contract is formed by asset specificity, it is an implicit self-enforcing mechanism, and a repeated-game reputation <WP=6>mechanism different from law or moral, i.e., a calculative trust mechanism. Analyses on franchising, strategic alliances, and long-term relationships in procurement of steel needed for railway manufacturing factories demonstrate that relational contract incentives are the principal problem in business networks’ operation, and that ownership arrangement and other contractual elements can be taken as important means for relational contract incentives. According to the author, social capital is not only an exogenous environmental factor, but can be an endogenous one also. In the operation of business networks, such as Japanese subcontracting, NUMMI Joint Venture and “Silicon Valley”, a lot of social capital (non-calculative trust, norms and social networks) is created, and social capital will in turn stabilize and promote business networks. Therefore, the mechanism of business networks’ operation is dominated by calculative trust, and social capital, such as non-calculative trust, norms and social networks, acts as its important complement.According to the degree of formal contracts’ effect on relational contracts, business networks can be divided into two types: a contractual one and a relational one. It can be concluded from the relational contract theory that the relational type characterizes a transitional economy. It is an inevitable fact that the development of Chinese family business and its networks, and emergence of many rent-seeking business networks appear in Chinese economy transitional peri更多还原