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银行资本监管绩效研究

Studies on the Effect and Efficiency of Bank Capital Regulation

【作者】 尚静

【导师】 许长新;

【作者基本信息】 河海大学 , 技术经济及管理, 2004, 博士

【摘要】 在金融自由化进程中,各国逐步放松了对银行的管制,但同时,资本要求作为银行体系稳健性管制的核心因素被大大地强化了。目前,西方国家已逐步形成了以资本充足和准备金率要求为核心,存款保险和最后贷款人制度为保障的银行监管模式,由于资本短缺往往成为发展中国家银行脆弱的根源,银行资本监管在发展中国家尤为重要。2004年,我国也颁布了《银行资本充足管理办法》,从办法中的规定可以看出,我国将要实施的银行资本监管办法基本上套用了美国等西方发达国家的模式。但在西方国家,对于银行资本监管,不仅理论上尚处于完善和深入中,实践上也存在着较大的缺陷,因而完善理论研究,借鉴西方发达国家的经验,结合我国的国情,构建符合我国实际的银行资本监管体系,已成为我国逐步开放金融市场的现实选择和重要前提。 本文在制度经济学和演化经济学框架下,对银行资本监管绩效及其制约因素进行了研究,在此基础上给出了改进资本监管绩效的路径:(1)银行资本监管是否有效,不仅取决于银行现有的资本头寸,还取决于银行准入价值、银行所在国的金融环境以及多层次委托代理问题等多个因素,因此,有效且有效率的银行资本监管不仅需要选择合宜的准入关闭政策、监管机制、激励相容的激励手段,还应允许一定程度上的弹性;(2)有效的资本监管并不一定是效率的,银行资本监管在保护存款者利益的同时,也可能加大社会成本;(3)虽然充足的资本可以保证金融机构的支付能力和抗风险能力,但在对银行的监管中不能过度地依赖这一指标。银行的成功或是长期生存归功于银行自身的管理与内部控制的质量,因此,在监管中不但要考虑外部力量的介入,更要注重银行内部的激励相容,必须处理好银行资本监管和银行自身管理质量之间的关系,处理好监管力量和市场力量之间的关系,也唯有如此,才能实现银行资本监管的帕累托效率;(4)我国目前的银行资本监管仍应以维护银行业的安全和稳定为首要目标,在此前提下,首先要彻底改革国有银行的治理结构,二次剥离不良贷款,并进一步健全、完善银行资本监管的保障机制,其次是要制定适合我国国情、具有可操作性的资本监管机制,科学地确定资本充足率,合理衡量资本充足,实行有差异的弹性监管办法,以提高我国银行资本监管的绩效。

【Abstract】 Bank capital adequacy regulation has been adopted by more than 100 countries, but there is no widely accepted rationale based on economicstheory and no definite framework of some notions and relative theories of bank capital adequacy regulation. This paper analyzes factors that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of capital regulation based on theories of institutional economics and evolutionary economics, and provides some countermeasures to improve the efficiency of capital regulation and some ideas for Chinese capital regulation as follows: Firstly, whether the capital regulation is effective or not is determined not only by the current bank capital position but also some other factors such as bank franchise value, the local financial environment and the multilevel principal-agency that cause the same capital regulation mechanism to produce different effects in different banks. Secondly, effective bank capital adequacy regulation is not always being efficient, as capital regulation protects the benefits of depositors, it may increase social cost at the same time. Thirdly, the minimum capital adequacy may ensure the pay-off of deposit and the safety of banks, but it can not be excessively relied on because under some circumstance it may be ineffective, so the success or the long-term safety of a bank depends on its self-administration and its risk control quality. Therefore, regulation needs the interference of exterior regulation forces and also stresses interior motivation. So we should deal with the relationship of capital regulation to self-administration quality and the relationship of regulation forces to market discipline in a optimal mixture , and only if so, the Pareto efficiency of bank capital regulation can be achieved.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 河海大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2005年 01期
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