【作者】 苏启林；

【导师】 隋广军；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 产业经济学， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 契约理论的三个主要分支——委托代理理论、不完全契约理论和交易成本理论之间不是相互排斥，而是相互补充的关系，特别是在对上市公司治理的解释方面。本文在整合契约理论三个主要分支基础上，解释了我国上市公司的家族控制与公司治理问题。 在上述理论框架下，本文以122家上市公司作为分析样本，发现：我国家族控制的上市公司中，既存在所有权层面的控制性家族与外部中小股东所形成第一重代理关系，也存在家族企业主与家族／非家族雇员在管理层面形成的第二重代理关系。相对于第一重代理关系降低企业价值，第二重代理关系的影响则不一定总是负面的。对第一重代理关系的进一步研究表明，家族控制的上市公司治理在股权集中度等五个方向上存在着代理冲突，引发家族控制的上市公司代理冲突的首要原因是现行的流通股与非流通股股权割裂。 本文在上述分析结果的基础上，借鉴了韩国治理家族性商社的经验，提出：对上市公司家族控制所导致的对外部中小股东的掠夺问题的治理应“宜早不宜迟”，越早治理，治理的成本越低。政府与相关的治理主体，应在一个三维的治理框架中权衡和综合多方面的因素探索家族控制的上市公司治理问题。最后，作者提出了相应的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The three main branches of contract theory, consigning agency theory, incomplete contract theory and transaction cost theory, are not repulsive to but supplementary for each other. Especially in the explanation to the corporation governance of public companies, the different branches of the contract theory have their respective focuses yet all the same time they reinforce each other. The author based on the contract theory, which includes the three main branch theories, interprets the problems of family control and corporate governance of China’s listed companies.Under the framework of the above-mentioned theory, the author takes the 122 companies listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2002 as analysis examples and reaches the finding that in the family controlled listed companies there exist the first level agency relationship regarding ownership problem between the controlling families and the outside small and medium-sized stockholders on the one hand, and the second level agency relation regarding management problem between the family employers and the family/non-family employers on the other hand. While the first agency relationship degenerates the firm value, the second agency relationship does not necessarily lead to negative influences. Further research on the first level agency relationship reveals that there appear in the family controlled listed companies five kinds of agency conflicts: ownership structure, capital structure, stock pyramids, departure of control and cash rights, and price warp of current and non-current stocks. It is concluded in the paper that the dissevering of stockholder into current and no-current segments is the upmost cause for the agency conflicts.With the analysis result of above and the reference to the Korean experience of governing the family-controlled chaebols, the author suggests that the earlier to deal with the expropriation problem of the outside small and medium-sized stockholders by the controlling families of listed companies is the better. The earlier the problem solved, the lower of the cost induced. Government and relative subjects should explore the governance problem of the family-controlled listed companies balancing and integrating multisided elements under the three-dimensioned framework. At the end of the paper, the author carries out the related policy suggestions.更多还原