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供应链关系协调管理研究

Study on Supply Chain Relationship Coordination Management

【作者】 蒋阳升

【导师】 蒲云;

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 , 交通运输规划与管理, 2004, 博士

【摘要】 供应链是一类复杂的巨型开放分布式系统,施加于其上的供应链管理模式弥补了传统企业管理模式无法管理企业间的不足,其本质是一类新型的企业间关系管理模式,它确立了合作竞争思想对企业间关系的指导地位,关系的协调则构成了供应链管理的重要手段和内容。 本论文围绕供应链企业间的合作竞争关系的协调,运用以博弈论和多代理系统理论与方法为代表的“综合集成研讨厅体系”的集成研究方法,从供应链关系协调机制和协调渠道——信息集成与共享两个方面对供应链关系协调管理进行了战略性研究。本论文的研究内容主要包括以下几个方面: 第一章首先提出了供应链关系协调管理的全文论点,确定了全文的研究方法——“综合集成研讨厅体系”,并提出了从供应链关系协调管理机制和供应链关系协调管理渠道——信息共享两个方面入手的研究思路。围绕论文的论点和研究方法,作者回顾与梳理了当前国内外关于供应链关系协调管理的研究现状和相关研究内容与方法,指出了当前研究存在的局限和不足,并在回顾与梳理的过程中,部分地论证了供应链关系协调管理在供应链管理中的核心地位。最后介绍了全文的结构与大体内容安排。 第二章通过对供应链管理产生和发展的企业环境、思想来源、主要技术条件以及其研究历程、定义和结构模型以及与传统管理模式的区别的回顾与分析,进一步论证了供应链管理是一种新型的企业间关系管理模式的本质和供应链关系协调管理在供应链管理中的核心地位。接着引出了供应链关系协调管理的定义,并将供应链关系协调管理的主要内容框架性地分为供应链关系协调管理机制和供应链关系协调渠道两个方面。最后介绍和分析了供应链关系协调管理的主要协调分析工具——博弈论和供应链关系协调管理与信息共享的相互关系。 第三章首先从企业个体经济理性假设出发,分析了供应链合作伙伴关系形成的动力条件和形成机理,指出效率与均衡是供应链合作关系是得以形成和维持的基本条件。在此基础上,建立了一类供应链加盟非合作博弈模型,定量地分析了供应链合作伙伴关系的形成过程和条件,利用模型分析结果,定性地解释了供应链及供应链管理的相关特征。 第四章研究了供应链合作伙伴关系形成和维持过程中的一类重要决策——合作伙伴的评价与选择决策着重研究了评价指标体系的建立和评价方法的 第n页西南交通大学博士研究生学位论文选择。结合供应链管理中评价问题的动态性特点,提出了建立动态评价指标体系的“双层映射法”和评价方法选择的“供需匹配”法。在此基础上,深入研究了两类重要的评价与选择决策问题。一是核心企业对供应商的评价与选择决策,建立了基于实证的评价指标体系,并将主成分评价方法引入到评价问题的求解中,给出了实际的算例;二是供应商对核心企业的评价与选择决策,建立了基于核心企业能力的评价指标体系,并将模糊综合评价方法引入到问题的求解中来。 第五章首先分析了供应链企业间关系的委托代理的本质,讨论了有效解两类典型委托代理问题—有害选择与道德风险问题的途经。针对有害选择问题,以核心企业对分销商的有害选择问题为例,设计了一类基于贝叶斯博弈显示原理的最优报酬机制;针对道德风险问题,以供应链中信息共享问题为例,设计了一类适用于核心企业激励和监督成员企业提高信息共享水平的激励监督机制,机制中,首次建立了产出和信息共享努力水平的对数函数关系,突破了传统的线性产出函数的局限。 第六章研究了供应链整体利益的分配机制,首先建立了一类可转移支付的供应链合作博弈模型,运用合作博弈中的核心,核非空性等概念给出了设计供应链利益分配机制的条件和约束,在此基础上,介绍并分析了几种确定分配向量参考值的分配方法,着重介绍了纳什谈判模型和shapely值求解法。 第七章从协调渠道—信息共享的角度研究了供应链关系协调管理。着重研究了多智能主体技术在供应链管理系统的应用。在深入分析供应链管理特征的基础上,建立了供应链管理系统的MAS理论分析模型,在该模型中,作者提出了企业实体复合移动代理体的系统设计思想,并基于该设计思想建立了供应链管理系统的混合MAS体系结构。在建立理论分析模型基础上,作者提出了供应链管理系统的MAS集成框架,并着重讨论了其中的系统异构问题,遗产系统封装利用问题,通信问题及其解决方案。最后,本章提出了适用于供应链管理系统的多代理混合协调机制,并讨论了供应链企业间的基于范例推理的合同网协议协调机制。 结论部分首先回顾了本文的主要工作和取得的主要结论,最后介绍了作者进一步的努力方向。

【Abstract】 Supply chain is one kind of open large-scale distributed systems, supply chain management is a new management approach to the relations of enterprises in nature, which remedies the limitation of traditional ones and emphasizes the importation of co-competition. And relationship coordination is increasingly becoming the important tool and element.This dissertation studies on relationship coordination at two aspects, with the help of Hall for workshop of Meta Synthesis Engineering mainly made up of game theory and MAS , One is relationship coordinative mechanism; the other is relationship coordinative channel. The research is made as following:At chapterl, main content and method in this dissertation are put forward. And existing literatures on relationship coordination on SCM are outlined, and then the limitations of them are analyzed. Finally, the structure and layout of this dissertation are described.At chapter 2, the development of SCM is analyzed on the aspects of environment, source of thought, technology condition. Further, the nature of SCM and the importance of relationship coordination management in SCM are demonstrated. The definition of relationship coordination management then is put then. Finally, the key tool used in analyzing the relationship coordination, Game theory and the relationship of relation coordination management and information sharing are introduced.Based on the individual rational hypothesis, this dissertation analyzes the condition and mechanism, which lead to establishment of cooperation fellowship, and presents that efficiency and equilibrium are the ultimate condition of forming cooperation fellowship of SCM at chapter 3.Then a game theory model of joining in SC is made, and the condition and the course of forming the cooperation partnership are analyzed quantificationally. Finally, some characters of SC and SCM are explained with the help of the above model.At chapter 4,the evaluation and selection of partner, especially the evaluation indexes and methods, are studied. Bi-mapping method and matching between demand and need method are developed on basis of dynamic character ofevaluation in SCM.Then two important issues of evaluation and selection of SCM are studied. The one is that core enterprise evaluates and selects supplier with the help of principal component evaluation method. The other is that supplier evaluates and selects core enterprise with the help of synthesis fuzzy method.In part five, the nature of supply chain enterprise’s principal-agent relationship and the basic ways for solving two typical principal-agent problems - adverse selection and moral hazard are analyzed firstly. Aimed at the problem of adverse selection, a kind of payment mechanism based on Bayes game theory’s revealability principal is designed, the problem of adverse selection between core enterprise and distributor enterprise as an example is showed. Aimed at the problem of moral hazard, a kind of incentive and Supervisory mechanism is designed, by using this mechanism, core enterprise can incentives and supervises it’s partners to improve their information sharing degree, in this mechanism, In the designed mechanism, the logarithmic function is firstly induced to describe the relationship between effort level and output, witch breakthroughs the traditional linear function’s limitation.In part six, the payment mechanism of supply chain’s profits is researched, firstly a kind of transferable payment cooperative game model, by using the concept of core and core non- vacant etc. the terms and subject to the payment mechanism of supply chain’s profits are given. On the basis of these, some kinds of methods to fix on the reference value of payment vector are introduced,, in which the Nash negotiation model and the Shapely method are taken emphases on.In part seven, a branch of supply chain relationship coordination management - the channel of information sharing among enterprise in supply chain is deeply analyzed. The application of multi-agent systems theory and method is taken emphases o

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