法律移植与管制

【作者】 耿利航；

【导师】 方流芳；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 民商法， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 本文在对证券市场中介制度的基本原理进行分析的基础上，对律师在中国证券市场中的作用和约束机制进行了分析，并试图以这个分析为例，探讨和反思法律移植与管制传统的紧张关系。中介机构见证机制作为第三方执行机制，是为弥补发行人信誉、合同、法律责任制度等方式对发行人机会主义约束的不足，目的是提供民间信用，以解决市场信息不对称问题。中介机构以自己声誉为发行人担保，为发行人和投资者之间的互相信任架起一座桥梁。中介机构的出现往往是市场自发的产物，是交易当事人为节约交易成本的需求。中介机构与最终的服务对象(投资者)之间存在利益冲突。中介机构受到声誉机制和法律责任机制的约束。在中国，除了增加交易成本，律师提供的服务并没有给证券市场带来更多的有效信息，投资者乃至监管者事实上都无法指望依靠律师来甄别或排除公司的不当行为。律师提供中介服务是管制的要求，监管者不过是希望通过律师的“法律工作”来“描绘”一个证券市场“法制化”、“规范化”的图景，律师的服务能够使监管者得到解脱，而投资者为监管者这个“化妆”选择付费。在管制的体制下，政府为市场发展提供制度性安排，国家信用为证券市场的发展提供了一利“隐性担保契约”。国家信用是最高的信用，有了国家的信用，就无须中介机构提供的民问信用。用来自国外“中介机构”的模式去理解和塑造中国中介机构，显然是南辕北辙。律师许可制度使有资格的律师垄断了服务资源，消除了竞争对手，成为保护某些律师垄断既得利益的温床。许可制度无法解决律师与投资者之间的利益冲突，监管者也无法挑选出适当的律师。只有竞争和责任约束能够迫使律师谨慎从事，阻止贪婪的律师去接受自己没有能力完成的工作。律师证券许可制度使总是处于利益冲突的中心的律师，又失去了一个通过市场竞争化解利益冲突的机制。 管制使律师能够依赖租金而存活，因此不在意信誉的维护，缺乏自我改善的动因。在缺乏信誉约束机制的条件下，监管者还垄断了处罚权，在对造假者宽大仁慈的同时，法院又阻止投资者通过民事诉讼争取权益。证券法书面的责任制度并没有得到真正执行。一个无法得到执行的制度，就不具有基本的约束力。在信誉和责任两种约束机制都软弱无力的情况下，律师等中介机构协助造假就是个理性的选择。这样的一个制度安排，必然会诱导更多肆无忌惮的律师不计后果地进入市场牟利，但另一方面，法律为预防不同寻常的情况，必然是包含过度和不完备的。法律以及执行的不精确会导致对中介机构阻}l—I’=不足或过度阻吓。律师提供的法律服务隐藏了更多质量的维度，职业服务的水平要求通过解释而不是检查来确定私人价值和社会价值。责任形式是一种成本最高、最不精确的“粗糙”法律执行机制。由于法律不完备以及信息制约，在发达经济中长期有效的法律执法方法，在很长一个时期内，对于中国这个转型经济的国家可能不起作用，执法机构拥有自由裁量权可能往往是扩大而非减少了腐败的范围。 <WP=5> 本文结论是，以“计划”和管制为核心的法律，可能并不能够建立市场秩序。一个国家资本制度的发展，可能不取决于谁拥有最好的国外法律复制品。资本市场应该放松管制，给竞争和创新实验最大的空间。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis discuses, on the basis of general principles as regards to intermediaries in securities market, the role of and controlling mechanism to lawyers who conduct business in the field of securities, the purpose of which is to explore and rethink the conflict between supplant of law and the tradition of control.Playing as "third-party enforcement mechanism" , intermediaries are esigned to fill the gape left behind by the other controlling mechanisms, such as guaranty by issuers’ reputation, warranty by contract and legal liability. The problem of unbalanced sharing of market information may be solved through private credits provided by intermediaries to issuers, which brings mutual trust to issuers and investors. The appearance of intermediaries, as a normal case, is an inherent choice of market which satisfies the demand of saving cost. Nevertheless, conflict lies between intermediaries and investors, the ultimate service consumers. Therefore two different controlling mechanisms, namely the mechanism of reputation and the mechanism of legal liability, should be put on intermediaries.In China, the service provided by lawyers adds little value to securities market, except resulting in the increase of transaction cost. The investors, as well as the regulators, are not able to rely on lawyers to distinguish or dismiss the malpractice of companies. Consequently, the provision of legal service is desired merely by regulators, through which an rtificiallylegalized securities market may be established, and the aim set forth by regulators may be realized while the investors pay the bill. Under this controlling mechanism, it’ s the State credits provides tacit warranty which promotes the development of securities market, private credits by intermediaries is of no need. Therefore, it’ s totally unwise to follow the practice pattern of foreign intermediaries in China.The licensing system of lawyers limits the accessibility to securities market, which protects the interest of a small group. The conflict between lawyers and investor are still left unsolved, and the regulators are unable to pick up most capable lawyers. As a result, competence and liability controlling system should be introduced in order to make lawyers act with due diligence.Under the controlling system, lawyers may make profits in reliance with "rent" , which makes them pay no attention to the maintenance of <WP=7>their reputation. More worse, in the lack of reputation control, regulators exercise sanction power exclusively, and courts refuse investors claim damages through civil litigation. The liability controlling system evidenced by the text of SECURITIES LAW of China has not been carried out in practice. Therefore, the assisting and abetting in misrepresentation by intermediaries, including lawyers, are a logical and wise choice under these circumstances.On the other side, in order to be enforceable for all situations, in particular for unexceptional situation, law is always incomplete. As a result, the quality of legal service should be improved through Interpretation, not verification or sanction. Liability controlling system is a kind of "harsh" enforcement mechanism, with highest cost and most inaccurate effect. The effective enforcing method in developed economy may, within a long period of time, have little effect in transacting economy as China due to incompleteness of law and control of information. Discretion owed by enforcement authority may enlarge, not reduce the width of corruption.In conclusion, the legal system which has plan and control as its core may not be able to establish market economy. The development of capital in one country may not attribute to the best copy of foreign legal system. Capital market should loosen control and provide as wide as possible the room for competence and creation.更多还原