企业并购中政府干预的经济学分析

【作者】 李江；

【导师】 张晖明；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 并购几乎是世界上每一个大公司发展的必由之途。并购在西方已有一百多年的历史，经历了五次大规模的并购浪潮，但中国企业并购只有不到二十年的历史。在经济全球化的背景下，中国如何跨越在企业并购中与发达国家在时间跨度上长达近一个世纪的差异及由此带来的在并购理论、制度、人才等方面的差距是我们面临的严峻挑战。在这个过程中，政府干预可以发挥重要的作用。怎样定位政府干预在企业并购中的地位，规范政府干预在企业并购中的行为，提高政府干预企业并购的效率，提升企业绩效和社会福利，促进经济发展,就成为本文力图阐明的核心。本文将新古典经济学与新制度经济学的理论方法结合起来，以企业并购理论和政府干预理论为基础，结合公共选择理论、信息经济学及产业组织理论的有关成果，以企业并购中的政府干预为研究对象，分析政府在企业并购中的作用，系统地研究了政府干预企业并购的逻辑演进。首先，剖析了政府干预企业并购的各种动因，指出了政府干预的存在基础；其次，分析了政府干预企业并购的各种形式，指出了政府干预的可能选择；第三，论证了政府干预企业并购的绩效和福利后果，指出了政府干预的必然性和局限性。最后研究了被干预的对象—企业的能动反应。同时文中贯穿的另一条逻辑思路是从理论到实践，从“完全竞争市场的理论模型”到“不完全竞争市场的客观现实”，从成熟市场国家的经验到转型期中国发展的现实，在理论演进与历史实证中分析政府干预的异同和特征表现。从而得出结论：即政府对企业并购干预的强弱，本质上与国家的经济发达程度并不呈现负相关关系。无论是发达国家的企业并购，还是发展中国家的企业并购，均不能离开政府的有效干预和引导。所不同的是政府干预的方式、机制、力度在成熟市场与转型市场经济条件下以不同的形式表现出来。具体到转型期的中国，鉴于政府和国有经济的天然联系、转型时期的制度短缺与制度滞后等原因，产生了政府参与企业并购活动的内生性要求，从而在制度环境不完善的情况下实现政府对市场的适当替代。政府的社会经济管理者身份使其尽管是出资者但却无法成为独立的“经济人”，还必须作为“社会人”，除了考虑企业效率外，还必须考虑并购可能对经济、社会、政治和国家安全等方面的影响。国有企业并购的目标具有多重性，既有经济目标，更有社会目标。理论是行为的基础。在论文的理论综述部分，以企业并购理论的演进为主线，回顾了西方学术界有关的企业并购理论，总结了西方发达国家五次并购浪潮的特征及政府在并购中的作用；同时也简要归纳了中国的企业并购理论及政府在并购中的行为特征；其次，论述了政府干预企业并购的两大理论假说，并对其进行了详细评述。动因是行为的出发点。在分析政府干预企业并购的动因时从理论和实证两个层面<WP=7>展开，剖析企业并购发生的动机、特征和制度演进的内在逻辑，分析了成熟市场国家政府干预并购的动因。最后探讨了转型期中国政府干预企业并购的动因，提出代理人效用最大化的理论假说，并予以实证检验。行为分析是论文的核心。在对企业并购中政府干预的具体行为进行分析时，我们首先阐述了政府干预企业并购行为理论的演变与成熟市场国家政府干预企业并购的关系；然后对转型期中国政府在企业并购中的行为及特征进行了探讨，指出政府干预更多的是一种基于权力干预的行政行为，同成熟市场经济国家相比，中国的企业并购更多地具有政府干预的烙印。绩效是行为的标准。关于企业并购中政府干预行为的绩效，文章首先阐述了完全竞争市场条件下企业并购的最优选择——市场化；其次对不完全竞争市场中政府干预行为进行分类，具体探讨了特殊集团利益政府干预和公共福利政府干预对并购效率和社会福利的不同影响；最后分析了转型期的政府行为与企业并购绩效的特殊性。回应是行为的结果。本文最后一章论述转型期中国的企业对政府干预并购的能动回应。由于转型中的国有企业与非国有企业状况不同，因而其行为也有差异，对政府干预的回应也就有所不同。更多还原

【Abstract】 In western countries, there has been one hundred years’ history of Merger and Acquisition (M & A) of firms, while in China, there is only twenty years’ practice. Under the background of economic globalization, how to shorten the gap of firms’ M & A between China and developed countries and to face the challenge of theory and institution construction are the urgent tasks before us. During this process, government intervention may play an important role. Therefore, how to treat government intervention during firms’ M & A, how to regulate government’s behavior and to increase the efficiency and social welfare of government intervention become the focus of this thesis.Combining the methods of new classical economics and new institutional economics, and based on the theories of M & A and government intervention, this thesis focuses on the analysis of the role and logic of government intervention in M & A. We first analyze the reasons why government will intervene M & A of firms. Then we present various types of government interventions. We also discuss the performance and welfare results of government intervention. Firms’ reaction to government intervention is also the content of our analysis.Another logic clue of this thesis is from the complete competing market theory to the reality of incomplete competing market, from the experiences of developed countries to the practices of China’s transition economy. Through comparison, we drew our conclusion that, there is no direct links between the degrees of government intervention and the development level of one country. Whether firms’ M & A takes place in a developed country, or it happens in a developing country, government intervention is a necessary part for the effectiveness of firms’ M & A. The differences lie in the measures, mechanisms and degree of government intervention.So far as China’s transitional economy is concerned, due to the natural links between government and State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs), also with the shortage and lag of institution provision, it is endogenously needed that government take part in the M & A of firms. Since government must work as the administrator of the whole society, thus it cannot behave as a pure investor of the firm. It must also take the social and political aims into consideration as well as economic efficiency aims while intervening into the M & A of firms. So we know that the M & A of SOEs is a multi-task practice, including both economic targets and social targets as well. Theory is the basis of behavior. So in chapter two, we first make an retrospection of the M & A theories of western countries. The characteristics of five M & A waves and government’s roles are discussed. At the same time we give a brief introduction to China’s<WP=9>M & A theories and government’s behavior in M & A. Then two hypotheses are discussed and commented by us. In chapter three, we analyze the reasons why government intervene into firms’ M & A from two angles of theory and practice respectively. The motions, characteristics, and internal logic of firms’ M & A are argued. The motions of government intervention in developed countries are also presented. The last part of this chapter discusses the motion of China’s government intervention. A theoretic hypothesis of agents’ utility maximization is given and tested here.Behavior analysis is the core of this thesis. In chapter four, we discuss in detail the behavior of government intervention in firms’ M & A. First we present the evolution of government intervention theories and the relationship between government intervention and M & A. Then we analyze China’s government intervention behaviors during transition. We point out that in China, government intervention is actually a kind of administrative behavior based on the power of the state. Comparing with developed countries, there is much more impression of government intervention during China firms’ M & A process.Performance is the criterion of measuring behavior. So in chapter five, we first present t更多还原