控制权收益、代理冲突与内部人治理的比较研究——兼论中国转型期公司内部人控制与治理

【作者】 王铮；

【导师】 张晖明；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 詹森和麦克林(1976)将代理理论、产权理论和金融理论的各种要素结合起来，发展了一种有关企业所有权结构的理论，由此引发了公司治理研究的学术热潮。在分散所有权结构下，代理冲突的实质是管理者激励与投资者保护间的权衡取舍。但随着比较研究样本国家的扩大和进程的深入，人们发现现实世界与伯利和米恩斯的描述是不相符合的。LLSV(1999)对27个成熟市场经济国家的所有权结构进行了实证研究，他们发现即使是在规模最大的企业中，完全的两权分离只是一个概念和神化。 所以，从全球范围看，内部人控制所引发的代理冲突不是英美传统意义上公司经理和分散投资者间的利益相争，而是控股股东和中小投资者之间的代理冲突。矛盾的焦点自然就从经理层和分散投资者的冲突转化为大股东与中小投资者间的权衡取舍问题。如何理解不同的代理冲突及其相应的治理模式自然就成为本文选题的目的，笔者力图在一个逻辑一致的框架内对不同代理问题和治理模式的产生和绩效进行比较研究，并把它运用到对转型期中国企业内部人控制和治理的研究中去。遵循这一研究路径： 第一章提出一个概念性的分析框架，并就此指明本文的学术兴趣和希望有所突破的方向。 第二章分析了大股东、董事会、控制权市场和激励报酬四种治理工具的作用机制和治理效果，并且在特定的所有权结构下比较了不同工具间的搭配机制和组合效率，并提出了治理模式的比较优势论。 第三章构建了所有权结构和代理冲突的局部均衡模型。理论推论表明，不同的代理冲突和治理模式都是行为人基于成本收益比较的理性选择。从这个意义上说，内部人控制是一个实证而非规范的范畴。 第四章对中国内部人控制问题的产生和演变进行了深入的考察和分析，得出内部人控制是放权让利改革逻辑产物的结论，并通过国有控股上市公司、经理层收购和家族类控股上市公司的研究指出内部人控制在中国演变和发展的三种模式。 第五章就中国上市公司股权结构和代理冲突进行了实证研究。发现股权集中有利于降低代理成本，但没有证据表明家族类上市公司财务指标的竞争性。在对红利代理成本说的实证检验中发现中国的经验和成熟国家有较明显的差异，即所有权结构和分红水平的正相关性。 第六章在对内部人治理工具比较研究的基础上指出，中国当前的司法环境和所有权结构决定了董事会和控制权市场在内部人治理中的局限性。在一个可预期的阶段，所有权集中还是必要的，同时指出激励合约的作用和实施的局限性，并指出针对不同类型的企业要采取有所区别的激励措施。 本文的潜在创新点大概有以下三方面： 一是建立了一个概念性分析框架，尤其强调了股东价值在内部人治理中的地位和影响，并就利益相关者的治理机制做了初步的研究和分析，这在以往的研究中经常被忽视，或者作为理所当然的出发点。 二是对内部人治理工具进行了较广泛的比较研究，提出了治理的比较优势论，并通过代理冲突的局部均衡模型来加以证实，即任何治理模式都是行为人在局限条件下的一种理性选择。也就是说，内部人控制不是一个贬义概念，而是一个实证范畴。 三是在对中国的实证研究中较早引入了代理成本的计算方法，系统比较了不同治理工具的适应性和相互间的替代互补机制。指出在可预见的阶段内，大股东激励和改善司法环境是中国上市公司内部人治理的可行政策选择。 因为时间、选题和学识所限，本文没有讨论法律制度的选择机理，也就是说为什么不可以移植更具竞争性的司法制度呢？同时在对中国的实证研究中人为缩小了样本的选择数量和空间分布，降低了结论的说服力，这都是笔者在今后研究中需要努力的方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 Jensen and Meckling(1976)combined the various factors of the agency theory, property rights theory and financial theory to a kind of corporate ownership structure theory and intrigued the upsurge of the corporate governance study. Agency conflict is essentially the tradeoff between the manager incentive and investor protect in a dispersed corporate structure. With the increase of the numbers of comparing specimen countries and study depth, the real world was found to be different from Berle and Means’s description. LLSV (1999) made demonstration research on 27 developed market economy countries’ ownership structure and found out the complete separation of proprietorship and control rights was simply a conception and apotheosis even in the largest corporate.Observing with a global view, the agency conflict intrigued by the insider control is not the traditional Anglo-Saxon corporate combat between the managers and dispersed investors but the conflict between the controlling blockholders and middle or small investors, so the focus is transferred from the conflict between the managers and dispersed investors to the tradeoff between the controlling blockholders and middle or small investors. How to understand the different agency conflicts and corresponding governance pattern is naturally this paper’s study goal. This paper attempts to compare the different agency problems and the evolution and performance of different governance patterns in a logically accordant framework, and uses its conclusion to analyze the Chinese corporate insider control and governance problems in the transition period.The first chapter brings up a conceptual analysis framework, and indicates this paper’s learning interests and the expected innovation direction.The second chapter analyzes the operating mechanism and governance effect of the large shareholders, directorate, control rights market and incentive remuneration, compares their arrange mechanism and combination effects under specific ownership structure, and proposes the governance structure comparative advantage theory.The third chapter constructs a partial equilibrium model of ownership structure and agency conflict to make clear that the different agency conflicts and governance patterns are behaviors’ rational selection based on cost-benefits comparison, hi this meaning, insider control belongs not to the normative category, but to the positive category.The forth chapter thoroughly investigates and analyzes the generation and evolution of Chinese insider control problems, and draws a conclusion that the insider control is the logical product of the giving out authority and giving away benefitsinnovation measure. I put forward three Chinese insider control evolution patterns through the study of state-controlled public corporation, MBOs and family-controlled public corporation.The fifth chapter makes a demonstration research on Chinese public companies’ ownership structure and agency conflict, and finds out the concentrated stock structure is propitious to reduce agency costs, but there is no evidence indicating the competition character of family-controlled public companies’ financial data. In the demonstration test of dividend agency cost hypothesis, Chinese corporate ownership structure is not positively related to the dividend level, which is apparently different from the mature countries.The sixth chapter points out on the comparison of the insider governance instruments that the current Chinese judicial environment and ownership structure determine the directorate and control rights market’s limitation on the insider governance. In a predictable stage, it is necessary to maintain the concentrated ownership. There are limitations of the incentive contract’s effect and execution, and different incentive measures must be applied to different kinds of enterprises.There are three potential innovations in this paper:First, I construct a conceptual analysis framework, which especially emphasize the stockholders’ importance in the insider governance更多还原