【作者】 方卫星；

【导师】 黄泽民；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 世界经济， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 本文是一篇立足于现实角度来研究货币政策操作规范问题的论文。1973年布雷顿森林货币金融体系崩溃之后，各国政府当局推行了形式多样的货币政策框架，目的在于增进货币政策的公信力、透明度和中央银行的责任性，努力实现经济资源配置效率和社会福利水平的提高。伴随着此间理论研究和实践探索的不断深入，中央银行的决策者们越来越清楚地认识到，现阶段货币政策主导性的、长期的最终目标是致力于实现价格稳定，为了实现这一目标，货币政策总体上应当遵从某种基于规则而不是完全不受限制的操作规范。 一个引人注目的重要趋势是，大多数国家或地区的中央银行在制定和实施规则型货币政策的过程当中，都采用了设定一个乃至多个明确目标的做法，并且随着时代背景和各种约束条件的变迁，这种设定做法本身还在不断发生着各种颇具意义的变化。有证据表明，目标设定制度与一国货币政策操作的整体绩效密切相关。目前正在被各国中央银行所采用的货币政策目标设定制度，主要有汇率目标设定制度、货币供应量目标设定制度和通货膨胀目标设定制度等三种类型，它们构成了本文的研究对象。 本文的研究内容主要是集中在三大方面：一是在货币政策行为理论的基础上，研究中央银行在货币政策框架当中实行目标设定制度的理论基础；二是分别对前述三类目标设定制度的内在机理进行系统性解析，同时结合相关案例，研究各类目标设定制度的实施效应；三是结合我国近年来的实际情况，研究货币政策的双重目标设定制度。在此基础上，本文最后在规范意义上对一国货币政策操作的基本准则进行简要的归纳总结。全文约25万字，共分为八章，内容安排如下： 第一章为全文的导论，主要是介绍本文的研究缘起，提出货币政策的目标设定制度这一重要研究命题，对西方学术界关于货币政策操作规范的研究文献进行了较为全面的检索述评，并对相关重要概念做出明确的界定和辨析，说明本文的研究意义、研究方法及主要的创新。 第二章立足于政治经济的视角研究货币政策行为的历史演进、内在本质和最终目标，目的是为后续各章内容提供一个背景铺垫。首先通过从实践操作和理论渊源上对货币政策历史起源的简要回顾，阐明货币政策自诞生之时起便开始拥有的“政治经济”属性。接着根据卢卡斯基于理性预期立场对丁伯根模型的批判，还原货币政策的博弈内质，并华东师范大学2003年度博七学位论文货币政策的目标设定制度—机理与效应在新政治经济学的基础上，分析了政治因素对货币政策行为的影响.最后从现行货币制度所具有的内在规定性，以及货币政策有效性的角度，论证了维持价格稳定是现阶段各国货币政策主导性的、长期的最终目标。 第三章研究中央银行的动态不一致性行为、通货膨胀偏好及其治理问题。在探究价格不稳定、尤其是高通货膨胀的根源时，中央银行自身的货币供给行为是首先被考虑到的因素。理论和实证研究表明，在货币政策博弈当中，一国中央银行可能会基于增加就业(或产出)、为预算赤字融资、改善国际收支以及维持金融稳定等动机，实施动态不一致性的货币政策，从而产生通货膨胀偏好。为了有效降低货币政策的动态不一致性和通货膨胀偏好，提高货币政策公信力，关键的环节之一是对中央银行本身的行为实施有针对性的激励约束。激励约束机制主要包括声誉约束机制、委托一代理方法和目标设定制度。其中，目标设定制度是一国政府针对目标变量所做出的公开的事先承诺，目标变量扮演着名义锚的角色，可以锚定私人部门的通货膨胀预期，同时约束中央银行的机会主义行为。第四章研究汇率目标设定制度的机理和效应。汇率变量在不同的国家、可以扮演自由变量、应当拥有较大的刚性，政策工具和名义锚等三种角色。汇率目标设定制度认为不同的时期一国名义汇率甚至是将本币与某种锚币之间的汇率完全固定，从而构成一个明确的目标，这样名义汇率就可以起到锚定私人部门预期和约束政府行为的作用。目前该制度主要有单方面的可调整钉住汇率、集体名义汇率锚和货币局制度等三种形式。汇率目标设定制度能够有效抑制惯性的通货膨胀力量和治理高通货膨胀，但可能会产生内外均衡冲突、丧失货币政策自主权、汇率水平错置、遭受投机攻击乃至货币危机等问题，因而在实行之后必须预先准备一个合适的退出战略。现阶段，对于大多数新兴和转轨经济体，可供选择的汇率目标设定制度的退出方向有:(l)在外汇管制条件下继续实行;(2)钉住一篮子货币;侈)美元化;(&)通过货币合作实现单一货币;伶)让汇率浮动起来。 第五章研究货币供应量目标设定制度的机理和效应。在布雷顿森林体系崩溃后，大多数发达经济体选择了货币供应量目标设定制度。与汇率目标设定制度的显著区别是，货币供应量目标设定制度使一国货币政策操作可以专注于实现内部的经济目标。在一国货币政策框架当中，货币供应量指标既可以扮演操作目标，也可以扮演中介目标，但本质上都是在扮演着货币政策的名义锚。货币数量理论始终坚持强调货币供应量决定物价水平的鲜明观点，它为货币供更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper focuses on the operational norms of monetary policy based on the international experiences. After the breakdown of Bretton woods system in 1973, the countries all over the world have adopted various monetary policy frameworks, which is aimed to enhance the credibility, transparency of monetary policy and the accountability of central banks. With the time going on, policymakers have reached the consensus that price stability is the overriding and long-run ultimate objective of monetary policy, and monetary policy should be operated on rules rather than without any constraints.The fact that many central banks use explicit targets in the monetary policy framework is a kind of conspicuous phenomenon during the last three decades. Some evidence has showed that the targeting regimes were correlated with the performance of monetary policy operations. Currently, the targeting regimes adopted by central banks include exchange rate targeting regimes, monetary targeting regimes and inflation targeting regimes, which are the topics of this paper. The main contents of this paper are as follows:Chapter 1 is the introduction of the whole paper. The research background, research literature and some key words are explained, and the significance, methodology and main innovations of this paper are also introduced.Chapter 2 focuses on the historical evolution, inherent characteristics and ultimate objectives of monetary policy based on the political-economy stance. The simple look-back of monetary policy indicates that the monetary policy is in itself a political economic issue; both economic factors and political factors can affect monetary policy behaviors. Owing to the famous Lucas Critique and the flourish of the game theory in the 1970s, the monetary policy is interpreted as the interactions between central bank and private agents. Furthermore, according to the current monetary regime and the theoretical and empirical researches about the efficiency of monetary policy, price stability is the overriding, long-run ultimate objective of monetary policy.Chapter 3 deals with the dynamic inconsistency problem, inflation bias in the monetary policy operation and its solutions. As the central bank is the source of the money and credit, the behavior of money supply should be examined in the first place when there exists the fluctuations of price level. In the dynamic game process of monetary policy, central bank may launch unanticipated inflation with such different incentives as increasing employment rate or output level, financing the fiscal deficits,improving foreign trade conditions and maintain financial stability. In order to eliminate the inflation bias and enhance the credibility of monetary policy, some kinds of incentive constraint mechanisms, such as reputation mechanism, principal-agent approach and targeting regimes, can be introduced into the monetary policy framework. Targeting regimes represent a kind of precommittment by the central bank, which can anchor the inflation expectations of private agents and restrict the opportunism of the central bank itself.Chapter 4 is dedicated to the mechanisms and effects of exchange rate targeting regime. Exchange rate, in general, can serve as free variable, policy tool and nominal anchor. Exchange rate targeting regime, which includes adjustable pegging, collective nominal anchor and currency board, emphasizes that the domestic currency should be targeted to the anchor currency, through which the credibility of monetary policy can be enhanced. Exchange rate targeting regime have suppressed the inflation inertia and high inflation effectively, but it may encounter such problems as the conflicts between the internal equilibrium and external equilibrium, the losing of monetary policy independence, exchange rate misalignment and fragile to speculative attacks. So, it’s necessary for those governments who adopt the exchange rate targeting regime to take the exit strategies into account.Chapter 5 is dedicated to the mechanisms and effects of monetary targetin更多还原