【作者】 纪纯；

【导师】 王春峰；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2003， 博士

【摘要】 风险投资者和创业者之间的严重信息不对称和风险投资过程中大量的不确定性因素，使他们之间存在许多特殊的利益冲突。风险投资契约是解决这些问题的重要手段。本文首先介绍了风险资本投资全过程的主要活动，建立了风险企业评估的AHP模型，通过一个算例分析了采用层次分析法评估风险企业的具体过程。在成熟的风险资本市场中，风险投资者使用最多的投资形式是可转换证券，主要包括可转换债券和可转换优先股。本文构造了一个可转换债券投资契约信号传递博弈模型。对该模型的研究证明，高水平的创业者会选择一个较高的转换价格，而低水平的创业者会选择一个较低的转换价格，风险投资者可以根据可转换债券的转换价格将不同水平的创业者区别开来。可转换债券的这种甄别功能能够减轻风险资本市场中的逆向选择问题。许多政府都通过对风险投资基金(公司)的补贴(资助)计划来促进本国风险投资业的发展。本文建立了风险投资者与创业者之间的契约关系理论模型，研究了政府补贴政策的影响机制。本文的研究证明政府补贴在提高风险投资者期望收益的同时，也提高了创业者的期望收益，这一政策也使得更多的投资项目值得风险资本去投资。因此，政府补贴增加了创业企业对风险资本的需求，能够促进风险投资业的发展。为了实现财富最大化，风险投资者需要给予风险企业的高级管理人员和核心技术人员必要的薪酬激励。本文建立一个理论模型，研究存在经理人员机会成本和风险企业的替换成本时，风险投资者如何确定最优的报酬——业绩敏感系数。在多阶段注资契约关系中，创业者和风险投资者都需要建立自己的信誉。创业者的信誉可以使他们更容易与风险投资者达成契约协议；而风险投资者的信誉可以使他们更容易地帮助创业者找到新的投资者。更多还原

【Abstract】 There are a lot of special conflicts of interest between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs because of that the uncertainties in venture capital investing are so many and the asymmetries of information are so great between them. Venture capital contracts are important means to resolve these problems.In this paper, the main activities in venture capital investing are introduced and an AHP model to evaluate venture enterprises is built. A numeration example is given to analyze the detail process to evaluate venture enterprises by an AHP model.Convertible securities, including convertible debts and convertible preferred stocks, are the most familiar investing instruments in developed venture capital markets. A signaling game model of convertible debts contracts is built in this paper. The study on this model proves that an entrepreneur with high quality will select a higher conversion price than an entrepreneur with low quality. Therefore venture capitalists can filter out high quality entrepreneurs from low quality ones by conversion price. The screening function of convertible debt could mitigate the adverse selection problems in venture capital markets. In order to promote the development of venture capital, governments of many countries carried out subsidy (finance) plans to venture capital funds (companies). In this paper, the contractual relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs is modeled to investigate the influence mechanism of government subsidies on venture Capital. The study proves that government subsidies increase entrepreneur’s expected pay-offs while increasing venture capitalist’s expected pay-offs and more start-up enterprises are worth investing under subsidies. Therefore we come to the conclusion that government subsidies could increase the demand for venture capital and promote the development of venture capital.The venture capitalists should give necessary payment incentives to high-class managers and key technicians of venture enterprises to maximize their wealth. A theoretical model is built to study the issue that how venture capitalists determine an optimum pay—performance sensitivity when there is replace cost for venture enterprises and opportunity cost for managers.Both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists should establish their reputation in stage finance contracts. The reputation of entrepreneurs can<WP=5>make it easier to contract with venture capitalists and the reputation of venture capitalists can make it easier to find new investors.更多还原